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Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, and Information 
Leakage: an Empirical Analysis of the Chinese Stock Market 
By  
HUI ZHANG 
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effect of corporate governance 
on firm performance and information leakage in the Chinese securities market. 
As one of the major emerging markets in the world, the results of this thesis are 
valuable not only to the Chinese market, but also to other emerging markets.  
To achieve this purpose, data is collected from most of the non-financial 
listed companies in the two Chinese stock exchanges, which are the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock exchange. The data sample covers 
the period from 2004 to 2008, since there was a series of new reforms in the 
Chinese stock market at that time. These reforms include new legislation and 
the reduction of non-tradable shares. Then this thesis employs the panel 
technique and the pooled OLS to estimate the effect of corporate governance 
on firm performance and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. 
Firstly the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in Chinese companies is empirically evaluated. The empirical 
results of this thesis find that the ownership structure of Chinese companies will 
affect their firm performance. In this thesis, proxies of ownership structure 
include the proportion of institutional ownership, the proportion of the state 
ownership, the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder, and the 
proportion of tradable shares in Chinese companies. A greater proportion of 
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institutional ownership has positive effects on firm performance in Chinese 
companies. Board subcommittees also help Chinese companies to increase 
firm performance. The market reforms of 2006 also help Chinese companies to 
increase their firm performance.  However, the board of directors and board of 
supervisors do not affect firm performance in Chinese companies. 
Secondly, information leakage in the Chinese Stock Market is empirically 
assessed. If investors receive corporate material information before the public 
disclosure, this phenomenon is known as information leakage. The thesis finds 
that information leakage in the Chinese market is widespread. 
Finally, the thesis empirically examines the effects of corporate 
governance on information leakage in Chinese companies. Board 
subcommittees have negative effects on information leakage in Chinese 
companies. Other variables of corporate governance do not affect information 
leakage in Chinese companies. Additionally, the thesis finds that market reform 
promotes more information leakage in Chinese market.  
On the basis of the empirical results, the thesis provides the following 
recommendations. First, the Chinese Stock Market needs to reform the relevant 
legislation.  Second, Chinese companies need to reform their ownership 
structure. These suggestions may strengthen the internal governance of 
Chinese listed companies, thereby, increasing firm performance and decrease 
information leakage. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
The series of financial scandals, which occurred at the beginning of the 
21st century, have seriously harmed investor confidence in the financial 
markets. Since then, research in finance has focused on various ways to foster 
prudent governance in organisations.  
Thirty years ago, the Chinese market began to replace a planning- 
oriented economic regime with a market-oriented one. During this process, the 
stock exchanges were created and the Chinese market began to introduce the 
corporate governance mechanism. Corporatization of the State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) began in 1992, followed by the introduction of a corporate 
governance mechanism through the Company Law of the People‟s Republic of 
China and the Securities Law of the People‟s Republic of China in 1994. The 
process was accelerated when China joined WTO in 2000 and opened its 
domestic market to international investors. At the beginning of 2006, the 
Chinese listed companies began to increase the proportion of tradable shares. 
At the same time, new Company Law of the P.R. China and new Securities Law 
of P.R. China were introduced to improve the corporate governance of the 
Chinese listed companies. However, the Chinese securities market and the 
corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies are not yet as 
sophisticated as those in the developed markets, such as the UK, and the U.S. 
Therefore, there are several lessons that China can learn from the developed 
markets.  
Most of the contemporary listed companies have numerous shareholders. 
However, most of these shareholders are excluded from corporate decision 
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making. Thus, shareholders of companies need an agent to control companies. 
However, the interest of an agent may not be consistent with that of 
shareholders. Conflicts of interest among corporate participants lead to the 
agency cost in companies. Agency cost is the cost arising from conflicts of 
interest among corporate participants. Conflicts of interest also create 
asymmetric information in the market, since most shareholders do not control 
companies. Under this circumstance, shareholders lack opportunities to 
oversee insiders. This motivates insiders to expropriate the interests of 
shareholders, and the cost of such expropriation is also a kind of agency cost. 
Therefore, companies need corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the 
agency cost in companies, thereby increasing firm performance and protecting 
the interests of shareholders. 
Mr. Jinglian Wu, the pre-eminent Chinese economist, has said that 
Chinese stock market looks like a disordered game of gambling (Zhang, 2005). 
Fraudulent activities are a serious problem in this market (Kang et al., 2008), 
and investors have to bear the costs of these. One such activity is insider 
trading, when investors use inside information or material information to trade 
stocks in the market. The majority of Chinese investors believe that insider 
trading is not only extensive, but also ingrained in the Chinese market(Huang, 
2007; Kang et al., 2008). Chinese research suggests that weak public 
regulation and low corporate transparency are the main reasons for insider 
trading activities in the Chinese market (Wang et al., 2003; Lu and Ge, 2004; 
Wu, 2004; Chen, 2007). By the end of 2004 only 11 cases of insider trading had 
been reported to the regulator, and there were only 2 criminal prosecutions for 
insider trading in the Chinese market (Huang, 2007). As the market becomes 
more developed, the Chinese Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), the 
3 
 
market‟s regulatory authority,  has begun to pay more attention to this problem 
(Liu et al., 2010). Although the CSRC has promised strict enforcement of the 
regulations, Chinese investors still doubt the effectiveness of the CSRC.  
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) show that prices move prior to a corporate 
announcement; this suggests that some market investors know the content of 
inside information in advance. This phenomenon may entail illegal insider 
trading activities, since use of inside information prior to a public announcement 
breaks insider trading regulation. The separation of control and ownership leads 
to the control of corporate information being held by executives of companies 
(Lakhal, 2008). Executives‟ managerial discretion enables them to choose the 
content and time of corporate disclosure under the regulatory rules of securities 
markets. Additionally, the regulatory rules also restrict the extent to which 
executives can benefit from their information advantages. In this case, 
corporate executives may leak information to certain types of corporate 
participants who have good relationship with executives (Mac, 2002). 
Information leakage widens the information gap between the participants who 
receive the information and other participants who don't receive it, and it may 
exacerbate the conflicts of interest between executives and those uninformed 
participants. Serious information leakage means that there is serious 
asymmetric information among participants in companies. Thus, an increase in 
corporate transparency will reduce the information leakage from companies. 
Previous studies of the Chinese securities market focus on information leakage 
prior to an announcement and then suggest that this may encourage insider 
trading activities (Tuan et al., 1995; Shi and Jiang, 2003; Yan and Zhao, 2006). 
However, they pay less attention to the idea of increasing corporate 
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transparency in order to decrease information asymmetry and reduce 
information leakage.  
In 2006, the Chinese Stock Market started a new round of corporate 
governance reform. Thus, it is valuable to evaluate effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance and information leakage in the new market 
environment.  
1.1. Aim and objectives 
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the effects of the current 
corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies on information 
leakage prior to earnings announcements and on firm performance. 
China has introduced various corporate governance mechanisms in the 
past few decades, which aim to align the interests of the managers with the 
interests of the shareholders. Such alignment is expected to improve company 
performance. In addition, corporate governance mechanisms are expected to 
reduce information asymmetry between companies and shareholders and 
consequently lower the phenomenon of information leakage.  
The objectives of the thesis are as follows. 
(1) To empirically evaluate the effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance in Chinese companies. 
(2) To empirically test the extent of information leakage in Chinese 
securities market. 
(3) To empirically examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and information leakage in Chinese companies. 
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(4) To empirically evaluate the effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance and information leakage in Chinese companies, and to 
provide recommendations.  
1.2. Summaries of empirical findings and 
suggestions 
This thesis finds that state ownership does not impair the performance of 
Chinese listed companies. Additionally, the ownership structure does not affect 
firm performance in Chinese listed companies. An increase in institutional 
investors helps listed companies to achieve better company performance in the 
Chinese market. Subcommittees of the boards of directors have positive effects 
on the performance of Chinese listed companies. Characteristics of the board of 
directors do not affect the performance of Chinese listed companies. Although 
there is a negative relationship between the proportion of tradable shares and 
company performance, this does not mean that the policy of elimination of non-
tradable shares should be abandoned. Generally speaking, firm performance of 
Chinese listed companies in the post-reform period is better than that in the pre-
reform period. To some extent, this result means that the market reforms are 
achieving their original goal.  
The research undertaken for this thesis finds that the ownership structure 
of Chinese listed companies has significant effects on the improvement of 
company performance. Although Chinese listed companies are experiencing 
reform, large shareholders, especially majority or holding shareholders, still 
have substantial influence on the listed companies; they have the ability to 
influence the management of companies in their own interests. For instance, 
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large shareholders influence the composition of boards of directors in the 
Chinese listed companies(Kang et al., 2008; Wei and Geng, 2008).  
Information leakage in the Chinese securities market is significant. Figures 
of run-up index show that information about an announcement may be leaked 
prior to the announcement, and it may be incorporated into the stock price. The 
normalized abnormal volume (NAV), which is the proxy of trading volume, 
shows that there is an increase in the trading volume before the announcement. 
These results suggest that the information might be leaked to the market before 
the announcement day, and there might be insider trading in the Chinese 
market.  
Company size does not affect information leakage in the Chinese market. 
The proportion of tradable shares also does not affect information leakage. The 
purpose of reducing non-tradable shares is to increase the liquidity of Chinese 
listed companies, thereby promoting the development of corporate governance 
to reduce information asymmetry between companies and shareholders. 
However, the „free-rider‟ problem, which is the weakness caused by widespread 
ownership, reduces corporate transparency. Thus, this causes the proportion of 
tradable shares to have insignificant effect on information leakage. State 
ownership is found to have no significant effect on information leakage. There is 
no significant relationship between the ownership concentration and information 
leakage. In general, the proportion of institutional ownership does not affect 
information leakage. Neither the characteristics of boards of directors (e.g. 
board independence, board size, and leadership structure) nor the 
characteristics of boards of supervisors (board size) of Chinese listed 
companies are found to affect information leakage. Board subcommittees have 
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negative effects on information leakage. This means that board subcommittees 
will reduce the information leakage in Chinese listed companies. Finally, this 
thesis finds that there is more serious information leakage in the Chinese 
market after the market reforms. The market reforms increased market liquidity 
However, the increase in market liquidity increases the profitability of illegal 
activities, thereby stimulating more information leakage.  
On the basis of the empirical results, the recommendations of this thesis 
include: 
 The current ownership reform policy should be continued, since 
institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm performance in 
Chinese listed companies. Thus, Chinese listed companies should 
increase the proportion of institutional ownership in the ownership 
structure. 
 The legislation of the Chinese market should encourage 
independent directors to actively join the process of corporate 
decision making. Additionally, the proportion of independent 
directors should be increased. The boards of supervisors and of 
independent directors should be integrated as one institution to 
increase the quality of internal supervision of Chinese listed 
companies. Finally, legislation should encourage institutional 
investors to actively join the management of the Chinese listed 
companies. 
 The CSRC, which is the regulatory agency of the Chinese market, 
should undertake more duties to increase the quality and skill of the 
Chinese investors. 
8 
 
1.3. Contributions 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange of China is now the sixth largest in the 
world, after London, with a total domestic market capitalisation of $2.704 trillion 
(www.world-exchanges.org, 2010). Hence the findings of this thesis will be 
valuable to domestic as well as to international market participants, regulators, 
other emerging markets and the developed markets. 
This thesis will contribute to literature in the following ways.  
1) Through the collection of recent market data, this thesis analyses 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms of 
Chinese listed companies and their performance. Empirical results 
indicate that an optimal ownership structure will help Chinese listed 
companies to increase their performance. Additionally, the recent 
market reforms also contribute to the improvement of firm 
performance in Chinese market   
2) This thesis provides empirical evidence that information leakage is 
still serious in the Chinese securities market. 
3) This thesis empirically evaluates the effect of corporate governance 
mechanism in Chinese listed companies on information leakage in 
Chinese market. Chinese listed companies should strengthen the 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate 
transparency thereby decreasing information leakage in Chinese 
market. 
4) The thesis provides empirical evidence of the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance and information leakage in 
Chinese companies. According to this evidence, the thesis provides 
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recommendations to Chinese companies to improve performance of 
corporate governance. 
1.4. Thesis structure 
 The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the corporate governance 
mechanism in Chinese market, thus the institutional background is introduced in 
Chapter 2. Firstly, this chapter briefly introduces the history of economic 
development in the Chinese Stock Market. Secondly, this chapter summarises 
the current practices of corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese listed 
companies. Thirdly, this chapter reviews the current developments of corporate 
governance mechanism in Chinese listed companies. Finally, chapter 2 briefly 
discusses the cultural background of Chinese society. 
The relevant literature is reviewed and discussed in Chapter 3. This 
chapter briefly reviews the relevant theories about corporate governance to 
develop the theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter also reviews the 
previous studies into the relationship between corporate governance and the 
performance of companies, and the relationship between corporate governance 
and corporate transparency. Previous studies reveal that a good corporate 
governance mechanism will help companies to increase their performance and 
reduce the information asymmetry between companies and their shareholders. 
The research method of this thesis is discussed in Chapter 4. Firstly, 
Chapter 4 briefly introduces the research philosophy and research method 
employed. After that this chapter develops the hypotheses of the thesis, which 
are based on the discussions within chapter 2 and chapter 3. Thirdly, this 
chapter introduces event study and the research model of the thesis. Finally, 
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chapter 4 discusses the data collection and provides descriptive statistics of the 
sample.  
The empirical results about the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanism and the performance of Chinese listed companies are 
presented and discussed in Chapter 5. In this chapter, the effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the performance of Chinese listed companies are 
listed in detail. After that this chapter discusses and interprets these empirical 
results to find out how the corporate governance mechanism affects 
performance of Chinese listed companies.  
The results concerning information leakage are listed and discussed in 
Chapter 6. Firstly, this chapter reports and discusses the results of event study 
to reflect the phenomenon of information leakage in the Chinese securities 
market. Secondly, this chapter discusses two reported insider trading cases and 
one suspected case of insider trading that happened recently.  
The relationship between corporate governance and information leakage 
is reported and discussed in Chapter 7. Firstly, this chapter shows the empirical 
results about the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism 
and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. Secondly, this chapter 
discusses and interprets the empirical results to find out how the corporate 
governance mechanism affects information leakage in Chinese listed 
companies.  
The thesis is concluded in Chapter 8. Firstly, this chapter provides 
suggestions for improving the quality of corporate governance mechanism in 
Chinese companies. Secondly, this chapter summarises the empirical findings 
of the thesis. Finally, this chapter provide future research directions. 
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Chapter 2. Institutional 
framework  
2.1. Introduction 
Because of its special development history and political regime, the 
Chinese securities market and Chinese listed companies have some unique 
features. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the institutional background 
of the Chinese securities market and the corporate governance mechanism of 
Chinese companies.  
Firstly, this chapter will briefly introduce the history of Chinese economic 
development. Features of the corporate governance of Chinese listed 
companies are the result of its special economic development. Thus, it is 
necessary to understand that development. 
Secondly, this chapter will introduce the features of the corporate 
governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies. This will describe the 
current practice of corporate governance. It also catalogues the criticisms of the 
corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies.  Additionally, 
this chapter will introduce the recent changes in the corporate governance of 
the Chinese listed companies. 
Finally, this chapter will briefly introduce the cultural background of 
Chinese society. Because of the specific cultural influence, the experience of 
other advanced markets cannot be used directly as a model for the 
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development of the Chinese market. Thus, it is important to recognize the 
cultural background of the Chinese market. 
2.2. History of Chinese economic 
development 
2.2.1. 1949-1978  
From 1949-1978, the dominant economic regime of China was a 
bureaucratic planning oriented or central planning oriented economic regime, 
which was introduced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the Soviet 
Union. During this period, the only business entities in the Chinese market were 
the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Under the central planning oriented 
economic regime, ‟the corporate governance of the state owned enterprise in 
China is typically government-oriented‟ (Li, 2006:108). During this period the 
government firmly controlled all aspects of the SOEs (Tian and Estrin, 2005). 
Under this circumstance, the corporate governance mechanism of the Chinese 
companies was simple, since the government simultaneously served as the 
managers and owners (Xu et al., 2005). For instance, members of the 
managerial team were nominated by the government and the quantity of output 
was determined by the government.   Additionally, before economic reform, the 
Chinese market lacked a sophisticated social security system. Thus, the SOEs 
have to serve as providers of social security in China (Xu et al., 2005).  
Overall, under the planning oriented economic regime, the Chinese SOEs 
lacked managerial discretion and they had to take into account other non-
commercial business.    
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2.2.2. 1978-1992 
After 1978, the new Chinese leaders decided to abandon the planning 
oriented economic regime to promote the future development of Chinese 
companies.  Under the planning oriented economic regime, the SOEs did not 
have managerial discretion and the non-business duties dispersed their 
managerial focus. As a consequence of this, the SOEs could not achieve good 
company performance. Thus, the government wanted to reform the situation, 
while retaining  minimum control of these SOEs (Tian and Estrin, 2005). Su 
(2005) classified the features of the economic reform: 1) decentralization, 2) 
commercialization, and 3) partial separation of ownership and control.  
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese government gave more 
managerial discretion to the SOEs (Zhang et al., 2005). Additionally, SOEs 
were authorized to allocate the residual value (Su, 2005). These reforms 
promoted SOEs to make market oriented decisions and provide financial 
incentives to staff.    
From the second half of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese 
economic reform could be characterised by the introduction of the Management 
Responsibility Contract System (MRCS) or Performance Contract (PC) (Zhang, 
2004; Zhang, 2006). MRCS created a criterion to evaluate the performance of 
executives, and thus motivate them to increase firm performance and their 
private wealth. 
However, Su (2005:120) says that ‟the contractual relationship between 
managers and the government was asymmetric and incomplete‟. First of all, as 
the owner of SOEs, the state still had substantial influence on them. 
Additionally, the government had no intention of closing the poorly performing 
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SOEs. As a result of this, the output of the SOEs could not match the resource 
input (Su, 2005; Zhang, 2004). MRCS lacked the motivation to promote the 
development of sophisticated Chinese entrepreneurs (Su, 2005). Additionally, 
Chinese SOEs still had to act as the providers of social security, rather than be 
a purely business entity (Su, 2005).  
Compared with the period of 1949-1978, the SOEs had more discretion to 
determine managerial decisions. However,  pre-1992 economic reform was 
driven by the willingness of the government, since it remained a substantial 
influence on economic development (Clarke, 2003). Zhang (2006) reports that 
only one-third of the Chinese SOEs generated a net profit and one-third of the 
Chinese SOEs generated a net loss. Therefore, China needed a new wave of 
economic reform.  
2.2.3. After 1992 
The year 1992 is a milestone in Chinese economic development when the 
Chinese government decided to replace the planning oriented economic regime 
with the market oriented economic regime. In 1992, the CCP held its 14th 
Representative General Meeting. One purpose of this meeting was to decide 
the economic policy for the next decade in China. Leaders of the CCP decided 
to introduce a market oriented economic mechanism to accelerate Chinese 
economic development (Zhang, 2004). The new economic mechanism can be 
characterized by a unified market, a new regulatory system, and the 
introduction of new laws. Additionally, the government wished to reduce the 
inappropriate political influence of the state, and increase the effect of market 
mechanism on economic development (Zhang, 2004). The government pushed 
the old SOEs to become modern corporations. Zhang (2004) has classified the 
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process of corporatization into two periods, which are the period of 1992 to 
1997 and the period of post-1997.  
From 1992 to 1997, the government selected some SOEs to comprise an 
experimental sample to test the effect of corporatization on economic 
development. At the same time, it was trying to complete the building of a 
capital market for China, e.g. two stock exchanges (Shang Hai Stock Exchange 
and Shen Zhen Stock Exchange) were created at the beginning of 1990s. 
Additionally, the government mitigated the restriction of development of non-
state owned business entities. Before 1992, non-state business entities were 
not legal economic entities in the market, since the national macroeconomic 
policy still restricted their development. After 1992, the government amended its 
economic policy to encourage the development of non-state business entities. 
At the same time, the government allowed some SOEs to become private 
companies. Some of the small SOEs and SOEs which performed very poorly, 
were sold to private investors to reduce the burden on the government‟s budget 
(Su, 2005).  
The Chinese government named the process of introducing the market 
oriented economic regime as the procedure to create a Modern Enterprise 
System (MES) or Corporate Shareholding System (CSS) (Su, 2005). Through 
initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), external 
investors were introduced to the Chinese SOEs (Su, 2005). In those 
corporatized SOEs, the state is the largest shareholder and holds the majority 
of shares; these shares cannot be exchanged in the market. To manage these 
state assets, the Chinese government created a new department, which is 
called the State Asset Management Bureau or the State Asset Management 
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Council (SAMB or SAMC), to serve as the majority (holding) shareholder in 
those corporatized SOEs (Su, 2005). In these experimental companies, a board 
of directors was created to represent the interests of corporate shareholders - 
the board‟s task was to make managerial decisions and monitor the managerial 
activities of executives. Additionally, the Chinese government changed its 
economic policy to allow bankruptcy, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). At 
the same time, the Chinese government established a social security system to 
reduce the non-business duties of Chinese companies. These activities were 
intended to motivate Chinese companies to become pure business entities. 
Tian and Estrin (2005) find that the company performance of those 
experimental SOEs was significantly better than that of the non-experimental 
SOEs.  
Thus, after the 15th Representative General Meeting of the CCP in 1997, 
the Chinese government accelerated the process of corporatization. The 
government pushed the majority of the SOEs to join the process of 
corporatization. The CCP also promulgated a series of internal policies to 
restrict the political influence of the Party Secretary in the SOEs (Tian and 
Estrin, 2005). In the managerial hierarchy of the SOEs, the Party Secretary 
works as a representative of the CCP to monitor their operation. Thus, these 
people have always had a substantial political influence on Chinese SOEs; for 
instance, they have the power to approve and reject any managerial decisions 
of SOEs. These new policies are intended to constrain the inappropriate 
influence of the Secretaries on management. China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) after 2000. This event further motivated the 
Chinese government to amend and abandon several laws that contradicted the 
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principles of the WTO, and thus facilitated the development of a market oriented 
economic mechanism in China.  
2.3. Corporate governance mechanism in 
Chinese listed companies 
2.3.1. Board of directors and board of 
supervisors 
The Chinese congress (The National People‟s Congress) promulgated the 
Company Law of the P.R.C. (CCL) in 1994 to standardise the corporate 
structure and legal liability of each participant. Promulgation of the CCL 1994 
represented a signal that the Chinese government was attempting to replace 
the planning oriented economic regime (Li, 2006). Under the requirements of 
the CCL 1994, power of control is distributed between four internal bodies, 1) 
general meeting of shareholders, 2) board of directors, 3) board of supervisors, 
and 4) corporate executives. However, the effect of the legislation is impaired 
by the fact that the general meeting of shareholders is nominal; the managerial 
team has too much power, and the board of directors and board of supervisors 
too little (Li, 2006).  
The CCL 1994 stipulated that a board of directors should monitor the 
corporate executives, thereby maximising the interests of the shareholders. 
Thus, the board of directors would represent the majority of shareholders in 
monitoring the listed companies. However, Tian and Estrin (2005), Allen et al. 
(2005), and Allen et al.(2007) state that the members of the boards in Chinese 
listed companies represent the interests of the majority (holding) shareholders, 
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since the nomination process is affected by them. The economic history of 
Chinese market causes the state to be the holding shareholder of the majority 
of Chinese listed companies. Therefore, the Chinese listed companies lacked 
directors who could represent the interest of other shareholders (Tian and 
Estrin, 2005). Besides the board of directors, another important pillar of the 
internal governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies is the board of 
supervisors. The CCL 1994 stipulated that the board of supervisors represent 
other stakeholders by taking part in the process of corporate decision making 
and of monitoring the companies (Wang, 2005).  
CCL 1994 defined the power and duties of the two boards. According to 
the CCL 1994, the power and duties of the board of directors includes: 
 to approve major related party transactions;  
 to propose to the board of directors the appointment or removal of 
the accounting firm;  
 to propose to the board of directors the calling of an interim 
shareholder‟s meeting;  
 to propose calling a meeting of the board of directors;  
 to appoint an outside auditing or consulting organization 
independently; and  
 to choose to solicit the proxies before the convening of the 
shareholders‟ meeting (Wang, 2005:144).  
According to the CCL 1994, power and duties of supervisory board 
includes:  
 to check up on the financial affairs of the company;  
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 to supervise acts of directors and managers to ensure that they do 
not violate laws, regulations or the company‟s articles of 
association;  
 to request remedies from directors or managers where their acts 
have harmed the company;  
 to propose the convening of interim meetings of the board of 
directors; and  
 to take other powers as provided by the articles of association 
(Wang, 2005:144). 
In a board of directors of Chinese listed companies, the executive 
directors are the members who undertake the executive duty. Thus, CEO and 
other senior managers will serve as executive directors on the board of a 
Chinese listed company(Wei, 2000). However, there was no mention of 
independent directors in CCL 1994.  
Figure 2.1 structure of board of directors and board of 
supervisors 
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2.3.2. Ownership structure  
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Generally, Chinese listed companies offer three types of shares, which are 
A-shares, B-shares, and H-shares, to different investors. A-shares and B-
shares are offered and exchanged in the Chinese domestic stock exchanges, 
but H-shares are offered and exchanged in the Hong Kong market (Chiou and 
Lin, 2005). A-shares are denominated in Renminbi (RMB); B-shares are 
denominated in US Dollars (USD); and H-shares are traded in Hong Kong 
Dollars (HKD).  The majority of shares that are issued by Chinese listed 
companies are A-shares. The Chinese Securities Regulation Commission 
(CSRC), which is the Chinese market watchdog, requires that the minimum 
percentage of A-shares is 25% of the total shares (Berkman et al., 2009). A-
shares are divided into two categories: tradable shares and non-tradable 
shares. Chiou and Lin (2005) point out that the proportion of non-tradable 
shares is much higher than that of tradable shares.  
Shareholders of non-tradable shares of the Chinese listed companies can 
be divided into two groups: 1) the state shareholders and 2) the legal person 
shareholders (Berkman et al., 2009).  The State shareholders include central 
and local government, and other large SOEs. Legal person shareholders are 
the domestic corporations and non-individual investors (Berkman et al., 2010). 
‟Hence this category includes shares held by the government through legal-
person entities, as well as shares held by private entities, both domestic and 
foreign‟ (Berkman et al., 2010:8).Chen et al. (2009:173) also state that the ‟legal 
person shares can be owned by a number of heterogeneous entities, ranging 
from solely state owned enterprises to private firms‟.  
Shareholders of the tradable shares include: individual investors, 
institutional investors, foreign investors, and the state. These shareholders can 
directly purchase tradable shares in the two domestic exchanges. After 2001, all 
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investors are allowed to trade A-shares and B-shares in the two domestic stock 
exchanges, and these investors include domestic investors, foreign investors, 
qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) and qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) (Allen et al., 2007).  
In western companies, the compensation package of executives and 
directors includes shares and stock options. In the Chinese market, however, 
companies are less inclined to give managerial ownership to employees (Firth 
et al., 2007). Firth et al.(2007) find that the lack of executive stock options is the 
reason for the low proportion of managerial ownership in Chinese listed 
companies.  
2.3.3. External regulation of the Chinese stock 
market 
Besides the internal corporate governance mechanism, investor protection 
also depends on external regulation mechanisms. External regulation 
strengthens the internal governance mechanism, since it is mandatory. 
Berkman et al.(2009) point out that the efficiency of the external regulation of 
the Chinese market is weaker than that of its overseas peers.  
Before 1998, Chinese financial market was regulated by various of 
government departments (Tan, 1999). These departments included the 
People‟s Bank of China, which is the central bank of China, the State Council 
Securities Commission (SCSC) and its executive organ, the China Securities 
Regulation Commissions (CSRC), the Ministry of Treasury, and the State 
Development Planning Commission This regulation system reduced the 
performance of market regulation, since there was no specialized market 
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regulatory agency. In 1998, the Chinese government reformed the regulatory 
system of the Chinese securities market with the integration of SCSC and 
CSRC. After that, CSRC became the primary regulatory agency of the Chinese 
securities market(Liebman and Milhaupt, 2007; Shen, 2008).  
However, the practical performance of the Chinese market regulatory 
agency does not reach the expectation of investors (Shen, 2008). Shen (2008) 
studied the reasons for low regulatory performance of CSRC. The primary 
reason for the poor performance of CSRC is its dual role: CSRC has to deal with 
the conflict between the market mechanism and the government. Thus, the dual 
role of CSRC restricts its regulatory effectiveness. Secondly, CSRC needs more 
power to regulate insider trading activities in the Chinese market. Currently, the 
CSRC is empowered to freeze the relevant transaction record, communication 
record and the bank account, to facilitate an insider trading investigation.  
However, CSRC still lacks the power to prosecute via civil litigation or the power 
to subpoena suspects. Thirdly, CSRC needs more resources to support 
investigations and enforcement activities.  
In the Chinese market, the People‟s Prosecutors are empowered to 
prosecute criminal litigation against market fraud activities (Shen, 2008). 
However, the People‟s Prosecutors lack experience, knowledge, and the 
experience of investigating of financial market fraud activities (Shen, 2008). 
Therefore, the CSRC is not supported by other legal institutions. 
After 2000, China became a member of WTO. As a response to this event, 
the Chinese congress and the Chinese government amended or abandoned a 
series of inappropriate laws and codes.  
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The first new regulation substantially increased the right of minority 
shareholders at a firm‟s Annual Shareholders‟ Meeting and reduced the voting 
rights of parties involved in related party trading; the second prohibited the 
issuance of loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling shareholder; and the 
third improved the transparency and regulation of asset transfer to related 
parties (Berkman et al., 2009:2). 
However, market participants, especially the small shareholders, believed 
that these new regulatory activities would be selectively enforced and favour the 
state owned listed companies (Berkman et al., 2009). Because of the influence 
of the state, the watchdog of the Chinese market cannot effectively enforce the 
law, since the market regulatory agency is a department of the state itself. This 
phenomenon becomes more serious if state owned listed companies are 
involved in a case of market fraud (Allen et al., 2007).   
The Chinese judicial system is another reason that reduces the efficiency 
of the legislation because it is deeply influenced by political factors. Additionally, 
„the Chinese court system has a long tradition of protecting State interests and 
has very little experience of private plaintiff-driven litigation‟ (Berkman et al., 
2009:9). Thus, the Chinese judicial system reduces the effect of new legislation 
intended to protect the small shareholder (Allen et al., 2007). Help from lawyers 
in private litigation is also poor in China (Allen et al., 2007). „Lawyers represent 
only 10-25% of all clients in civil litigation and business cases, and even in 
criminal prosecutions, lawyers represent  only half  the cases‟ (Allen et al., 
2007:31). The unsophisticated legal system means that small investors cannot 
get effective protection from the external market litigations. 
2.3.4. Chinese stock exchanges 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the Chinese government established stock 
markets in Shang Hai and Shen Zhen - the Shang Hai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
and the Shen Zhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Companies listed in the SHSE 
tend to be larger, more prominent in their industry sector, and closer to the 
government (Liebman and Milhaupt. 2007).  
The primary function of the Chinese stock exchanges is to allow the listed 
SOEs issue stocks to raise funds from the capital market (Zhang, 2004; Tang et 
al., 2006). In the two stock exchanges, listed SOEs and other listed companies 
can raise extra financial resources through initial public offering (IPO) and other 
activities (Zhang, 2004). The majority of listed companies in the two stock 
exchanges are state owned listed companies. IPO of listed companies and 
issuance of new shares have to be permitted by CSRC, and a large volume 
share transaction has to be approved by the CSRC (Kato and Long, 2006). 
Neither of these two stock exchanges are independent from the 
government; thus both of them are deeply influenced by state preferences 
(Clarke, 2006; Liebman and Milhaupt, 2007). Under these circumstances, stock 
exchanges cannot become self-regulating authorities to monitor the activities of 
the state owned listed companies (Clarke, 2006; Liebman and Milhaupt, 2007). 
In the British and the US markets, the stock exchange serves as an 
independent self-regulatory agent to protect the rights of small investors; 
however, the Chinese stock exchanges fail to provide protection to small 
investors (Liebman and Milhaupt, 2007). Although Chinese Securities Law was 
amended to provide self-regulatory power to two stock exchanges, these self-
regulatory powers are still influenced by the public regulatory agency (Liebman 
and Milhaupt, 2007).  
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2.4. Criticisms of corporate governance 
and recent reforms 
Figure 2.2 criticisms of corporate governance of Chinese listed 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China is trying to adopt the practices of corporate governance learnt from 
the experiences of western companies. However, current corporate governance 
practices of Chinese listed companies, which were adopted from the western 
markets, are not working well (Tam, 2000). The first criticism of Chinese listed 
companies is the low corporate management transparency. Qu and Leung 
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corporations is lower than their expectation. Chinese listed companies disclose 
Criticisms of Corporate 
Governance 
Board of directors:  Ineffective 
independent directors 
Ownership 
structure:  Inappropriate designing 
Board of supervisors:  Function 
needs to be reconsidered 
26 
 
less information to the market. This causes serious information asymmetry and 
has resulted in a series of financial scandals. However, Qu and Leung (2006) 
argue that the quality of the corporate disclosure cannot be changed quickly, 
due to the influence of Chinese culture. Chinese business people prefer to 
disclose less information to the market, to avoid inadvertent disclosure of 
information to their competitors.  
In 2002, CSRC, the Chinese market watchdog, promulgated a new code 
of corporate governance to increase the quality of corporate governance of 
Chinese companies. Rajagopalan and Zhan (2008) state that the promulgation 
of Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies was driven by the 
series of financial scandals in the US and Chinese markets. The new code 
contains the following principles to increase the quality of corporate governance 
of the Chinese listed companies:  
1) Transparent procedures must be established to select the 
board of directors. 
2) If the controlling shareholder owns a stake in excess of 30%, 
a cumulative voting mechanism must be adopted to ensure that 
the voting interests of minority shareholders are given 
appropriate consideration. 
3) There must be at least two independent directors on or 
before June 30, 2002, and one-third of the board members must 
be independent directors on or before June 30, 2003.  
4) Members of the board of supervisors must be given access 
to information related to operational status and must be allowed 
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to hire independent intermediary agencies for professional 
consultation. 
5) Corporate governance-related information (e.g., the 
composition of the board of directors and the board of 
supervisors, the attendance records of independent directors) 
must be disclosed. 
6) Prices of related-party transactions must be fully disclosed, 
and listed companies cannot provide financial collateral to related 
entities. 
7) Detailed information on controlling shareholders must be 
promptly released, and listed companies cannot provide financial 
collateral to related entities. 
8) The establishment of functional subcommittees and their 
operating details, discrepancies between the existing situation 
and the requirements of the code, and the corporate governance 
improvement plan must be disclosed (Rajagopalan et al., 
2008:58-59). 
 
Additionally, for the first time the Code of Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies introduced independent directors to Chinese listed companies 
(Tang, 2008). In 1995, Chinese companies which were listed in the overseas 
markets introduced independent directors, as required by the regulatory rules of 
the foreign markets. Yet the majority of  Chinese listed companies, which were 
listed in the domestic exchanges (SHSE and SZSE), did not introduce the 
system of independent directors(Yuan, 2008; Qu, 2009). On 16th of August, 
2001, CSRC promulgated the Guidance of Introducing Independent Directors in 
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Listed Companies to require all listed companies to appoint independent 
directors. This guidance provides the definition of independent directors(Clarke, 
2006; Liu, 2009), which includes:  
1) he/she must not hold a position in the listed company or its 
affiliated enterprises, nor can their direct relatives or their 
major social relations hold such position in such enterprises;  
2) he/she must not hold more than 1% of the outstanding shares 
of the listed company directly or indirectly;  
3) he/she must not hold a position in a unit which holds more 
than 5% of the outstanding shares of the listed company 
directly or indirectly, or of the unit which ranks as one of the 
five largest shareholders of the listed company;  
4) he/she must also satisfy any of the above conditions in the 
immediate proceeding year;  
5) he/she must not provide financial, legal or consulting services 
to the listed company or its subsidiaries;  
6) he/she must not be the person stipulated in the articles of 
association as someone who is inappropriate to take up such 
a position;  
7) he/she must not be the person determined by the CSRC as an 
inappropriate person for such a post (Wang, 2005:143).  
In legislative terms, the Chinese congress amended the old CCL 1994 to 
make independent directors a mandatory requirement for all Chinese listed 
companies, with the minimum proportion of independent directors of a board to 
be one-third.  
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Conventional wisdom predicts that independent directors will increase the 
quality of corporate governance, for they are independent from the corporate 
managerial team. However, in practice,  Xiao and Yu (2007), Feng (2008) and 
Yuan (2009) find that board independence has no significant effect on the 
quality of corporate governance of the Chinese listed companies. There are 
several reasons for these findings.  
Firstly, the nomination of independent directors is distorted. Wang (2005), 
Allen et al. (2007), Lau et al. (2007), and Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008) state 
that independent directors of Chinese listed companies are controlled by the 
corporate managerial teams of those companies. Jiang (2009a), Jiang (2009b), 
Liu (2009), Zhang (2009a), Gu (2009), Qu (2009), Yuan (2009), Zhou (2009) 
point out that the special ownership structure of Chinese listed companies gives 
opportunities to the holding (majority) shareholders to control the nomination 
and appointment of independent directors. Under this circumstance, 
independent directors have no incentive to monitor either the managerial team 
or the majority (holding) shareholders. Thus, these nominal independent 
directors lead to small shareholders being easily expropriated by large 
shareholders and executives.  
Secondly, the Chinese market lacks the human resource to meet the 
qualification demands for the role of independent director of its listed companies 
(Wang, 2006; Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; Feng, 2008; Jiang, 2009; Liu, 
2009; Zhang, 2009; Gu, 2009; Qu, 2009; Yuan, 2009; Zhou, 2009). The majority 
of independent directors are people who lack experience in management and 
financial auditing. Thus, these candidates cannot work as qualified independent 
directors in Chinese listed companies.  
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Thirdly, a system defect of the corporate governance mechanism leads to 
independent directors failing to increase the quality of corporate governance of 
the Chinese listed companies. Yuan (2009), Qu (2009), Gu (2009), Jiang (2009) 
point out that there is a conflict of roles between independent directors and the 
board of supervisors. The role duplication causes the boards of supervisors and 
of independent directors to become rivals of each other. Thus, this supervision 
structure reduces the performance of independent directors.  
Fourthly, the Chinese market lacks a complete legal regime to facilitate the 
system of independent directors (Jiang, 2009; Qu, 2009).  Relevant regulations 
fail to define the duty of independent directors. Additionally, independent 
directors do not have legal liabilities under the current regulation regime. Thus, 
the unsophisticated requirement for the role of independent directors in Chinese 
companies result in a lack of efficiency in their use.  
Fifthly, independent directors lack effective financial incentives. 
Independent directors of Chinese listed companies will be awarded salary 
(Jiang, 2009; Gu, 2009; Zhang, 2009; Qu, 2009; Liu, 2009). However, the salary 
of independent directors will be influenced by the company‟s executives. Thus, 
to some extent independent directors of Chinese listed companies are 
monitored by corporate executives.  
Sixthly, low board independence also limits the effectiveness of 
independent directors. The CCL requires that all of the listed companies must 
introduce independent directors, and the minimum proportion of independent 
directors is one-third. Thus, most of Chinese listed companies comply with this 
rule. However, very few of companies want to increase the board‟s percentage 
of independent directors beyond the minimum. 
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The third criticism of the current corporate governance practice of Chinese 
listed companies is the establishment of a board of supervisors. The Chinese 
market watchdog requires that all listed companies build a two-pillar internal 
governance mechanism, which consists of a board of directors and a board of 
supervisors. This special internal governance mechanism is unlike the Anglo-
Saxon style or the European Style. In the Anglo–Saxon internal governance 
system, the shareholders elect the board of directors, and the board of directors 
has the duty of monitoring the managerial activities of the corporate executive 
team. In the European internal governance system, the corporate stakeholders, 
which include shareholders and corporate employees, elect the board of 
supervisors to serve as the top authority in a company, to monitor the 
managerial activities. The board of directors and the managerial team in the 
European companies assume managerial duty. In the Chinese internal 
governance system, however, the board of directors and the board of 
supervisors exist at the same level in the hierarchy, and assume the same duty, 
that of monitoring  managerial activities. Although Firth et al. (2007:493) argue 
that a large and active board of supervisors can „improve the earnings-returns 
association, reduce absolute discretionary accruals, and have higher quality 
financial statements based on the auditor‟s opinion‟, the conflict of role between 
the supervisory board and the independent directors reduces the efficiency of 
the setting up of a board of supervisors. Secondly, the board of supervisors 
lacks real supervisory power to monitor the quality of internal governance (Li et 
al., 2005). In the old CCL, the board of supervisors had a purely secondary role 
rather than being an effective supervisory institution. In CCL 1994, the only 
power of a board of supervisors was to suggest to the managerial staff that they 
correct their managerial wrongdoings.  The board of supervisors also lacked the 
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power to dismiss members of the corporate managerial team who were 
engaged in corporate wrongdoings. As a consequence of this, shareholders of 
Chinese listed companies were less inclined to consider the board of 
supervisors as an effective regulatory body or care about its performance 
(Dahya et al., 2003).  
The new CCL provides real power to the board of supervisors to help it 
become a genuine supervision institution in the companies. Under the new 
CCL, the board of supervisors has the power to prosecute members of the 
managerial team, if their activities expropriate the rights of corporate 
shareholders. This new power will increase the deterrent effect of the board of 
supervisors. However, the nomination of members to the board of supervisors is 
still controlled by the majority (holding) shareholders and therefore this reduces 
the deterrent value of the new power. Although members of the board of 
supervisors are supposed to be elected by the general meeting of shareholders, 
the abnormal ownership structure of Chinese companies causes the nomination 
process of the board of supervisors to be distorted by the majority (holding) 
shareholders. The majority (holding) shareholders, inevitably, have the desire to 
appoint their supporters to serve as members of the supervisory board (Dahya 
et al., 2003; Li et al., 2005). Hence, in Chinese listed companies, boards of 
supervisors have less incentive to monitor the executives, due to the intrinsic 
relationship between supervisors and shareholders. 
The last and the most serious criticism of the Chinese corporate 
governance system is the inappropriate ownership structure of Chinese listed 
companies. To some extent, this ownership structure is the cause of many of 
the problems in the corporate governance of Chinese companies (Wei and 
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Geng, 2008). The Chinese stock market is different from other developed 
markets, due to the existence of stock segmentation and the majority (holding) 
shareholder. Stock segmentation classifies shares of Chinese listed companies 
into two major categories, which are tradable shares and non-tradable shares. 
The majority (holding) shareholder has a dominant power in the Chinese listed 
companies, and this makes it impossible for other small shareholders to 
challenge them.  
Non-tradable shares are a unique characteristic of the Chinese stock 
market. Non-tradable shares cannot be freely exchanged in the secondary 
market. However, the rights and obligations of non-tradable shares are the 
same as that of tradable shares. The majority of state shares, legal person 
shares, and shares of company founders are non-tradable shares. During the 
process of SOEs reform, the former SOEs become corporatized SOEs. Assets 
of these enterprises were divided into original shares. The state, along with 
other institutional investors and individuals, purchased these original shares. 
After listing, some of the original shares, which were purchased by the state and 
state-oriented institutions, become the non-tradable shares. The purpose of the 
existence of non-tradable shares is to reduce the unknown impact of listing. The 
long history of a planning oriented economic mechanism means that the SOEs 
lack experience of listed company management. Therefore, the existence of 
non-tradable shares gives the listed SOEs time to learn from relevant 
experience. However, this share segmentation has a serious of weakness. 
Firstly, the majority of non-tradable shares are held by the state. As the founder 
of SOEs, the state easily holds the majority of the original shares. The second 
type of shareholder of non-tradable shares is the legal person shareholder. 
However, these shareholdings are based on the residual value of SOEs during 
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the decentralization. Thus, these shareholders are indirectly influenced by the 
state (Song, 2008). Although employees of SOEs also hold the original shares, 
the amount of their shares is too small to influence a company‟s operation. 
Therefore, the largest original shareholder is the state, and its influence is too 
big to be challenged.  
Secondly, non-tradable shares mean that the market mechanism cannot 
influence listed company operation. Tomasic and Fu (2006) point out that the 
inappropriate proportion of non-tradable shares makes Chinese listed 
companies unable to take full advantage of corporatization. Xu et al. (2005) 
point out that the inappropriate proportion of non-tradable shares prevents 
takeover and other mechanisms from increasing the quality of company 
operation and thereby improving performance. The low liquidity of non-tradable 
shares causes the large shareholders of non-tradable shares to be well 
entrenched. Thus, other small shareholders are easily expropriated by these 
large shareholders. Huang and Fung (2005) state that the existence of non-
tradable shares causes serious information asymmetry in the Chinese stock 
market.  
The second unique aspect of the ownership structure of Chinese 
companies is the majority (holding) shareholders. As mentioned, during the 
process of corporatization the state held the majority of original shares of SOEs 
and these original shares became non-tradable shares after listing. Therefore, 
the state became the majority (holding) shareholder of most new listed 
companies. At the beginning of the Chinese stock market, all listed companies 
were SOEs and there were no private listed companies. Nowadays, although 
the state sells some SOEs to private investors and private companies are 
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permitted to be listed on the stock exchanges, the inappropriate ownership 
structure still remains. Ownership concentration adds a positive effect to the 
quality of corporate governance (Gaspar and Massa, 2007; Chen-Lung et al., 
2009), but inappropriate ownership concentration impairs the quality of 
corporate governance (Faccio et al., 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; López-
de-Foronda et al., 2007). The CCL stipulates that one share equals one vote, 
and that all the important managerial decisions must be approved by two-thirds 
of the votes. The majority (holding) shareholders of the Chinese listed 
companies hold the most shares in their companies. Thus, Chinese listed 
companies are deeply influenced by the preferences of majority (holding) 
shareholders. Under this circumstance, the board of directors, the board of 
supervisors, and the managerial team have to comply with the interest of 
majority (Holding) shareholders. Other shareholders have fewer opportunities to 
enter the process of decision making to protect their interests. Thus, small 
shareholders become passive decision makers while still having to bear the 
cost of managerial decisions they are powerless to prevent. Liu and Sun(2005) 
point out that ownership structure makes a difference to firm performance of the 
Chinese companies. Chen et al. (2007b:135) state that ‟firms under the control 
of large state shareholders have poorer performance than that under the control 
of large non-state shareholders‟. Chen et al. (2007b) state that a reduction of 
political control will increase company performance. Therefore, the current 
ownership structure of the Chinese listed companies needs to be reformed.  
In response to the criticisms, the Chinese government began to reform the 
inappropriate ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. On 31st of Jan, 
2004, CSRC announced its reform proposal to the market. In May of 2005, 
CSRC officially disclosed the guidance of ownership reform for Chinese listed 
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companies. By the end of 2007, nearly all Chinese listed companies had 
disclosed their ownership structure reform plans. According to these plans, 
companies would gradually transfer their non-tradable shares to tradable 
shares. These reform plans also included a compensation mechanism for 
tradable shareholders, for the price spread between non-tradable shares and 
tradable shares. At the beginning of corporatization, the original shares were 
not priced through the market mechanism. Therefore, the price of the original 
shares was lower than its market value. Once listed, the shareholders of 
tradable shares had to purchase tradable shares at the market price. Thus, 
there was a price spread between the non-tradable and the tradable shares. 
Under this circumstance, the shareholders of tradable shares believed that their 
rights were impaired since the shareholders of non-tradable shares benefited 
from the price spread. Without an optimal compensation mechanism to offset 
the cost of price spread the reform of ownership structure would be a failure. 
Therefore, non-tradable shareholders promised to compensate the price spread 
to tradable shareholders. To reduce the negative effect of state shareholding on 
firm performance, the government also decided to exit from the non-key 
industries in order to concentrate the national resource on the key industries. 
The government defined Military, Power and Grid, Petroleum and 
Petrochemical, Telecom, Coal, Civil Aviation and Shipping as the seven key 
industries that must be dominated by the state. In the non-key industries, the 
state would gradually transfer its dominant power to private investors, thereby 
reducing the influence of the state to some extent. 
2.5. New legislation  
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As an important pillar of the corporate governance mechanism, external 
regulation of the Chinese market has also been experiencing reform during the 
last few years. On January 1, 2006, the new Company Law of the P.R.China 
(CCL) 2006 and the new Securities Law of the P.R. China (CSL) 2006 came 
into effect. These new laws increase the power of corporate shareholders, 
especially the power of the small shareholders, which in turn improves the 
quality of corporate governance in the Chinese market.  
Compared with the CSL 1999, the CSL 2006 gives the CSRC more 
regulatory power to control fraudulent market activities. According to the 
relevant provisions of the CSL 2006, the CSRC has the power to freeze the 
cash, securities and other capital of illegal transactions. This new power 
motivates CSRC to withhold the revenue from illegal transactions, and thus 
compensate investors for the damage. At the same time, the CSRC now has 
power to seize important evidence concerning illegal transactions. Under the 
CSL 1999, the CSRC did not have the power of seizure of key evidence in 
illegal transactions, and so participants in illegal activities had time to destroy or 
modify key evidence, and thus undermine effective inspection by the market 
watchdog. New regulatory power will reduce this phenomenon and increase the 
possibility of effective illegal transaction inspection, as key evidence of illegal 
transactions will be seized by the CSRC.  
The CSL 2006 requires an authoritative member of the managerial team, 
such as the CEO, to sign important financial disclosures to ensure the quality 
and veracity of the content of that disclosure. The managerial teams, the board 
of directors, and the board of supervisors have to ensure the veracity, accuracy, 
and integrity of any corporate disclosure. The purpose of this new requirement 
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is to reduce the serious information asymmetry in the Chinese stock market. If 
the company discloses false information to mislead market investment 
behaviour, and such institutions fail to prove they are innocent, the board of 
directors, the board of supervisors, and the majority (holding) shareholders, are 
liable for the compensation of the shareholders. Therefore, the board of 
directors, the board of supervisors, and the majority (holding) shareholder have 
to take great care over the content of financial disclosure to reduce the 
incidence of false financial disclosure.  
The CSL 2006 clearly bans the short-term transaction. In the old CSL 
there is no restriction on short term transactions and corporate insiders could 
benefit from short term transaction. The short term transaction is a typical 
insider trading transaction for corporate insiders needs to trade their shares 
quickly. Therefore, the restriction of short term transactions forces corporate 
insiders to keep shares of their companies for a long time, thereby reducing 
information advantage of corporate insiders. The CSL 2006 forbids directors, 
supervisors, top executives, and shareholders, who hold over 5 per cent shares, 
from taking the short swing trading strategy. The board of directors has a duty 
to order corporate insiders to give the benefit of short-term transactions to the 
company. If the board fails to require corporate insiders to do this, the small 
shareholders can launch derivative lawsuits to correct this and the relevant 
directors will become the defendants in such lawsuits.  
The CSL 2006 extends the definition of corporate insiders. Besides the 
definition of corporate insiders of the old CSL, the CSL 2006 considers that the 
staff of securities companies, stock exchanges securities service companies, 
majority (holding) shareholder companies, and the staff of sub-companies of the 
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majority (holding) shareholder companies, can all be regarded as corporate 
insiders. The extension of this definition of corporate insiders will prevent the 
incidence of insider trading activities in the market as more people will be 
considered corporate insiders. Additionally, CSL 2006 increases the penalty for 
insider trading activities.  
Compared with the CCL 1999, the CCL 2006 clearly defines the 
qualification and duty of the directors, the supervisors and the top executives. In 
the old CCL there was no clear definition of the qualification and duty of 
directors, supervisors, and top executives. Thus, under the new CCL 2006, 
unqualified people have less opportunity to serve as directors, supervisors and 
top executives of the companies. These provisos of the CCL 2006 motivate 
Chinese listed companies to increase the quality of their corporate governance.    
The CCL 2006 provides the board of supervisors with more power to 
monitor top corporate staff. Firstly, the board of supervisors has the right to 
advise the general meeting of shareholders to fire directors and executives who 
breach the company‟s constitution. Secondly, if the board of directors fails to 
call a general meeting of shareholders, the board of supervisors has the right to 
call a general meeting of shareholders. Thirdly, the board of supervisors has the 
right to propose a bill to the general meeting of shareholders. Fourthly, 
supervisors have the right to prosecute the directors and the executives, if they 
breach the duties of their role and thereby impair the rights of the company. 
These new powers motivate the board of supervisors to monitor the directors 
and the executives of the company and thus increase the quality of corporate 
governance.  
2.6. Cultural analysis of China 
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2.6.1. Basic Confucian beliefs  
Hofstede (1980, cited in Qu and Leung, 2006: 243-244) identifies four 
dimensions of the societal culture: 
1) large versus small power distance, the extent to which the 
member of a society accepts that power in institutions and 
organisations is distributed unequally; 
2) individualism versus collectivism, which stands for a preference 
for a loosely knit social framework in society wherein individuals 
are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate 
families only, versus a preference for a tightly knit framework in 
which individuals can expect their relatives clan, or other in-
group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty; 
3) strong avoidance versus weak uncertainty avoidance is related 
to the degree to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity ; and 
4) masculinity versus femininity, which stands for a preference in 
society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material 
success versus a preference for relationships, modesty, caring 
for the weak and the quality of life.  
Based on these four dimensions, Hofstede and Bond (1988) point out that 
the Chinese society is characterised by large power distance conservative, long-
term orientation, collectivism and femininity.  
During the long history of civilization of Chinese society, the core principles 
of social value of Chinese society are Confucian values (Miles, 2006; Qu and 
Leung, 2006) which have influenced the Chinese people for over 2,000 years. 
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Confucius, to some extent, is the greatest master in Chinese history and created 
the Confucian values in the sixth to fifth century BC. The core principal of 
Confucian values is the moral standard and social philosophy. Additionally, 
people have to be sincere, benevolent, show filial piety, and propriety. Miles 
(2006:305-306) states that Confucians believe that the ‟basis of a stable, unified, 
and lasting social order is through living according to civilized and cultured 
principles developed through human wisdom, not through the imposition of strict 
laws on individuals‟. To maintain social integrity and harmony, there must be 
good moral example. Additionally the knowledge of the older generation has a 
strong influence within Chinese society. Under the influence of Confucians, 
conservative and submissive people can be easily seen as good moral 
examples. Confucians consider people who attempt to change the existing 
social order as examples of the immoral.  
2.6.2. Anglo-American corporate governance 
and guanxi network in Chinese society 
In the Anglo-American companies, directors of companies prioritize the 
interests of the corporate shareholders above other stakeholders. In the Anglo-
Saxon style companies, ownership is separated from control, and the ownership 
is always dispersed across different shareholders. Therefore, shareholders can 
only passively monitor managerial activities. To solve this problem, shareholders 
elect an independent board of directors to monitor the managerial team. At the 
same time, the market promotes takeover activities to increase the quality of 
corporate governance. If the corporate insiders break their roles and therefore 
cause damage to corporate shareholders, the corporate shareholders will ask 
such corporate insiders pay a remedy to offset the damage. Mile (2006:306) 
states that the Anglo-Saxon legal systems which „regulate the legal relationship 
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between directors and the company and between directors and shareholders 
are highly developed, detailed, and sophisticated‟. Traditional corporate 
governance theory always presumes that corporate executives have more 
incentives to pursue self-interest activities. Thus, shareholders are more likely to 
use prosecution as a way of obtaining remedy from the executives. The 
sophisticated legal system facilitates shareholders to prosecute more lawsuits to 
protect their rights. ‟Anglo-American societies are therefore highly litigious‟ (Mile 
2006:307).  Generally, in western societies and companies, the contract within 
organisations will determine the relationship and interactions among the 
participants of the organisations. The sophisticated external legal system will 
deter the individual from attempting to break the contract, which is accepted by 
majority of the participants. 
However, in the Confucian society, especially in the Chinese society, 
relationship and interactions among the organizational participants is more 
determined by the guanxi network. To some extent guanxi is the fundamental 
factor of Chinese society, and Chinese society is the consequence of a complex 
guanxi network. Farh et al. (1997) and Farh et al. (1998) classified guanxi of the 
traditional Chinese society into five categories: 1) emperor-subject, 2) father-
son, 3) husband-wife, 4) elder-younger, and 5) friend-friend. Nowadays, the 
guanxi of emperor-subject has disappeared. The rest of the other categories still 
affect the Chinese people. „The practice of guanxi stems from Confucianism, 
which fostered the broad cultural aspects of collectivism manifested in the 
importance of networks of interpersonal relations‟ (Park and Luo, 2001: 455). 
Xin and Pearce (1996) argue that the guanxi is very important to the conduct of 
business in Chinese society. The guanxi network can be a predetermined 
relationship that has a common behaviour expectation and down plays 
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individual desire, e.g. the guanxi between family members. Or the guanxi 
network can be a consequence of active social activities, e.g. the guanxi 
between friends. Thus, building and interaction of the guanxi network is 
complex since the individuals of a guanxi network always have the dual-role 
status: the passive follower and active initiator (Yang, 1994).  
In the Chinese society, guanxi network has four characteristics: 
transferable, reciprocal, intangible, and utilitarian (Park and Luo, 2001). 
Through a guanxi network, two unrelated individuals will contact each other with 
a common connection. In a guanxi network all participants have to provide 
favours to other participants: if a person has received a favour within this guanxi 
network, the favour must be returned or he/she will be considered an 
untrustworthy individual. In fact, the guanxi network is not a written contract and 
it is hard to measure solely in fiscal terms. Finally, the factor that drives people 
to be part of the guanxi network in Chinese society is the exchange of benefit. 
In other words, if there were no exchange of benefit, there would be no desire to 
be part of a good guanxi network.  
Although the economic reform which started 30 years ago leads to 
Chinese people beginning to accept the legislation in their social life, the guanxi 
network still deeply influences Chinese society. Additionally, Johnston (1997), 
and Luo (2002) state that the unsophisticated legal and contract system leads 
Chinese society, especially  business people,  to rely on the guanxi network to 
facilitate the conduct of business in the Chinese market. Thus, Braendle Gasser 
et al.(2005:390) argue that the guanxi network has „deeply rooted forces and 
may take precedence over legitimate decision based on laws or regulations‟.  
Thus, in the Chinese market, good guanxi network is an important business 
resource for the companies.  
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At the same time, the complex guanxi network is a criticised aspect of the 
Chinese market. In business conduct, Chinese business people prefer to 
establish a good guanxi network. Besides the guanxi network of business-to-
business (B2B), Chinese business people prefer to seek the guanxi network of 
business-to-government (B2G). A good B2B relationship will help the 
companies easily find alliances and it facilitates the exchange of business 
resource in the market. Conversely, the B2G relationship will lead to serious 
consequences, one of which is  political corruption, which will in turn impair the 
quality of corporate governance of those companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993).  
Nye (1967:419) defines corruption as behaviour  
...which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique), pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery 
(use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of 
trust); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources 
for private-regarding uses).   
To some extent, political corruption is the most critical aspect of the 
Chinese market. Corruption breaks market fairness, since it allows business 
people to bypass market regulation. Additionally, it impairs the reputation of the 
government and market regulation. The existence of the B2G relationship in the 
Chinese market prevents market regulation from being effectively enforced, and 
thus lowers the deterrence of market regulation.  
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To some extent, the guanxi network of the Chinese market prevents 
Chinese companies from being able to benefit from developing the corporate 
governance mechanism which is introduced from western companies. The 
guanxi network leads to corporate participants being more likely to bypass 
company contracts. Additionally, the guanxi network downplays the quality of 
the external regulation system and therefore leads to the external monitoring 
losing its function, which is an ex post solution to managerial wrongdoings. 
Thus, Chinese society should pay more attention to reducing the negative 
influence of guanxi networks. 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to introduce the institutional background of the 
Chinese securities market.  
Firstly, this chapter briefly introduced the economic development history of 
China. During last 30 years, China is trying to use the market oriented economic 
regime to replace the central planning oriented economic regime. One of results 
of this economic reform is the introduction of a corporate governance 
mechanism in Chinese listed companies. 
Secondly, this chapter described the characteristics of the corporate 
governance mechanism of Chinese companies. In Chinese listed companies, 
shares are highly concentrated to the holding shareholder. The proportion of 
floated shares is higher than that of non-floated shares. The stock segmentation 
causes the holding shareholder to be entrenched in listed companies. Under 
this circumstance, the holding shareholder has power to affect most aspects of 
listed companies. Thus, this ownership structure generates several problems of 
corporate governance in Chinese listed companies.    
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Finally, this chapter briefly described the cultural background of the 
Chinese market. Under the influence of the values of Confucius, Chinese listed 
companies have less incentive to comply with the provisions of a good 
corporate governance mechanism. Additionally, Chinese society is based on 
personal relationships, rather than on contract relationships. Thus, this 
characteristic of Chinese society restricts the performance of corporate 
governance mechanism in Chinese listed companies. 
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Chapter 3. Literature review 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant theories and previous 
studies, thereby developing the theoretical framework of this thesis. This 
chapter contains a section on theoretical background and a section on empirical 
evidence.  
Firstly, the section on theoretical background briefly reviews the basic 
knowledge of corporate governance mechanisms.  It introduces the purpose of 
a corporate governance mechanism and briefly introduces its components. 
Additionally, this section introduces the prospects for the future development of 
corporate governance.  
Secondly, the section on theoretical background describes the relationship 
between information and securities markets. Because of information 
asymmetry, investors who have information advantages (e.g. inside information) 
will have an advantage over other investors. Insider trading activities destroy 
fairness and integrity in the securities market. Hence the market needs to 
regulate and restrict insider trading activities. 
After the section on theoretical background, the section on empirical 
evidence collects previous relevant empirical studies of the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanism and firm performance. Ownership 
structure will affect firm performance. For instance, institutional ownership will 
increase firm performance (Gorton and Kahl, 2008). Characteristics of boards of 
directors will affect firm performance of the listed companies. For instance, 
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board size affects firm performance (Guest, 2009). The use of board 
subcommittees will increase firm performance, since it increases the quality of 
the corporate governance mechanism of listed companies. For example, an 
independent audit committee increases  corporate transparency to align 
managerial activities with the interest of shareholders, thereby increasing firm 
performance (Koh et al., 2007). 
Secondly, the section on empirical evidence reviews previous studies of 
the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and corporate 
transparency. The composition of a board of directors affects corporate 
transparency. For instance, board independence (the proportion of non-
executive/independent directors to executive directors on the board) is a factor 
in the improvement of corporate transparency (Cornett et al., 2009). Ownership 
structure also affects corporate transparency. For instance, institutional 
investors are a factor in the decrease in information asymmetry (Gaspar and 
Massa, 2007; Chen-Lung et al., 2009). Additionally, the use of subcommittees 
ensures that listed companies convey more information to investors, thereby 
reducing the information asymmetry between companies and investors. The 
use of a compensation committee motivates listed companies to disclose more 
information to increase corporate transparency (Laksmana, 2008)  
The figure 3.1 shows the theoretical framework of this thesis. Because of 
the separation of ownership and control, shareholders delegate the power of 
control to the agent. Under this circumstance, there will be conflict of interest 
between the principal (Shareholders) and the Agent (Executives). The cost of 
this conflict is the agency cost.  
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One of the agency costs is the information asymmetry between 
shareholders and companies. Increased information asymmetry will reduce the 
transparency of companies. Under this circumstance, a small portion of 
shareholders will try to seek a channel to access the information of companies. 
However, the majority of shareholders have no such opportunities to access 
that information. Thus, the corporate information will leak to some specific 
shareholders. These shareholders may use that leaked information in the 
market, thereby generating the problem of insider trading. Greater agency cost 
means that there will be more conflicts of interest among participants of 
companies. Under this circumstance, these conflicts of interest will reduce firm 
performance.  
To reduce the agency cost, there are two theories: the agency theory and 
the stewardship theory. Under the agency theory, the agent will be considered 
as a self-interest institution. Thus, the principal, which is the shareholders, has 
to adopt more supervisory methods to monitor the agent. Alternatively, under 
the stewardship theory, the agent or the executives will be considered as a 
smart leader of the organisation. They have the ability to increase firm 
performance, which is in the common interest of all corporate participants.  
The corporate governance mechanism is based on the agency theory. 
Generally, the internal governance mechanism relies on the board of directors, 
board subcommittees, and the ownership structure. A good internal corporate 
governance mechanism will reduce the information asymmetry and increase 
firm performance. 
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Figure 3.1 structure of theoretical framework 
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3.2. Theoretical background 
Modern listed companies follow a structure which has separation of 
ownership and control.  Owners of these companies cannot manage them 
directly because of their complex structure and large size (Berle and Means, 
1968). Instead, the control of companies is delegated to a professional 
managerial team, which is known as an „agent‟.  Because of the separation of 
ownership and control, there will be conflicts of interest between the owners and 
the managerial team; these conflicts may affect firm performance. Executives 
should maximise the welfare of shareholders, by making decisions which are in 
the shareholders‟ interest. However, the separation of ownership and control 
may lead to divergence between managerial decisions and the interest of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate executives manage the 
content of corporate disclosure and the time of disclosure (Brunnermeier, 2005). 
This makes it impossible for the owners of companies to oversee the 
managerial team of companies effectively. To align managerial decisions with 
the shareholders‟ interest, shareholders may monitor executives‟ actions. At the 
same time, shareholders can provide incentives to motivate executives to align 
managerial decision-making with the interest of shareholders. For instance, 
shareholders will award stock or stock options to executives and directors (Kim 
et al., 2010). In this case, their wealth will be positively related to firm 
performance. Thus, executives have an incentive to increase firm performance.  
The costs of monitoring and incentive provision, arising from the divergence of 
interest between shareholders and executives, are agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). As a result of agency costs, firm performance may be reduced.  
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There are also conflicts of interest among the owners of the companies 
themselves. Differences in percentages of ownership mean that owners of 
companies have various goals. Under this circumstance, conflicts of interest 
among owners of companies may have a negative impact on firm performance. 
An over-spread ownership structure will cause corporate executives to be less 
monitored (Hart, 1995). The over-spread ownership structure will exacerbate 
the „free-rider‟ problem where many shareholders are unable to monitor 
executives. However, a greater ownership concentration in companies will 
generate serious conflicts of interest among shareholders (Dahya et al., 2008). 
For instance, the related-party transaction of controlling shareholders damage 
firm performance (Clarke, 2007). The conflicts of interest among shareholders 
have the potential to increase the information asymmetry: for instance, there 
may be collusion between the controlling shareholder and the executives which 
exacerbates the information asymmetry to expropriate the interest of other small 
shareholders (Laidroo, 2009). The existing conflicts of interest damage firm 
performance and increase information asymmetry in the financial market.  
Corporate governance is a market oriented mechanism that may align 
interest of various corporate participants of a corporation, and reduce the 
presence of information asymmetry between companies and shareholders. A 
corporate governance mechanism in divided into two categories - an internal 
and an external governance mechanism. The internal governance mechanism 
includes the board of directors, board subcommittees and ownership structure. 
The external mechanism mainly focuses on market regulation.  
The board of directors and board subcommittees ensure that companies 
are less influenced by corporate executives (Clarke, 2007). The board of 
directors will effectively monitor executives and replace inappropriate 
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executives when executives fail in their duty (Black, 2001; Smith, 2002). This 
will motivate executives to comply with the interests of shareholders, thereby 
reducing the conflict of interest between shareholders and executives. Board 
subcommittees will increase both the quality of corporate auditing and of 
corporate information disclosure, and ensure the independence of corporate 
compensation and nomination (Vafeas, 1999; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; 
Vafeas, 2003; Gendron and Bédard, 2006). Under this circumstance, the 
executives will be monitored, compensated, and they may disclose more 
information to shareholders. Thus, companies may achieve a better 
performance and there may be less information asymmetry between companies 
and shareholders. Institutional shareholders are able to monitor executives and 
lower the influence from controlling shareholders on companies (Lin et al., 
2007; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). Thus, institutional ownership may moderate the 
asymmetric information and improve firm performance.in companies. 
3.2.1. Agency cost and corporate governance 
3.2.1.1. Agency theory 
Bagley (1999:162) states that: 
 In an agency relationship, one person- the agent - acts for or 
represents another person–the principal. The principal delegates a 
portion of his or her power to the agent, and the agent then manages 
the assigned task and exercises the discretion given to him or her by 
the principals. The agency relationship is created by an express or 
implied contract or by law.  
54 
 
In the agency relationship, the principals may not believe that the agent 
will act in the best interest of principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Under this 
circumstance, the principals will establish appropriate incentive mechanisms to 
motivate agents to align their activities with the interests of principals, and the 
principals will pay more monitoring cost to limit the aberrant activities of agents 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
One feature of contemporary listed companies is the separation of control 
and ownership. Public listed companies typically have a widespread ownership 
structure. Thus, it is impossible to call on all of the shareholders to determine 
firm operation. In this case, the alternative solution is to appoint a board of 
directors (the executive members of a board of directors) to manage the 
company. In a listed company, the relationship between shareholders and 
executives, such as chief executive officer (CEO) and other executive members 
of the board, is an agency relationship. ‟Owners become principals when they 
contract with executives to manage their firms for them‟ (Davis et al., 1997:22). 
Executives must therefore align their managerial activities with the interests of 
the shareholders, since they work as agents of the shareholders. Owners invest 
their capital into companies, and executives are responsible for managing their 
investment. Under the agency theory, however, executives may be not trusted 
and they may be identified as self-interested people who manage the firm in 
their own interests rather than that of the shareholders (Anderson et al., 2007). 
If the interest of executives differs from that of owners, shareholders have to 
bear the cost of conflicts of interest. The conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and executives lead to the shareholders having little trust in the 
executives. Hence, shareholders have to pay the extra cost of monitoring 
managerial activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
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Besides the conflict of interest between the executives and the 
shareholders, there will be conflicts of interest between different shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997b). Hansmann et al. (2004) illustrate that if a 
company has a dispersed ownership structure, the myriad of small shareholders 
will become the principal and the larger shareholders will become the agent. 
Small shareholders lack the opportunities to be included in firm management. 
Therefore, they rely on large shareholders to monitor the management of the 
firm, since large shareholders, especially the majority (holding) shareholders, 
have the opportunity to influence firm management. However, the interests of 
large or majority shareholders may differ from that of the minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997b). Thus, the small shareholders will be easily 
expropriated by large shareholders, for small shareholders are excluded from 
the process of corporate managerial decision making.  
The third type of corporate agency cost is the ‟conflict between firm itself 
(including, particularly, its owners) and the other parties with whom the firm 
contracts, such as creditors, employees, and customers‟ (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2004:22). Hansmann and Kraakman (2004:22) suggest that a 
company, to some extent, can be seen as an agent that behaves 
opportunistically toward the various principals, ‟by expropriating creditors, 
exploiting workers, or misleading consumers‟. 
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Figure 3.2 agency theory 
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3.2.1.2. Stewardship theory 
A core duty of the board of directors is to monitor the managerial activities 
of the highly-paid managerial teams, and to protect the corporate shareholders, 
but a series of corporate scandals indicates that boards sometimes fail to 
perform this duty (Anderson et al., 2007). The financial scandals, which were 
revealed at the beginning of the 21st century (e.g. Enron, Parmalat), show that 
the independent directors of those companies failed to monitor the managerial 
activities of executives, and there was poor interaction between the board of 
directors and the managerial teams in those companies. There should be an 
alternative theory that promotes the independent directors to become strategic 
partners of the executives rather than monitoring them, and thus, increase the 
efficiency of the corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholders 
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making and receive the material or managerial information of the companies. In 
this way, the board of directors will become an informed supervisory body that 
has the ability to detect any managerial wrongdoings promptly. The traditional 
agency theory holds that corporate executives who act from self-interest and 
expropriate the rights of the shareholders, will be seen by the board as 
committing theft from their companies (Anderson et al., 2007). The subjective 
judgement of the board can lead it to doubt all managerial activities of the 
executives, including reasonable managerial activities. Thus, corporate 
executives can be mistrusted by the board. Under these circumstances, there 
will be a serious conflict between the board and the corporate executives. The 
traditional agency theory impairs the cooperation efficiency between the board 
and the executives. The executives of the company have less incentive to 
cooperate with the board, since neither body trusts each other. Poor 
cooperation between the executives and the board can induce executives to 
limit the information supply and thereby reduce the supervision ability of the 
board. Anderson et al. (2007) state that stewardship theory is an alternative 
theory that can help to reduce the weaknesses of the traditional agency cost 
theory. Davis et al. (1997:21) state that stewardship theory is rooted in the 
theory of psychology and sociology and it ‟defines situations is which managers 
are not motivated by individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives 
are aligned with objectives of their principals‟. Davis et al. (1997:24) point out 
that „in stewardship theory, the model of man is based on a steward whose 
behaviour is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviours have 
higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours‟.  
Contemporary listed companies are held by a diffuse group of owners who 
may have different goals. The varying goals of owners will cause companies to 
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have low operational efficiency. Thus, there should be some people to work as 
stewards in the companies to maximize company value, which is the main 
interest of all participants.  Executives are responsible for the daily management 
of companies. Thus, they can be seen as the stewards of those companies, in 
which case their task is to maximize the value of their companies. Thus, 
although there may be conflicts of interest between the executives and the 
principals, the managerial behaviour would not depart from this purpose. 
Therefore, the interests of the executives will be aligned with that of the other 
corporate participants (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory causes corporate 
executives to realize the ‟trade-off between personal needs and organizational 
objectives that by hard working toward organizational collective ends, personal 
needs are met‟ (Davis et al., 1997:25). Stewardship theory motivates the pro-
organizational behaviour of executives (Davis et al., 1997). This will drive the 
executives to actively pursue the company‟s goals, since they are the company 
stewards and their interests will be similar to that of the companies. This will 
reduce the cost of monitoring, which is used to align executive activities.  
Figure 3.3 stewardship theory 
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One difference between agency theory and stewardship theory is the 
effect of the leadership structure on firm performance. In agency theory, no 
person should work as the chairman and the CEO simultaneously in 
companies, since this combined leadership structure will lessen the monitoring 
effectiveness of the board of directors. According to agency theory, a combined 
leadership will exacerbate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
executives. By contrast, stewardship theory suggests that the role separation of 
chairman and CEO is not an essential practice to increase management 
effectiveness.  
Some studies show that the role separation of CEO and chairman does 
not help companies achieve better performance in the market (Dalton et al., 
2007; Bennington, 2010; Dalton and Dalton, 2010). Thus, the regulatory 
requirement, which is the separation of CEO and Chairman, may not actually 
increase the managerial effectiveness of the board in companies as it is 
expected.  
According to stewardship theory, to improve firm performance the chair of 
a board should increase his managerial skills. An effective board leader should 
have sufficient industry knowledge, good leadership skills that motivate 
communications within boardrooms, and time management ability to increase 
the effectiveness of board meetings. The CEO needs fluent industry knowledge, 
management experience, and good relationships with corporate insiders and 
outsiders. Thus, he will be a good candidate to chair the board in a company. If 
a combined leadership is good management structure in companies, there is no 
need to pressurise companies to adopt a separation structure. 
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However, stewardship theory ignores the effect of combining the roles on 
the asymmetric information in companies. A combined leadership structure 
means that the board of directors cannot effectively monitor corporate 
executives. In this case, executives have more opportunities to control the 
information released by companies. Thus, the combined leadership structure 
will exacerbate the problem of information asymmetry in companies (Gul and 
Leung, 2004; Xiao and Yuan, 2007a; Cheung et al., 2010). Additionally, the 
combined leadership structure will mean a poorly-performing CEO cannot be 
easily replaced with a better one (Mak and Li, 2001; Goyal and Park, 2002). 
Thus, it is doubtful that the CEO duality can actually increase firm performance 
in long term.  
Currently, the practice of corporate governance in Chinese companies is 
based on the agency theory. For instance, the code of corporate governance in 
the Chinese market requires companies to introduce independent directors on 
the board of directors, and figures from table 4-1 indicate that most Chinese 
companies adopt the separation of leadership structure. The purpose of the 
recent market reforms in the Chinese market is to increase the power of 
supervisory institutions in companies to monitor executives. This thesis intends 
to assess the practice of corporate governance in Chinese companies, rather 
than introduce another theory to Chinese companies. In light of this, agency 
theory has been adopted in the empirical studies. 
3.2.1.3. Definition of corporate governance 
The corporation is the most popular form of business organization in the 
contemporary business world (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aguilera, 2005). As 
a business organisation, a corporation has plenty of participants. An 
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organization needs governance mechanisms to resolve any conflicts of interests 
among its myriad participants (Daily et al., 2003). Governance mechanisms 
restrict the phenomenon of power abuse by protecting the interests of the 
majority of the members of an organization (Licht, 2002). Corporate governance 
can be seen as a pack of contracts that represents an ex ante regime to 
constrain executive managerial discretion, if shareholders fail to monitor the 
actions of executives (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Talley and Johnsen, 2004; 
Nelson, 2005). Corporate governance aims to align the interests of different 
participants with the interests of the organization. If the interests of a company‟s 
participants cannot be unified, that company‟s managerial efficiency and 
performance will be diminished. Corporate governance is dynamic, for 
corporate participants regularly choose a corporate governance mechanism 
(Nelson, 2005). Additionally, the corporate governance mechanism should solve 
the conflicts of interest between shareholders and stakeholders. Thus, an 
optimal corporate governance mechanism needs to be accepted by the majority 
of the stakeholders. 
Koh et al. (2007) characterize three essential purposes of corporate 
governance: these are safeguarding financial reporting, ensuring accountability 
and enhancing value. Safeguarding financial reporting ensures the quality of 
financial disclosure, thereby reducing the information asymmetry between 
companies and market investors. Ensuring accountability motivates corporate 
participants appropriately to fulfil their duty to their companies. A high quality of 
disclosure and an effective managerial team will help companies achieve a 
better performance in the market. 
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Investors rely on corporate disclosure to evaluate potential target 
companies, and monitor the companies they have invested in. Because of the 
separation of ownership and control, shareholders employ professional 
executives, such as the CEO and other executive members of the board, to 
manage their companies. Corporate shareholders rely on corporate disclosure 
to evaluate the performance of corporate executives. Improving managerial 
transparency is one purpose of the corporate governance mechanism (Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Chen et al., 2007a). Low managerial transparency result in serious 
information asymmetry between companies and investors. As a result of this, 
investors are unable to make favourable investment decisions and monitor 
executives. However, full disclosure will not increase firm performance either, 
because it reveals a company‟s secrets to its rivals (Makadok, 2003; Welch and 
Rotberg, 2006).  
Nelson (2005) shows that a greater quality of corporate governance 
positively affects firm performance. A good corporate governance mechanism 
will motivate corporate executives to better fulfil their duty. An optimal corporate 
governance mechanism imposes appropriate performance pressure on 
company managerial teams, to ensure that managerial activities are aligned 
with the interests of the corporate shareholders. If there is an appropriate 
alignment, executives of the companies will have more incentive to increase 
firm performance. 
3.2.1.4. Board of directors 
  Board of directors 
Fama(1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Zahra and Pearce II (1989) 
define the board of directors as a kind of market-induced institution that serves 
63 
 
as an ultimate decision maker and supervisor in a company. The board is a 
bridge between shareholders and managers, since it works as an intermediary 
between corporate shareholders and corporate managers, and is entrusted by 
the majority of corporate shareholders to monitor managerial activities (Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001). The separation of ownership and control makes 
shareholders reliant on the board of directors to monitor corporate executives. 
Thus, the board of directors plays an important role in the corporate governance 
mechanism (Aguilera, 2005; Guest, 2008), since a board represents the diverse 
shareholders in monitoring managerial activities. Black(2001:1) says that ‟each 
member of the board of directors shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner 
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation‟.  
Zahra and Pearce II (1989) define three roles of a board of directors; these 
are strategic, controlling, and serving. The board has a duty to make important 
decisions and to decide the strategic future direction of the firm, to represent 
shareholders in  controlling the company, to be accountable to shareholders 
and to convey objective information to them (OECD, 1999). Members of a board 
are elected by corporate shareholders, thereby representing them in the 
management of the company. Bagley (1999:162) says that „in agreeing to act 
on behalf of the principal, the agent becomes a fiduciary‟. Thus, „directors act as 
the fiduciary agents of the corporation – those designated to hold assets in trust 
or to exercise authority on behalf of someone else – and, as such, they have 
two main legal duties: care and loyalty‟ (Aguilera, 2005:44). 
Duty of loyalty requires agents to „act solely for the benefit of their principal 
in all matters directly connected with the agency undertaking‟; and duty of care 
requires agents to „avoid mistakes, whether through negligence, recklessness, 
64 
 
or intentional misconduct‟ (Bagley, 1999:162). If directors break their fiduciary 
duty, they will be held liable, since their activities will lead to a loss for the 
corporate shareholders.        
Board subcommittees 
Board subcommittees will increase the performance of a board of 
directors, for they can reduce the influence of executives on board decisions 
(Vafeas, 1999). Companies often establish an audit committee, remuneration 
committee, nomination committee, risk committee, and these subcommittees 
serve as assistants to the board (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007a). In 
contemporary listed companies, the compensation subcommittee is established 
to determine some specific managerial decisions, such as the compensation 
package for independent directors and executives (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). 
In practice, the nomination of executives and independent directors to the 
listed companies is controlled by the board (Vafeas, 1999).  In the case of a 
dispersed ownership structure, the collective nomination decision of all 
shareholders is costly. Therefore, the board undertakes the duty of nominating 
and appointing corporate executives and independent directors. To increase the 
quality of nominations, a nomination committee is created to help the board  
nominate appropriate people to the executive positions. A benefit of using a 
nominating committee is that the process of corporate nomination is more likely 
to be independent from the current managerial team (Vafeas, 1999). However, 
if corporate insiders control the process of corporate nomination, they could 
nominate and appoint people affiliated to them to serve as members of the 
corporate managerial team. 
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An optimal compensation package will motivate corporate executives to 
align managerial activities with the interests of shareholders. In the listed 
companies, the board delegates the function of designing the compensation 
contract to the compensation committee (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). The core 
function of a compensation committee is to design a compensation package 
and act as a consultant to the board in deciding the payment of executives and 
independent directors. Through using a compensation committee, corporate 
compensation will be less influenced by corporate insiders. Thus, the 
compensation committee plays an important role in determining compensation 
packages (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). After the financial scandals at the 
beginning of the new century, market regulatory agents considered the 
compensation committee as a core decision-making body, responsible for 
setting and monitoring compensation payment of executive directors and 
independent directors (Vafeas, 2003).  
Gendron and Bédard (2006) argue that the audit committee is an 
important part of corporate governance, since it  has a duty to constrain the 
opportunistic activities of corporate executives. Core functions of the audit 
committee include: 
1) To review the information of managerial activities. 
2) To call regular meetings with internal and external auditors to review 
the firm‟s financial statement. 
3) To review the process of internal and external auditing. 
4) To review the internal controls, which question management, internal 
and external auditors and evaluate the performance of these 
institutions (Bosch, 1995; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2002a; Klein, 2002b; 
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Thompson, 2003; Moeller, 2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Conor and 
Jenny, 2007). 
   Independent directors 
To increase the performance and efficiency of a board and its 
subcommittees, the majority of its members should be independent directors 
(Vafeas, 1999; Vafeas, 2000; Vafeas, 2003). After the series of financial 
scandals in the early 2000s, board independence and the proportion of 
independent directors on a board is attracting more attention. If a director is 
defined as an independent director, this director cannot be a member of the 
managerial team and must be independent from the profit-seeking shareholders 
(Clarke, 2007). Clarke (2007:84) defines a typical independent director as ‟one 
who has no need or inclination to stay in the good graces of management, and 
who will be able to speak out, inside and outside the boardroom, in the face of 
management‟s misdeeds in order to protect the interest of shareholders.‟ 
Roberts et al. (2005:13-15) illustrate three key principles of independent 
directors, which in a collaborative and effective board are „1) engaged but non-
executive, 2) challenging but supportive, 3) independent but involved‟. 
Independent directors can improve the quality of corporate governance in 
different ways. Firstly, independent directors have a duty to monitor related 
party transactions, if they are driven by the interest of large shareholders 
(Clarke, 2007). Large shareholders may want to give their affiliated companies 
preferential conditions, in any dealings between them and the company. This 
phenomenon expropriates the right of the small shareholders, since it is less 
beneficial to small shareholders. Independent directors can protect the right of 
the small shareholders, for they are independent from large shareholders. 
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Independent directors protect the right of minority shareholders „for even one 
isolated director can provide a degree of protection to minority shareholders by 
publicizing, or threatening to publicize, majority shareholder abuse of which he 
becomes aware‟ (Clarke, 2007:80). Secondly, independent directors serve as a 
„brains trust‟ or consultants in a company (Clarke, 2007). Independent directors 
are employed from the external market; thus they can bring fresh managerial 
ideas to companies. Thirdly, independent directors solve the problem of 
executive directors dominating the board (Clarke, 2007). Independent directors 
are independent from the company‟s managerial team; hence, if the majority of 
board members are independent directors, the board of directors will have more 
incentive to monitor the corporate executives. Finally, independent directors 
serve as the implementers of external regulation (Clarke, 2007). Clarke 
(2007:82) states that independent directors can implement external regulation 
through 
…exercising their voting power on the board to induce the company 
to act in compliance with the standards, through using their access to 
information to alert the authorities to non-compliance, or through 
using their access to information to certify compliance. 
Independent directors or external directors have a fiduciary duty to 
corporate shareholders, for they represent the interests of small shareholders 
on the board. Black (2001) characterizes the four core fiduciary duties of 
independent directors as loyalty, care, disclosure, and special care when the 
company is a takeover target. The most important type of fiduciary duty is the 
duty of loyalty (Black, 2001; Smith, 2002).  
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The duty of loyalty requires that independent directors act in the interest of 
the company, in other words, independent directors should be loyal to the 
interests of the majority of the company‟s shareholders. The role of independent 
directors is to review and approve self-dealing transactions, and thus, ensure 
that the transactions are entirely fair to companies (Black, 2001). The term self-
dealing transaction has two tiers of meaning (Black, 2001). Firstly, the self-
dealing transactions are directly beneficial to corporate insiders, such as insider 
trading, and impose a relative cost on corporate shareholders. Secondly, the 
self-dealing transaction can be a transaction that transfers value to one 
company from another, such as the related party transaction between two 
companies. If independent directors are only nominally independent from 
corporate insiders and the large shareholders, they could easily approve self-
interest transactions while having fewer incentives to assess and monitor them. 
Under this circumstance, independent directors would be breaking the duty of 
loyalty and failing to protect the right of small shareholders. 
The second fiduciary duty is the duty of care, which requires independent 
directors to „pay attention and to try to make good decisions‟ (Black, 2001:14). 
Independent directors should make the ‟best‟ decision that maximizes the 
wealth of corporate shareholders. Unlike the duty of loyalty, the duty of care 
cannot be judged effectively. Firstly, the majority of investors lack relevant 
business experience and they are excluded from the business transactions 
(Black, 2001). They cannot make an unbiased evaluation of the decisions of 
independent directors. Secondly, an unfavourable share price may not be 
caused by bad managerial decisions (Black, 2001). There is no causal 
relationship between good managerial decisions and favourable stock price, 
since the stock price is not influenced by a single factor. Therefore, a poor 
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share price cannot be seen as a result of the quality of managerial decisions. 
Thirdly, a risky decision will generate two opposite results (Black, 2001). A risky 
decision generates uncertain results, which can be bad or good. Thus, although 
a decision is considered carefully, it still may result in poor firm performance. A 
heavy legal liability for failing in its duty of care will disincline the board from any 
risky projects. Duty of care should motivate the board of directors to support the 
optimal risky projects (Black, 2001).  
The third fiduciary duty is the duty of disclosure, which requires 
independent directors to reduce the information asymmetry of companies (Black 
2001). Independent directors must require executives to disclose more specific 
information about the company to the shareholders. More corporate disclosure 
will reveal more information to the investors and help shareholders to accurately 
assess the company.  
The last fiduciary duty is the duty of special care when the company is a 
takeover target (Black, 2001).  During the takeover, there will be a conflict of 
interest between directors and shareholders, since directors will face the risk 
that they will be replaced by alternative directors. Additionally, directors are 
more likely to select the bidder in line with their own interest. Thus, directors 
attempt to influence the process of takeover to extend their own interest. The 
duty of special care can be seen as an expansion of the duty of loyalty, since it 
requires the directors, whether internal or external, to align their activities with 
the interests of shareholders. 
3.2.1.5. Developments in corporate governance after 
scandals 
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Brown and Caylor (2006) point out that the financial scandals (e.g. Enron 
and  Parmalat) that occurred at the beginning of the 21st century reveal that the 
financial markets needed to reform the corporate governance mechanism. For 
instance, independent directors cannot effectively monitor corporate executives, 
and the provision of non-auditing services by the audit companies causes 
shareholders to face moral hazard. 
Thus, global financial markets have begun to reform their corporate 
governance mechanisms. For instance, in 2002, the US congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) after the case of Enron and WorldCom; SOX 
increases the requirements of internal audit, to ensure that potential managerial 
wrongdoings can be detected in advance. Additionally, the SOX rules pay more 
attention to the role of independent directors. 
Another part of corporate governance reform is auditing reform. Those 
serious corporation scandals not only reveal the failure of the board of directors, 
but also highlight the poor auditing quality and poor independence of the audit 
committee in those companies (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005; Romano, 2005). 
Ferrarini and Giudici (2005) state that the external audit companies of those 
companies not only provided professional auditing services, but also provided 
non-auditing services. Romano (2005) points out that the provision of non-
auditing services will compromise the quality of the auditing report. To attract a 
company to purchase their auditing services, the audit companies have to 
sacrifice their auditing independence (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). Companies 
prefer to build a long-term business relationship with their auditing companies, 
which then have a low auditing independence, because the executives have 
more opportunities to manipulate the company's financial information. Under 
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these circumstances, auditing companies have less incentive to improve their 
auditing quality, and this exacerbates the information asymmetry. 
3.2.2. Information and the stock market 
3.2.2.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The term efficient market hypothesis (EMH) means that the stock prices 
„instantaneously and fully reflect all relevant available information‟ (Blake, 
2000:309).  If the securities market is an efficient market, the stock price will be 
equal to its true value, or the difference between market price and true value will 
be small. Investors need the financial market to be efficient, since this will help 
them to effectively evaluate the companies. 
To explain the EMH, Fama (1965; 1970) provides three information sets: 
1) weak-form, 2) semi-strong-form, and 3) strong-form. The weak-form 
information set only contains the historical prices of stock. The semi-strong-form 
information set includes all public information. The strong information set 
contains all available information, even private inside information. Under the 
three information set forms, the EMH can make different predictions. The weak-
form EMH implies that the stock price will fully reflect the historical performance 
of the stock, but investors are unable to predict the future with historical 
information (Blake, 2000). The semi-strong-form EMH means that the stock 
price will reflect all the public information, and that new information will be 
incorporated into the stock price rapidly (Blake, 2000). The strong-form EMH 
implies that the stock price will fully reflect all information, and that no investor 
can have an advantage over any other by getting an exclusive return (Blake, 
2000).  
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Investors need the securities market to be efficient, but in fact there is 
evidence against the EMH. The double moving average rule will be evidence 
against the weak-form EMH. Investors can set the short moving average and 
long moving average with historical data. If the short moving average rises 
(falls) over the long moving average, it will be a signal to purchase (sell) shares. 
In this case, the historical stock price will help investors to make their future 
investment decisions. Brock et al. (2000) show this rule works with their study of 
the US securities market. The calendar effect will be the evidence to go against 
the semi-strong-form EMH. The calendar effect indicates that there will be 
significant excess return of stock around the specific times of the „day of the 
week, or month of the year‟ (Blake, 2000:398-399). Ariel (2005) found that the 
return prior to a national holiday in the US will be higher than that of the average 
daily return. Both  legal and illegal insider trading  will be evidence  against the 
strong form EMH (Blake, 2000). Registered insiders and other illegal insiders 
have the ability to access non-public material information and this will help them 
to get excess returns from the market. Lorie and Niederhoffer (2010) and Jaffe 
(2004) state that the information advantages of insiders give them the ability to 
predict the price movement and to get an excess return in the market. 
These empirical studies indicate that even in the US market, which is a 
typical developed market, the strong-form EMH does not hold. Thus, there will 
be opportunities for the investors who have information advantage to earn 
excess returns from the market.  
3.2.2.2. Information leakage and insider trading 
       Information leakage 
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Information leakage is the phenomenon that the content of important 
corporate announcements, such as M&A and earnings announcement, is 
known by the market prior to the announcement date. 
Information leakage includes two types of business practice: „trading 
based on non-public material information and private communication between 
analysts and firms‟ (Mac, 2002:3). The known financial scandals show that 
some market makers changed their quoting behaviour before the information 
disclosure, since they received recommendations from market analysts, who 
are close to the trading department of a company (Heidle and Li, 2004). With 
information leakage, the stock price will be increased (decreased) before the 
good (bad) news. For instance in the US market, stock price will be adjusted 
before the disclosure date (Keim and Madhavan, 1996). Brunnermeier 
(2005:417) proposed three features of early-informed agents‟ trading strategy: 
1) he trades based on his private information twice, once before 
the public announcement and a second time after it  
2) he builds up a position which he intends to unwind partially 
after the public announcement because he predicts that the 
market will overreact to the news  
3) his trading prior to the announcement makes it more difficult 
for other market participants to learn from past price 
movements.  
Information leakage damages market fairness and integrity for the majority 
of investors do not receive the material information until companies publicly 
disclose it. Executives control the corporate information supply, time the 
disclosure, and choose the target user of disclosure (Lakhal, 2008). The market 
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regulatory rules prohibit executives from trading shares based on their 
information advantage, and executives have to disclose information to moderate 
the asymmetric information among company‟s participants. As a consequence 
of this, executives may leak information to their affiliated corporate participants. 
However, the myriad of other corporate participants lose the opportunity to have 
equal access to corporate information. Information leakage creates an 
information advantage for informed participants to expropriate the interest of 
other uninformed participants (Chiyachantana et al., 2004). The information 
advantage is based on the leaked information from corporate executives. Thus, 
leaking information to a small group of people may also exacerbate the conflict 
of interest between executives and corporate participants who do not receive 
the information. Brunnermeier (2005) indicates that although information 
leakage may increase efficiency of the pricing process in the short term, it 
makes the pricing process less informative in the long term. Thus, regulatory 
agencies of financial markets regulate the phenomenon of information leakage. 
For instance, the SEC promulgated Regulation Fair Disclose (FD) on 23 
October, 2000 to reduce the selective disclosure of listed companies.         
Insider trading 
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) classifies insider trading in 
two categories: legal insider trading and illegal insider trading. Legal insider 
trading is when insiders trade their company‟s stock, and report such 
transactions to the SEC (SEC, 2001).  
Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, 
in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and 
confidence, while in possession of material, non-public information 
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about the security. Insider trading violations may also include 
„tipping‟ such information, securities trading by the person „tipped‟, 
and securities trading by those who misappropriate such information 
(SEC, 2001).  
Insider trading breaks integrity and fairness in the securities markets, since 
it undermines the rights of other investors. Thus, the majority of financial 
markets act to control insider trading activities. However, illegal insider trading is 
hard to  detect, since it is hard to track the pattern of trading (Keown and 
Pinkerton, 1981). The predicate of insider trading is inside information. If this 
inside information is leaked to the market, investors can use it in their 
investment decisions. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) identify a possible pattern of 
information leakage. Insiders will leak the information to their friends and the 
latter spread this information further. To the market regulatory agency, it is easy 
to regulate the trading activities of registered insiders. However, it is much 
harder to examine the trading activities of the tippees of insiders. Thus, to 
reduce insider trading activities, one possible solution is to reduce information 
leakage. 
3.3. Empirical evidence 
3.3.1. Corporate governance mechanism and 
firm performance 
Cremers and Nair (2003; 2005) classify the corporate governance 
mechanism in  two categories,  internal and external. A typical external 
governance mechanism contains the market of control (e.g. takeover) and the 
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market legislation system (Easterbrook and Fiscal, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997a). Ownership structure and the board of directors are the important pillars 
of a typical internal governance mechanism (Cremers and Nair, 2003; Cremers 
and Nair, 2005).  
An unsophisticated corporate governance mechanism fails to reduce 
conflicts of interest among corporate participants, thereby exacerbating the 
agency costs of companies. For instance, a strong managerial team might align 
its managerial activities with its own interests (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). In 
these circumstances, there is a serious conflict of interest between the 
managerial team and the shareholders.  
A proper corporate governance mechanism will effectively reduce the 
conflicts of interest in a company. Klapper and Love (2004) state that an optimal 
corporate governance mechanism will bring higher operation performance and 
higher firm performance to a company. In the emerging markets, a better 
corporate governance mechanism will maximise the wealth of investors (Morey 
et al., 2009). Additionally, a better corporate governance mechanism increases 
the confidence of investors, for their investment will be guaranteed by the 
internal safeguard. A better corporate governance mechanism reduces 
information asymmetry, thereby leading to greater equity liquidity (Chen et al., 
2007a). 
An effective corporate governance mechanism is important to expanding 
new firms, since these firms need continuous financial support from the capital 
market. Thus, developing companies aim to adopt a good corporate 
governance mechanism to attract investment from the capital market (Klapper 
and Love, 2004). Firms which have a higher proportion of intangible assets, 
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also aim to employ a good governance mechanism. Intangible assets lead 
investors to doubt the safety of their investment, for intangible assets cannot be 
physically measured. Thus, investors need an extra protection to ensure the 
safety of their investment. A complex corporate governance mechanism can be 
seen as a commitment that companies will take all necessary action to ensure 
the investment will be appropriately deployed (Klapper and Love, 2004). 
3.3.1.1. Board of directors and firm performance 
The board of directors is an important pillar of the internal governance 
mechanism; its characteristics or composition will determine its effectiveness. 
Lakhal (2003) summarises three most important characteristics of a board: 
board size, board composition, and board leadership. They will affect the 
performance and quality of the corporate governance mechanism of a 
company. An optimal board will bring better firm performance to the corporate 
shareholders (Ragothaman and Gollakota, 2009). 
Firstly, firm performance will be influenced by the board independence. 
Leftwich et al. (1981) and Short and Keasey (1999) state that a board which is 
dominated by inside directors will be considered  an ineffective board. Boards of 
directors should represent the wide range of corporate shareholders, especially 
the small shareholders, in the management of companies and in monitoring the 
activities of the corporate executives. Investors will consider the board as a 
supervisory board, if the board is solely composed of independent directors, so 
greater board independence is a significant signal of good corporate 
governance (Black, 2001). Board independence will reduce the incidence of 
self-interested activities by insiders (Black, 2001). The duty of supervision 
undertaken by the independent director includes: 1) monitoring the incidence of 
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self-dealing activities of inside executives, and 2) taking necessary action to 
correct any management wrongdoing immediately (Bhagat and Black, 2002). 
Greater board independence leads to the board being better able to replace any 
executives who breach the accepted managerial code of practice (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). Lakhal (2003) argues that there will be more collusion with 
the corporate executives if the majority of the board members are inside 
directors. Under this circumstance, small shareholders and external 
shareholders will be easily expropriated by the managerial team, since they 
cannot rely on the board of directors to monitor it. Therefore, a board that is 
dominated by internal directors will exacerbate conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and executives.  
In companies, a poorly-performing managerial team will be replaced by an 
alternative managerial team. The relationship between the incidence of 
disciplinary turnover among executives and  board independence is positive 
(Hermalin, 1988). Hemalin and Weisbach (1998:112) point out that „CEO 
turnover is negatively related to performance and this relation is stronger when 
the board is more independent‟. Stock prices react positively  to the 
appointment of new independent or external directors (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 
1990). Appointment of an extra independent director signals that the company 
will provide better protection, and thus increases the confidence of 
shareholders. Dahya et al. (2008) state that independent directors, to some 
extent, are the strong protectors who provide a shield for the outside 
shareholders. Thus, greater board independence is a factor in improving 
company performance (Dahya et al., 2008; O‟Connel and Cramer, 2010).  
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However, other empirical results indicate that greater board independence 
does not actually increase firm performance. Mura (2006) states that board 
independence does not affect firm performance. Yermack (1996), Agrawal and 
Knoeber(1996; 1998), Bhagat and Black (2002) demonstrate that firm 
performance is negatively associated with board independence. Moreover, 
Fernandes (2005:17) argues that „companies with zero non-executive board 
members actually have a strong alignment between managerial and 
shareholder interests‟. Independent directors are independent from the 
company‟s managerial team, and thus they are excluded from the daily 
management of the companies. Greater board independence can leave the 
board with insufficient real information, thereby generating poor managerial 
decisions. 
Secondly, a board of directors‟ influence on firm performance is affected 
by board size. Jensen (1993) states that board size is an important factor in 
evaluating the performance of board of directors. Yermack (1996), Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003), and Guest (2009) point out that a smaller board is 
associated with better firm performance. A small board will spend less time 
informing its members. The shorter communication distance between members 
will help increase the efficiency of the board‟s decision making. An effective 
board will provide a rapid managerial decision to a company. O‟Connel and 
Cramer (2010) argue that there is a negative relationship between firm 
performance and the size of the board of directors in companies. However, 
Dalton et al. (1999) argue that board size positively affects firm performance. 
Although a large board may have lower efficiency of communication, a larger 
board can call on the experience of more directors to generate relatively 
favourable managerial decisions. Additionally, a complex company also need a 
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large board. Thus, a small board cannot increase firm performance in such 
companies (Coles et al., 2008; Larmou and Vafeas, 2010). 
Finally, the performance of a company will be determined by the 
leadership structure of its board of directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue 
that the conflict of interest between corporate insiders and the corporate 
shareholders will be exacerbated if one person simultaneously works as CEO 
and chairman. The dual-role leadership structure means that the board of 
directors and the managerial team are controlled by a single person (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Under this circumstance, the board of directors will have less 
incentive to monitor the managerial activities of the executives, thereby 
motivating corporate executives to manage companies in their own interests. 
Thus, the dual-role leadership exacerbates the potential for conflict of interest 
between shareholders and executives. To reduce this conflict of interest the 
CEO role should be separated from that of chairman; this will ensure that the 
managerial team will be effectively monitored by the board. The CEO-Chair 
separation will help companies increase the operation performance (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008). However, Schmid and Zimmermann (2008) state that the role 
separation of CEO and chairman does not really affect the improvement of firm 
performance, since firm performance will be reduced by the cost of role 
separation (Brickley et al., 1997). Schmid and Zimmermann (2008:185-186) 
characterise some potential costs of role separation: 
1) Who monitors the monitor? New agency costs may arise with the 
delegation of decisions to the independent chairman who is given 
enormous power, which he can use to extract rents from the firm. 
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These costs, however, can be reduced when the chairman holds 
equity in the firm. 
2) There are information costs in transferring critical information 
between the CEO and the chairman. As a result of his function, 
the CEO presumably possesses considerable specialized 
knowledge, which is also valuable to the chairman. Hence, a 
separation of the two functions requires a costly and possibly 
incomplete transfer of information between the CEO and 
chairman.  
3) Although a combination of the two functions creates a clear-cut 
leadership and potentially a more rapid implementation of 
decisions, separating the CEO and chairman functions might 
create the potential for rivalry between the two title holders. At the 
same time, a separation of the functions can make it more difficult 
to assign blame for bad company performance. 
4) In firms with combined functions, the CEO/chairman first passes 
the CEO title to his successor while retaining the chairman title 
during a probationary period. Doing so allows the board to 
monitor the new CEO on the job, and for the outgoing 
CEO/chairman to provide assistance and pass on important 
information to the new CEO. After the probationary period, the 
new CEO is often assigned the additional title of chairman, and 
the old chairman resigns from the board. The prospect of being 
promoted to chairman can provide important incentives to new 
CEOs, which are lost if a firm maintains an independent chairman. 
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Faleye (2007) points out that firms have incentives to consider an 
alternative leadership structure, and the separation of CEO and chairman will 
be counterproductive to some companies. 
3.3.1.2. Subcommittees and firm performance 
Audit committees work as internal reviewers in the listed companies (Klein, 
1998; Klein, 2002b; Klein, 2002a). An independent audit committee works as an 
independent reviewer of corporate financial disclosures and the managerial 
activities of corporate executives. Low independence of an audit committee will 
impair the efficiency and performance of that audit committee and therefore 
affect the quality of corporate disclosure and corporate auditing. A high quality 
of corporate disclosure will increase the confidence of market investors, since it 
reduces information asymmetry and market uncertainty. Effective corporate 
internal auditing will detect managerial wrongdoing and deter the executives 
from involving themselves in self-interested activity. Therefore, using an 
independent audit committee will enhance firm performance (Koh et al., 2007). 
Menon and Williams (1994) and Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find that the 
presence of executive directors on a board‟s compensation committee 
decreases its efficiency. A more independent compensation committee is more 
likely to impose a performance-sensitive remuneration package on corporate 
executives (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). There is a positive relationship 
between the executive stock options and firm performance if the company has a 
high quality compensation committee (Sun et al., 2009). 
An independent nomination committee is an important factor in improving 
board independence (Ruigrok et al., 2006). The quality of the board of directors 
will determine how the corporate governance mechanism influences the 
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performance of a company. The independence of the nomination committee is 
predicated on an effective board, since it ensures the nomination process is 
less influenced by corporate insiders. If a nomination committee is dominated 
by corporate insiders, the insiders will have more opportunity to allow affiliated 
people to serve as members of the board of directors. Hence, the board will 
have less incentive to monitor the managerial activities of the executives (Brown 
and Caylor, 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2006). 
3.3.1.3. Ownership structure and firm performance 
Besides the board of directors, another important pillar of the corporate 
governance mechanism is the ownership structure, since shareholders are the 
owners of listed companies. Because of the dispersed ownership structure, the 
rights of each shareholder will depend on the size of their holding. Therefore, 
the composition of corporate ownership will affect firm performance. 
Firms prefer a dispersed ownership structure if there is an active stock 
market, and the country‟s supervisory system encourages takeover as a 
method of  acquiring company control (Bolton and von Thadden, 1998). Admati 
et al.(1994) state that widespread ownership brings greater market liquidity and 
better risk-diversification to companies. Appropriate ownership concentration 
positively affects the performance of a company, since it lowers the problem of 
free-riders, which is caused by a dispersed ownership structure. Individual and 
small shareholders lack the ability and knowledge to monitor the corporate 
executives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Himmerlberg et al. (1999), Hansmann 
and Kraakman (2004) find that a dispersed ownership structure will exacerbate 
the conflict of interest between the executives and the shareholders, since the 
owners lack the ability to monitor the executives. Additionally, it is costly to call 
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all of the shareholders to manage listed companies (Hart, 1995). This means 
companies have less incentive to invite small shareholders to be part of the 
process of firm management. Thus, small shareholders have to rely on the large 
shareholders to monitor the corporate executives. Ownership concentration 
leads to large shareholders having opportunities to monitor the managerial team 
(Admati et al., 1994). Effective block-holders have more incentive to monitor 
corporate management and influence managerial decision making to improve 
the firm performance (Gorton and Kahl, 2008; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010).  
As a large shareholder in a company, the attitude of the founding family 
will influence firm performance. Andres (2008) states that an active founding 
family will drive the firm to get a better performance in the market, whereas a 
passive founding family cannot provide this benefit. Additionally, the effect of 
family ownership on firm performance also depends on the capital structure of 
the company (King and Santor, 2008). The ownership structure also affects the 
transaction cost of a company‟s share. There is a negative relationship between 
the bid-ask spread and the institutional ownership (Kini et al., 1995). A wide bid-
ask spread will decrease the firm‟s liquidity through the high transaction cost. 
The high transaction cost prevents companies getting extra investment via the 
capital market, thereby decreasing performance.  
However, if the ownership of a company is highly concentrated in 
dominant or majority (holding) shareholders, ownership concentration will have 
a negative effect on firm performance. Large shareholders are able to 
expropriate the right of small shareholders through abusing the company‟s 
assets (Dahya et al., 2008). Large shareholders have opportunities to abuse the 
company‟s assets while leaving the cost to small shareholders. If majority 
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(holding) shareholders enhance their ownership through cross-shareholding or 
they appoint their affiliated people to serve as powerful employees, the 
ownership of majority (holding) shareholders will negatively affect firm 
performance (Yeh, 2005). Through related party transactions, dominant 
shareholders seriously expropriate the right of small shareholders (Dahya et al., 
2008). A related party transaction is a transaction when a dominant shareholder 
arranges a deal between two firms, which are related to this dominant 
shareholder. In such a transaction, the company, which is controlled by a 
dominant shareholder, will provide advantaged terms to the other company, 
which is related to the dominant shareholder (Dahya et al., 2008). Thus, the 
related party transaction hurts the right of the small shareholder, since they do 
not share the benefit of a related party transaction. Under some special 
circumstances, the majority (holding) shareholder can improve the quality of 
corporate governance. For instance, when firms issue new shares in the 
market, dominant shareholders will prefer to appoint new additional 
independent directors to the board of directors (Dahya et al., 2008). Through 
the appointment of new independent directors, majority (holding) shareholders 
seek to increase the confidence of investors and attract more investment from 
them.  
To ensure that managerial activities are aligned with the interests of 
corporate shareholders, corporate executives need to be awarded an effective 
compensation package. An effective compensation mechanism will attract an 
appropriate outside human resource, and will persuade the current corporate 
managerial team to increase the firm‟s performance (Anderson and Bizjak, 
2003). The purpose of managerial ownership is to link the wealth of managerial 
executives with the improvement of firm performance. In this way increased firm 
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performance will increase the wealth of corporate executives. Through 
managerial ownership, corporate executives will be stimulated to improve firm 
performance. Thus managerial ownership is positively related to the target 
returns of companies (Bauguess et al., 2009). Inappropriate managerial 
ownership, however, will have a harmful effect on firm performance. A large 
managerial ownership endows managerial executives with the power to reduce 
the effective supervision of the internal governance mechanism. Well-
entrenched managerial executives will have more inclination to manage the 
company in their own interests rather than in the interests of corporate 
shareholders. Therefore, inappropriate managerial ownership will impair firm 
performance. There is an inverted-U or hump-shaped relationship between 
Tobin‟s-Q and managerial ownership (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Coles et al., 
2007). 
3.3.1.4. Endogeneity between firm performance and 
board of directors 
The corporate governance mechanism is a material factor in the 
improvement of firm performance.  At the same time, company performance will 
determine the choice of a corporate governance mechanism, such as the 
composition of the board. Thus, the corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance simultaneously influence each other.  
Hermalin and Weisbech (1998), Bebchuk et al. (2002), and Ryan Jr and 
Wiggins Iii (2004) point out that board independence is a result of the 
bargaining process between the corporate executives and the board of directors, 
and the turnover of executives will be higher if the majority of the board is 
independent.  During this process, the bargaining power depends on the 
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previous performance of the company (Wintoki et al., 2008). Board 
independence increases the supervision deterrence of internal governance, and 
thus motivates the corporate executives to improve firm performance 
(Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Dahya et al., 2008). If the executives fail to 
increase firm performance, they will be replaced by alternative executives. 
Conversely, if the executives increase firm performance, they will ask for more 
managerial discretion from the board. Black (2001), Wintoki et al. (2008) state 
that within any particular period, board independence will be negatively related 
to previous firm performance, since the executives will be given more 
managerial discretion, thereby influencing the choice of the company‟s 
corporate governance mechanism. 
However, in the Chinese securities market, the endogeneity between 
company performance and independent directors does not exist. The ownership 
structure of Chinese listed companies makes the problem of insider control 
serious, since large shareholders, especially the majority (holding) shareholder, 
have substantial influence in the Chinese listed companies (Li et al., 2005; Kang 
et al., 2008). Independent directors will be influenced by the interest of large 
shareholders (Kang et al., 2008; Wei and Geng, 2008). Under this circumstance 
board independence will have no significant effect on firm performance of 
Chinese listed companies (Wei, 2000). Thus, if they perform poorly in the 
market companies will have fewer reasons to increase the board independence 
to improve firm performance, 
3.3.2. Corporate governance mechanism and 
corporate transparency 
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The separation of ownership and control in contemporary listed companies 
leads to conflicts of interest among their participants. Shareholders give 
managerial discretion to corporate insiders. However, not all corporate insiders 
are loyal to the shareholders; some of them are unscrupulous and intend to 
expropriate the rights of the outsiders. Thus corporate governance is attracting 
more and more attention, since shareholders have to rely on corporate 
governance mechanisms to monitor listed companies.  
Aguilera (2005) states that corporate governance, which includes internal 
and external mechanisms, will ensure the operational efficiency of a company to 
maximise the wealth of corporate participants and provide good entrenchment 
to them. Jiraporn and Davidson (2009) argue that market regulation will 
encourage shareholders to actively protect their rights. In general, the external 
corporate governance mechanism depends on the quality of public legislation 
and other market mechanisms; internal mechanisms are mainly determined by 
the board of directors and the ownership structure. 
3.3.2.1. Board of directors 
The board of directors is an important component of the internal corporate 
governance system, since it takes on the duty of monitoring the corporate 
executives to protect the corporate shareholders. The separation of ownership 
and control, and a dispersed ownership structure make collective supervision by 
all corporate shareholders costly. The board therefore represents the majority of 
corporate shareholders in monitoring the companies with the permission of 
those shareholders, who delegate managerial and supervisory power to the 
board of directors (Lim et al., 2007; Dahya et al., 2008). Supervision of 
managerial activities is one of the most important duties of the board. 
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Supervision is used as a comprehensive label to cover all value–enhancing 
activities. It „comprises intervention in a company‟s affairs as well as information 
acquisition and is used synonymously with intervention and shareholder 
activism‟ (Maug, 1998:66).  
Directors have a fiduciary duty to corporate shareholders, thus they are 
supposed to protect their interests. However, in practice, directors are often 
criticised by the shareholders since the highly-paid corporate executives have 
opportunities to expropriate interest from the corporate shareholders (Anderson 
et al., 2007). If the board is dominated by executive members, such as the 
CEO, it will have fewer intentions to monitor the managerial activities of the 
corporate executives. Thus, corporate governance mechanisms emphasise the 
need for independent directors as they will bring greater transparency, 
accountability and efficiency to corporate governance (Aguilera, 2005; Lin et al., 
2007).   
The high accuracy and transparency of corporate disclosure is one 
objective of a good corporate governance mechanism, for it facilitates corporate 
shareholders to protect their rights (OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004). However, a 
corporate managerial team can have a strong need to manipulate the content of 
financial disclosure in order to reduce company transparency. Black (2001), Ho 
and Wong (2001), Klein (2002a), and Davidson et al. (2005) state that board 
independence is negatively related to the incidence of earning management. If 
a board is solely composed of executive directors, companies will have less 
incentive to increase the quality of corporate disclosure. If corporate executives 
have the opportunity to manipulate the content of financial disclosure, corporate 
shareholders cannot effectively detect illegal activity in the corporate managerial 
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team. Black (2001) indicates that independent directors have a duty of loyalty 
and a duty of disclosure to corporate shareholders. Independent directors are 
independent from the corporate managerial team, and therefore will be less 
influenced by the corporate insiders. If the majority of the board is independent, 
the board will be more likely to demand that corporate insiders increase the 
transparency and accuracy of corporate financial disclosure (Forker, 1992; 
Nowak and McCabe, 2003; Ahmed et al., 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; 
Bingfa et al., 2011). Greater independence in the board constrains the 
phenomenon of earnings management, and reveals true financial information 
about the company to the market (Cornett et al., 2009). A reduction in earnings 
management  increases the quality of corporate information disclosure which 
will in turn reduce the information asymmetry (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). 
Generally, greater board independence will lead insiders to disclose more 
information and reduce information asymmetry, and thus help shareholders 
effectively monitor their companies. 
The effectiveness of a board will be decreased by low board 
independence, large size and dual-role leadership structure (Ryan Jr and 
Wiggins Iii, 2004).  A large board has a low efficiency of internal communication, 
since members have to spend more time understanding an event and 
determining a suitable solution. A large board cannot verify corporate 
information rapidly, thus the large size of a board can decrease the quality of 
corporate disclosure. A small board will have a high verification efficiency of the 
content of information, thereby increasing the information value of a corporate 
announcement (Vafeas, 2000).  
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The phenomenon that one person can simultaneously be the chairman 
and CEO in a company will exacerbate information asymmetry, since this gives 
a corporate managerial team more opportunity to manipulate corporate 
information disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001). The CEO as the leader of the 
corporate managerial team controls the daily management of company. The 
chairman is the leader of board which monitors the managerial activities of 
corporate managerial team, in order to protect the rights of the shareholders. If 
one person simultaneously serves as the CEO and the chairman in a company, 
this person will be given substantial managerial power. For instance, this person 
has the power to undermine the internal governance mechanism. With this dual-
role leadership structure, the corporate managerial team will have more 
managerial discretion because its leader is also the leader of the board of 
directors. Therefore, the board will have less incentive to monitor the activities 
of the corporate managerial team and this will increase information asymmetry 
between the company and its shareholders (Bingfa et al., 2011).   
3.3.2.2. Board subcommittees 
Board subcommittees work as assistants to the board to deal with certain 
managerial issues. Klein (1998) points out that the independent status of these 
subcommittees is very important, for this will determine how they affect the 
internal governance of a company. The majority of western companies have 
established audit, compensation (remuneration) and nomination committees. 
Vafeas (1999, 2003) argues that if the executive directors serve as members of 
these board subcommittees, they will be less likely to reduce the influence of 
company executives. 
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An effective audit committee is the guarantee of corporate financial 
accuracy and integrity and therefore increases corporate transparency; this 
reduces information asymmetry and provides better protection to the corporate 
shareholders (Cotter and Silvester, 2003; Koh et al., 2007). A primary function 
of the audit committee is to review the content of any disclosure to ensure the 
quality of corporate financial disclosure. Additionally, the audit committee has a 
duty to ensure the quality of internal and external auditing in a company. Finally, 
the audit committee has a duty to review and evaluate the performance of the 
corporate managerial team. These duties require the audit committee to work 
as independently as possible in a company. Thus, an effective audit committee 
should contain sufficient independent directors. Vafeas (1999, 2003) points out 
that the efficiency and performance of an audit committee will be impaired if it is 
controlled by insiders. Menon and Williams (1994) also state that the executive 
members will reduce the independent status of the audit committee, and render 
it incapable of independent company review. Executive directors are inevitably 
close to company insiders which compromises their ability to review them. 
Under this circumstance, the audit committee will be unable to effectively audit 
the company, thereby increasing information asymmetry. 
The compensation committee plays an important role in a company for its 
duty is to design an effective compensation package for the corporate 
managerial team. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) point out that the principal duty of 
a remuneration committee is to design the corporate compensation contract that 
will attract and retain suitable executives. The remuneration committee should 
therefore be an independent body in a company, since it must ensure that 
insiders cannot influence the compensation scheme. William (1985), and 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) argue that if it is not independent, executives have 
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more opportunity to influence the compensation contract to their own 
advantage. An independent compensation committee ensures that the content 
of corporate compensation represents the interests of the majority of 
shareholders. Secondly, an independent compensation committee will reduce 
the information asymmetry, since it will disclose more information about the 
corporate compensation mechanism to the market (Laksmana, 2008). This will 
give shareholders more opportunity to monitor the corporate insiders.  
If the board‟s nomination is less influenced by insiders, the board will have 
more reason to use its independent judgement in a company (Laksmana, 
2008). Thus, nomination independence ensures board independence, and thus, 
increases the deterrence-value of the corporate governance mechanism. 
Vafeas (1999) points out that the benefits of using a nomination committee 
include:  
1) higher efficiency of nomination 
2) less influence of corporate executive team in nomination 
3) enhancement of board independence.  
Ruigrok et al. (2006) also state that the nomination committee enhances 
board independence. Vafeas (2003) illustrates that an independent nomination 
committee will increase the board‟s independence, since it ensures the 
independence of the board member. Greater independence of the nomination 
committee will motivate the board of directors to appoint more genuinely 
independent directors in companies. Thus, an independent nomination 
committee will increase board independence, and motivate the boards of listed 
companies to work correctly, thereby increasing corporate transparency. 
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3.3.2.3. Ownership structure 
Institutional shareholders are considered  an important component of 
corporate governance, since they are block holders and are able  to monitor the 
managerial activities of the corporate executive team (Lin et al., 2007). 
Compared with individual and small shareholders, institutional shareholders 
prefer to hold substantial shares in a company for they are likely to want to 
become part of the firm‟s management (Lin et al., 2007). The dispersed 
ownership structure of modern listed companies leads to individual and small 
shareholders having fewer ambitions and opportunities to monitor them. Under 
these circumstances, companies may be less supervised by the shareholders, 
and thus an opportunity arises to increase information asymmetry and 
expropriate the right of these small shareholders. Therefore, the dispersed 
ownership needs to be appropriately concentrated in some large shareholders, 
like institutional shareholders. Appropriate ownership concentration gives 
institutional shareholders the opportunity to monitor the listed companies and 
reduce the information asymmetry. Lin et al. (2007) point out that the 
institutional shareholders prefer to appoint more independent directors to the 
board of directors. Thus, appropriate institutional ownership increases the 
board‟s independence and this places more supervisory pressure on the 
companies. Increased board independence will also drive the listed companies 
to increase the quality of corporate disclosure (Laidroo, 2009). Appropriate 
ownership concentration mitigates the phenomenon of earnings management, 
which also increases the quality of corporate disclosure (Gaspar and Massa, 
2007; Chen-Lung et al., 2009). Increased transparency of disclosure will help 
the investors to monitor the listed companies effectively and protect their rights.  
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Like a double-edge sword, ownership concentration can also have a 
harmful effect on investor protection, if shares of the company are 
inappropriately concentrated in large shareholdings. Inappropriate ownership 
concentration leads to large shareholders monopolizing a company‟s operation, 
due to their substantial influence.  In this way they can manage companies in 
their own interests and impose an unexpected cost on the small shareholders 
(Faccio et al., 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; López-de-Foronda et al., 2007). 
In other words, individual and small shareholders are excluded from the process 
of corporate decision making, thereby having few opportunities to monitor 
companies. Lower ownership concentration will increase a board‟s 
independence because the process of corporate nomination will be less 
influenced by the large shareholders (Cotter and Silvester, 2003). High 
ownership concentration leads to large shareholders controlling the board‟s 
nomination process for these listed companies. Thus they can nominate and 
appoint their own people to serve as members of the board. The board will then 
align its activities with the interests of the large shareholders rather than with 
those of all shareholders. Large shareholders will be able to persuade corporate 
executives to reduce the quality of disclosure, to ensure that this information 
remains their privilege (Laidroo, 2009). 
To motivate managerial teams to align their activities with the interests of 
corporate shareholders, listed companies allow members of the executive 
teams to hold shares of their own companies. Appropriate managerial 
ownership will increase the alignment effect of the corporate governance 
mechanism and therefore reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and insiders. López-de-Foronda et al. (2007) state that in the common law 
countries, such as UK and Ireland, low managerial ownership adds an 
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alignment effect to the managerial teams while high management ownership 
creates an entrenchment effect in the managerial teams. Appropriate 
managerial ownership aligns the activities of executives with the interests of the 
company since their wealth will be related to it. However, inappropriate 
managerial ownership motivates managerial teams to go against the 
supervision of the internal governance mechanism. Lasfer (2006) states that the 
proportion of managerial ownership negatively affects board independence; 
greater ownership motivates managerial teams to influence the board‟s 
composition. Independent directors will seek to reduce the influence of the 
corporate executives; thus corporate executives will want to reduce board 
independence. Additionally, executives who have  large option positions are 
more likely to file earnings restatements and therefore manage the earning 
announcements of their companies (Burns and Kedia, 2003). 
3.4. Good corporate governance 
Companies need corporate governance to align the various interests of 
their participants. Alignment of interest will reduce the conflicts of interest 
among corporate participants; thereby increasing firm performance and 
decreasing asymmetric information. OECD (2004) concludes that the practice of 
good corporate governance should promote corporate transparency - to ensure 
the integrity of markets, protect the rights of all shareholders without any 
discrimination, and facilitate shareholders in exercising their rights. It recognises 
the rights of stakeholders and encourages cooperation between corporation and 
stakeholder in creating wealth for the corporation and society, increases the 
responsibility and accountability of the board to the shareholders, and discloses 
all material matters regarding companies in a timely and accurately way. 
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Khanchel (2007:743-745) summarises eight indicators of a good corporate 
governance mechanism: 1) independent directors, 2) independence of 
committees, 3) board size, 4) split chairman/CEO roles, 5) board meetings, 6) 
competence of audit committee members, 7) reputation of auditors, and 8)  
audit committee meetings. Moreover, a good corporate governance mechanism 
not only concerns the wealth of corporate shareholders, but it also protects their 
rights (Aguilera, 2005). 
For instance, the UK Corporate Governance Code requires that a board of 
directors in companies should have the following features, such as high 
independence, appropriate board size, and the separation of CEO and 
chairman of a board.  
However, empirical studies indicate that greater board independence 
(Mura, 2006), a small board (Coles et al., 2008; Larmou and Vafeas, 2010), and 
role separation will not actually increase firm performance (Schmid and 
Zimmermann, 2008). Although these features increase the corporate 
transparency which protects the interest of other shareholders (Cornett et al., 
2009; Chung et al., 2010; Bingfa et al., 2011), they cannot be considered as 
features of good corporate governance, since an increase in firm performance 
is one of the important purposes of corporate governance.  
However, the use of board subcommittees and institutional ownership are 
found to have positive effects on both firm performance and corporate 
transparency. The use of board subcommittees concentrates the relevant 
members of a board and reduces the influence of corporate executives on 
managerial decision making. This ensures that the board will manage 
companies objectively and comply with the interest of the company. Thus, 
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board subcommittees will also help companies improve firm performance and 
reduce asymmetric information (e.g. Koh et al., 2007; Laksmana, 2008; Sun et 
al., 2009). Institutional investors will help companies to increase the quality of 
corporate governance. As a consequence of the widespread ownership 
structure, the problem of the free-rider will harm the quality of corporate 
governance mechanisms of companies, since most small shareholders have 
little ability or inclination to monitor companies. Thus, corporate insiders will be 
less monitored by shareholders. Under this circumstance, institutional investors 
will work as representatives of many outside shareholder to monitor companies. 
They are able to drive corporate insiders to comply with the interest of the 
majority of shareholders and reduce asymmetric information. In this way, 
institutional investors will have positive effects on firm performance and 
corporate transparency (e.g. Gorton and Kahl, 2008; Chen-Lung et al., 2009; 
Laidroo, 2009; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). Thus, the use of board of 
subcommittees and the proportion of institutional ownership should be 
considered as features of good corporate governance. 
As mentioned above, some features of a good corporate governance 
mechanism, such as high board independence, small board and the role 
separation, may not help companies to improve firm performance (e.g. Mura, 
2006; Larmou and Vafeas, 2010; Zimmermann, 2008). However, the board 
subcommittees and institutional ownership are able to improve firm 
performance and reduce asymmetric information (e.g. Sun et al., 2009; 
Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). Thus, Chinese companies may motivate the 
development board subcommittees and institutional ownership to increase the 
quality of corporate governance mechanisms. 
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3.5. Barriers to corporate governance in 
China 
As mentioned in section 2.4 and section 2.6, barriers that limit the 
development of corporate governance in Chinese companies include the 
inappropriate ownership structure, the unsophisticated legislation, and the 
culture of Chinese society. 
The choice of a corporate governance mechanism should be oriented by 
the interest of the majority of shareholders, since this will ensure that the 
corporate governance mechanism of companies will reduce conflicts of interest 
among most of the corporate participants. However, if the choice of corporate 
governance is driven by the interest of a single shareholder, the corporate 
governance mechanism may only reduce conflicts of interest between 
executives and holding shareholder and there will be no solution for the conflicts 
of interest among shareholders of companies. The inappropriate ownership 
concentration in Chinese companies means that corporate governance is less 
developed. Because of the influence exerted by holding shareholders, the 
nomination of companies is distorted and influenced by their interests 
(Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; Zhou, 2009; Chen et al., 2011). Under this 
circumstance, the board of directors, board subcommittees, and executives of 
companies represent the interest of holding shareholder only. This may reduce 
the conflicts of interest between holding shareholders and executives, but the 
conflicts of interest among shareholders of companies will be hard to eliminate.  
Stock segmentation also restricts the development of corporate 
governance mechanism in Chinese companies. Stock segmentation results in 
the market mechanism being unable to improve the quality of corporate 
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governance in Chinese companies (Tomasic and Fu, 2006). Companies with a 
poor corporate governance mechanism will become the target companies of 
other companies that have a good corporate governance mechanism. However, 
stock segmentation in Chinese companies causes mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) to be rare in the Chinese market (Xu et al., 2005). In this case, the 
market mechanism cannot drive Chinese companies to increase the quality of 
corporate governance.  
A good corporate governance mechanism needs a series of sophisticated 
laws. However, the unsophisticated legislation of the Chinese market means 
that corporate governance is less developed. For instance, the duties and 
liabilities of independent directors in Chinese companies are not clearly defined 
(Jiang, 2009b). Thus, this causes independent directors to be ineffective in 
Chinese companies. The design of the board of supervisors also restricts the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in Chinese companies, as the duties of 
this institution are similar to that of the board of directors. Thus, the 
unsophisticated legislation of the Chinese market restricts the development of 
corporate governance in Chinese companies. 
Finally, the culture of Chinese society is another reason for the limited 
development of corporate governance in Chinese market. Corporate 
governance is based on a series of contracts, and the participants of companies 
need to comply with these contracts. However, in Chinese society, the guanxi 
network is more important than the contract. The guanxi network is deeply 
rooted in Chinese society, making its importance higher than that of any 
contract. Thus, the guanxi network may drive participants of companies to break 
contracts. As a consequence, corporate governance will lose its deterrence 
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value in Chinese companies. Therefore, the guanxi network is another factor 
that limits the effectiveness of corporate governance in Chinese companies. 
3.6. Research gap 
Previous studies focus on the situation of the pre-reform period (e.g. 
Tomasic and Fu, 2006; Xu et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007). Because of the 
recent market reforms, such as the elimination of non-tradable shares in the 
Chinese securities market, Chinese listed companies may be motivated to 
change their attitude to corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, it is valuable 
to test the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance after market reform. This will reveal how the market reforms 
change the effect of corporate governance mechanism on company 
performance in Chinese listed companies.  
Previous studies of the Chinese securities market found that there is 
significant information within it (e.g. Shi and Jiang, 2003; Yan and Zhao, 2006). 
These studies found that before the corporate announcement date, such as the 
announcement of M&A, the stock price would be dramatically increased, while 
the effect of an information announcement on stock price was not significant in 
the short term. Thus, they argue that this phenomenon may suggest that the 
content of a corporate announcement is leaked to the market in advance, and 
there may be insider trading activities based on that leaked information. Yet, 
these studies pay less attention to the effect of the corporate governance 
mechanism on the phenomenon of information leakage. It is valuable to test the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and the 
phenomenon of information leakage in the Chinese securities market, and thus, 
find out how the corporate governance mechanism might be used to reduce it. 
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As mentioned above, previous studies ignore the new development of 
corporate governance in the Chinese securities market. Thus, this thesis adopts 
data of pre and post reform periods to measure how these new developments 
of the Chinese securities market will impact on the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance and information leakage in China.  
3.7. Research hypotheses 
The research hypotheses are developed as follows.  
Board of directors 
Fama (1980) argues that the board works as an efficient internal 
monitoring institution in listed companies. Thus, the composition of the board of 
directors will determine its effect on the quality of the corporate governance 
mechanism. 
The board of directors will affect information asymmetry of the companies 
(Lim et al., 2007). Shapiro (2005), Cheng and Lo (2006) state that corporate 
insiders have intentions to manipulate corporate disclosure. Dye (2001:184) 
says that „any entity contemplating making a disclosure will disclose information 
that is favourable to the entity, and will not disclose information unfavourable to 
the entity‟. Leftwich et al. (1981), Short and Keasey (1999) state that low board 
independence decreases the efficiency of corporate transparency. Independent 
directors have a responsibility to gather adequate information about firms 
(Nowak and McCabe, 2003). Forker (1992), Ho and Wong (2001) Bhagat and 
Black (2002), Karamanou and Vafeas(2005), Ahmed et al.(2006) and 
Kanagaretnam et al.(2007) argue that the proportion of independent directors 
on the board can improve the quality of corporate disclosure.  
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However, Vance (1964), Yermack(1996), Agrawal and Knoeber(1996), 
Bhagat and Bolton (2002), and Fernandes(2005) state that there is a negative 
relationship between board independence and firm performance. Independent 
directors are not involved in the managerial process of companies, and thus 
they are lack information about the company. Under this circumstance, their 
judgement may not be well enough informed, and therefore, the decisions of 
independent directors may be not suitable. 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between board 
independence and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. (i.e. board 
independence decreases information leakage) 
Hypotheses 1b: There is a negative relationship between board 
independence and firm performance in Chinese listed companies. 
Board size will affect the efficiency of a board of directors in the corporate 
governance mechanism. Jensen (1993) argues that board size is an important 
indicator to measure board efficiency. Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993), 
Eisenberg et al. (1998), and Ahmed et al. (2006) state that board size 
negatively affects the quality of monitoring by a board, since a small board has 
higher efficiency in communication and coordination. Lakhal (2003) points out 
that a smaller board can put more monitoring pressure on the corporate insiders 
to ensure the quality of corporate information disclosure. Yermack (1996) and 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) state that the smaller board leads to the companies 
achieving better firm performance in the market. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
also report a negative relationship between firm performance and the size of the 
board of directors. 
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Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between board size and 
information leakage in Chinese listed companies. (i.e. board size increases 
information leakage) 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a negative relationship between board size and 
firm performance in Chinese listed companies.  
The last characteristic is the board‟s leadership. In a company, the CEO 
and the Chairman are the two most important roles. The CEO is the leader of 
the corporate managerial team, while the Chairman heads the board of 
directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) illustrate that if one person simultaneously 
works as both the CEO and the Chairman, potential conflicts of interest within 
the company will be exacerbated, since the board‟s activities will be aligned with 
the interests of the managerial team. Separation of the role of CEO and 
Chairman increases the quality of board monitoring (Mak and Li, 2001; Goyal 
and Park, 2002). Thus, role-separation strengthens information disclosure and 
motivates corporate managerial teams to increase firm performance.  Peng et 
al. (2010) find that the CEO duality will negatively moderate the positive 
relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in Chinese 
companies. 
Hypotheses 3a: There is a negative relationship between role separation 
and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. (i.e. role separation 
decreases information leakage) 
Hypotheses 3b: There is a positive relationship between role separation 
and firm performance in Chinese listed companies. 
Board subcommittees 
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Besides the board of directors, board committees are another important 
pillar of the corporate governance mechanism. A board delegates some of its 
duties to its subcommittees (Vefeas, 1999). In a company, the audit committee, 
the compensation committee, and the nominating committee all work as 
consultants to the board of directors (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007b). The 
majority of members of these subcommittees should ideally be independent 
directors, since this will reduce the influence of inside directors. 
The function of an audit committee is to ensure the quality of financial 
statements and to oversee internal and external auditing. The remuneration or 
compensation committee is the designer of corporate executives‟ compensation 
packages. The nomination committee takes on the task of choosing candidates 
to be the board members. The establishment of board subcommittees will 
increase board performance and increase the quality of corporate governance 
(Menon et al., 1994; Klein, 1998; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Vafeas, 1999; 
Vafeas, 2003).   
Hypotheses 4a: there is a negative relationship between board 
subcommittees and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. (i.e. 
board subcommittees decrease information leakage) 
Hypotheses 4b: there is a positive relationship between board 
subcommittees and firm performance in Chinese listed companies. 
Ownership structure 
A widespread ownership structure is a feature of modern listed 
companies. However, a widespread ownership structure can create the problem 
of the free-rider, which is caused by inexpert and/or passive investors, and thus 
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impair the quality of the corporate governance mechanism. Thus, shares need 
to be appropriately concentrated. A concentrated ownership structure leads to 
institutional shareholders becoming blockholders, thereby motivating them to 
monitor the managerial team of their companies (Admati et al., 1994; Lin et al., 
2007). The existence of institutional investors thus increases the quality of 
company corporate governance. Singh and Gaur (2009) find a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. However, 
if the ownership concentration is inappropriately concentrated to the large 
shareholders, these large shareholders can expropriate the right of small 
shareholders and influence the quality of corporate governance via their 
substantial shareholding (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; López-de-Foronda et al., 
2007). Therefore, lower ownership concentration or absence of majority 
(holding) shareholders will increase board independence (Cotteret et al., 2003).  
Hypothesis 5a-1: there is a positive relationship between holding of the 
largest shareholder (as percentage of all shares) and information leakage in 
Chinese listed companies. (i.e. holding of largest shareholders increases 
information leakage) 
Hypothesis 5a-2: there is a negative relationship between holding of the 
largest shareholder (as percentage of all shares) and firm performance in 
Chinese listed companies 
In China, most of the listed companies are former SOEs. In the process of 
corporatisation of these listed companies, SOEs became public companies 
through IPO, and the state became majority (holding) shareholders. Shen and 
Lin (2009) state that state ownership weakens the possibilities of turnover of 
poorly performing executive staff in Chinese listed companies. Thus, Lin et al. 
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(2007), Chen et al. (2007b) and Li et al. (2008) state that a low proportion of 
state ownership will increase firm performance. State ownership will exacerbate 
the information asymmetry between companies and shareholders (Choi et al., 
2010). Additionally the state holdings will reduce the efficiency of market 
regulation (Berkman et al., 2009). Thus, state ownership will increase 
information asymmetry, thereby causing more cumulative abnormal returns 
prior to the announcement date. 
Hypothesis 5b-1: There is a positive relationship between the holding of 
the state (as percentage of all shares) and information leakage in the Chinese 
listed companies. (i.e. the holding of the state increases information leakage.) 
Hypothesis 5b-2: There is a negative relationship between the holding of 
the state (as percentage of all shares) and firm performance of the Chinese 
listed companies. 
Another feature of the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies is 
that the majority of shares of the Chinese companies are non-tradable shares. 
Non-tradable shares cannot be freely traded in the market. Tomasic and Fu 
(2006) state that the non-tradable shares make it impossible for the market 
mechanism to improve the quality of corporate governance mechanism. Thus, 
the Chinese government and the market regulatory authority have begun to 
reduce the number of non-tradable shares.  
Hypothesis 5c-1: There is a negative relationship between the percentage 
of tradable shares and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. (i.e 
percentage of tradable shares decreases information leakage.) 
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 Hypothesis 5c-2: There is a positive relationship between the percentage 
of tradable shares and firm performance in Chinese listed companies. 
Nowadays, institutional investors have become important market 
participants. Shen et al. (2009) point out that institutional ownership positively 
affects the turnover of corporate executives when firm performance is poor. 
Hovey et al. (2003) and Lin et al. (2007) state that institutional ownership is 
positively related to firm performance. 
Hypothesis 5d-1: There is a negative relationship between the holding of 
institutional investors (as percentage of all shares) and information leakage in 
Chinese listed companies. (i.e.the holding of institutional investors decreases 
information leakage.) 
Hypothesis 5d-2: There is a positive relationship between the holding of 
institutional investors (as percentage of all shares) and firm performance in 
Chinese listed companies.  
Board of supervisors 
In Chinese listed companies, the board of supervisors is another important 
pillar of internal governance. The function of a board of supervisors is to 
represent stakeholders and employees in monitoring both the managerial team 
and the board of directors (Wang, 2005). However, the board of directors is the 
most powerful monitoring institution in the company, and so the supervisory 
board plays  a purely consultative role (Tian and Estrin, 2005). Therefore, it is 
thought that the creation of a board of supervisors does not have a significant 
effect on the quality of corporate governance in the Chinese markets. However, 
recent market reform has given more regulatory power to the board of 
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supervisors, and it is expected that the supervisory board will now have more 
impact on company performance and CARs. 
Hypothesis 6a: There is a negative relationship between the size of the 
board of supervisors and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. (i.e. 
the size of the board of supervisors decreases information leakage) 
Hypothesis 6b: There is no significant relationship between the size of the 
board of supervisors and firm performance in Chinese listed companies. 
3.8. Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the relevant theories and the previous studies. It 
also included sections on theoretical background and on empirical evidence. 
Firstly, the section of theoretical background briefly described the purpose 
of a corporate governance mechanism. Companies rely on corporate 
governance mechanisms to reduce conflicts of interest among the corporate 
participants. The section on theoretical background briefly described the 
components of internal governance mechanisms in corporate governance. 
Additionally, the section on theoretical background suggested the direction for 
the future development of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Secondly, the section on theoretical background briefly described the 
effect of information on the securities market. Because of the information 
asymmetry, inside information will help investors to gain an abnormal return. 
Thus, insider trading activities destroy market fairness and integrity .Several 
reasons are reviewed which support the regulation of insider trading. This 
section listed these reasons.  
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Thirdly, the section of empirical evidence reviewed the previous relevant 
studies about the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. Previous studies reveal that the corporate governance 
mechanism will affect firm performance of the listed companies. Firstly, 
composition of board of directors will influence firm performance. For instance, if 
a company separates its CEO from the chairmanship of its board of directors, 
there will be fewer conflicts of interest in this company, thereby helping 
companies to achieve good performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Secondly, 
use of board subcommittees will increase firm performance. For instance, by 
increasing corporate transparency the audit committee motivates the 
managerial team to align its managerial activities with the interests of corporate 
shareholders (Koh et al., 2007). Finally, ownership structure will affect firm 
performance. For instance, a greater proportion of institutional ownership is a 
factor in improved firm performance (Kini et al., 1995). 
Fourthly, the section of empirical evidence reviewed previous studies of 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
transparency.  Firstly, board composition will affect corporate transparency. For 
instance, board independence increases corporate transparency (Cornet et al., 
2009). Secondly, ownership structure will affect the quality of corporate 
transparency. For instance, institutional ownership positively influences board 
independence, thereby increasing corporate transparency (Chen-Lung et al., 
2009). Inappropriate ownership concentration will lower corporate transparency, 
since it impairs board independence (Laidroo, 2009).  The use of board 
subcommittees will drive companies to increase corporate transparency and 
reduce information asymmetry. Laksmana (2008) points out that the 
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compensation committee will disclose compensation information to investors, 
thereby reducing the information asymmetry between companies and investors. 
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Table 3-1 summary of empirical evidence 
Corporate governance and firm performance 
Board of directors 
Board independence will increase firm 
performance 
Hermalin (1988); Hemalin and Weisbach (1998); 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990); Dahya et al . 
(2008) 
Board independence will harm firm 
performance 
Agrawal and Knoeber(1996; 1998); Yermack 
(1996); Bhagat and Black (2002);  Fernandes 
(2005); Mura (2006) 
Dual-role leadership will increase firm 
performance 
Fama and Jensen (1983) 
Dual-role leadership will harm firm 
performance 
Brickley et al. (1997); Schmid and Zimmermann 
(2008); 
Large board will help companies to have 
a better firm performance 
Dalton et al. (1999); Belhkir (2004) 
Large board will decrease firm 
performance 
Yermack(1996); Hermalin and Weisbach(2003); 
Guest (2009) 
Board subcommittees 
An audit committee will increase firm 
performance 
Koh et al. (2007) 
A compensation committee will increase 
firm performance 
Sun et al. (2009) 
Ownership structure 
Appropriate ownership concentration is a 
factor in increasing firm performance 
Admati et al. (1994); Kini et al. (1995); Gorton and 
Kahl (2008); Elyasiani and Jia (2010) 
Inappropriate ownership concentration 
will harm firm performance 
Yeh (2005); Dahya et al. (2008) 
Appropriate managerial ownership will 
help companies to have good 
performance 
Loderer and Martin (1997); Coles et al. (2007); 
Bauguess et al. (2009) 
Corporate governance and information transparency 
Board of directors 
Board independence will increase 
information transparency 
Forker (1992); Nowak and McCabe (2003); 
Ahmed et al. (2006); Kanagaretnam et al. (2007); 
Cornett et al. (2009) 
Dual role leadership will decrease 
information transparency 
Ho and Wong (2001); Binfga et al. (2011), 
Small board will help companies to 
increase information transparency 
Vafeas (2000); Ryan Jr and Wiggins Iii (2004) 
Board subcommittees 
An audit committee will increase 
information transparency 
Cotter and Silvester (2003); Koh et al. (2007) 
A compensation committee will increase 
information transparency 
Laksmana (2008) 
A nomination committee will increase 
information transparency 
Ruigrok et al. (2006) 
Ownership structure 
Appropriate ownership concentration is a 
factor increasing information 
transparency 
Gaspar and Massa (2007); Chen-Lung et al. 
(2009); Laidroo (2009) 
Inappropriate ownership concentration 
will harm information transparency 
Faccio et al. (2001); Anderson and Reeb (2004); 
López-de-Foronda et al. (2007); Laidroo (2009) 
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research methods that will be 
employed in this thesis.  
Firstly, this chapter briefly introduces the research philosophy of this thesis 
Research philosophy provides the guideline for researchers for the discovery 
and development of knowledge. This thesis chooses epistemology as its 
research philosophy. Additionally, this thesis will use a deductive approach and 
a quantitative method.  
Secondly, this chapter will discuss the collection of data. The data are 
collected from the annual reports of Chinese listed companies between 2004 & 
2008. This includes data about the financial ratios of Chinese listed companies, 
board characteristics, ownership structure, board subcommittees, and boards of 
supervisors. Information on share prices is collected from DataStream. 
Descriptive statistics on the data will be presented in section 4.3 of this chapter. 
4.2. Data collection 
To test the hypotheses formulated in section 3.5, data has been collected 
on companies as listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. In 2005, 
the Chinese government and the market regulator launched new market 
reforms. One feature of these reforms changed the ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies. This was effective from the end of year 2005. This 
thesis will test the effects of the corporate governance mechanism on firm 
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performance and CARs. To test the hypotheses formulated in section 4.3, data 
is taken from companies listed on Shanghai & Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
However, the corporate governance data is available only from year 2004. 
Therefore, the sample period is from year 2004 to year 2008. Firstly, the data 
sample for this thesis only includes the non-financial listed companies because 
firm performance of financial companies varies from that of non-financial 
companies. Secondly, this sample excludes companies that are delisted before 
2008. Two companies were delisted from the Shanghai stock exchanges before 
2008, and their size is very small. Although this may cause a survivorship bias, 
it is expected that their influence will be too small to substantially affect the 
thesis findings. The final sample contains 1165 non-financial listed companies. 
Previous studies state that the composition of board subcommittee will 
affect firm performance (e.g. Vafeas, 1999; Vafeas, 2000; Vafeas, 2003; Clarke, 
2007). However, since the annual reports of Chinese companies lack relevant 
information, this thesis is unable to assess the effect of the composition of 
board subcommittees on firm performance in Chinese companies. In this case, 
this thesis only examines the effect of the presence of board subcommittees on 
firm performance and information leakage in Chinese companies. If there are 
more relevant data in future, it will be worthwhile to assess the effect of the 
composition of board subcommittees on firm performance and information 
leakage in Chinese companies.  
The time series of market index and prices of each company are collected 
from Datastream and finance.yahoo.cn. Data on the corporate governance of 
the Chinese listed companies are collected from annual reports available from 
the website www.cninfo.com, which is provided by the China Securities 
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Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The accounting (financial) data of the Chinese 
listed companies will have low quality due to the embryonic accounting 
standards(Chang and Wong, 2004). Although the website of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission cannot fully ensure the quality of accounting 
and corporate governance data, it will reduce the incidence of companies 
manipulating information for their annual reports. The CSRC requires all 
companies to ensure the quality before they submit their annual report. Thus, 
the information from this website will be trusted.  
In this thesis, the data sample is composed of panel data. Compared with 
the time series data and cross-sectional data, the panel data has following 
advantages: 
 First, and most importantly, we can address a broader range 
of issues and tackle more complex problems with panel data 
than would be possible with pure time-series or pure cross-
sectional data alone. 
 Second, it is often interesting to examine how variables, or the 
relationship between them, change dynamically (over time). 
To do this, using pure time-series data would often require a 
long run of data simply to get a sufficient number of 
observations to be able to conduct any meaningful hypothesis 
test. But by combining cross-sectional and time series data, 
one can increase the number of degrees of freedom, and thus 
the power of the test, by employing information on the 
dynamic behaviour of a large number of entities at the same 
time. The additional variation introduced by combining the 
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data in this way can also help to mitigate problems of 
multicollinearity that may arise if time series are modelled 
individually.  
 Third, as will become apparent below, by structuring the 
model in an appropriate way, we can remove the impact of 
certain forms of omitted variables bias in regression results 
(Brooks, 2008:488-489). 
The following variables can be directly collected from the annual report: 
BV: total asset of the listed companies. 
TPER: proportions of the tradable shares of the ownership structure of Chinese 
listed companies. 
1STPER: proportions of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. 
SPER: the total state ownership. 
TINTPER: the proportions of tradable institutional ownership.   
BSIZE: the number of directors on the board of Chinese listed companies. 
SSIZE: the number of members of the board of supervisors. 
INDPER: the proportion of independent directors on the board. This variable is 
calculated as follows. 
Proportion of independent directors = number of independent directors / 
total number on the board of directors.  
DERATIO: the ratio of debt over the equity. This variable is calculated as follows: 
  D/E ratio = debt of company / equity of company 
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The following dummy variables also can be collected from the annual 
report. 
ROLESEP: if CEO and Chairman is not the same individual =1, otherwise =0. 
DUAC: if the company has an audit committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUCC: if the company has a compensation committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUNC:  if the company has a nomination committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUREFORM: if the year is 2004 and 2005 =1, otherwise =0 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics (table 4-1) show the variables examined in this 
thesis. 
118 
 
Table 4-1 descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N   Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Panel A: full sample Panel D: 2006 
BSIZE 9.53 9.00 20.00 3.00 2.06 5815 BSIZE 9.532244 9 20 4 2.04921 1163 
BV 4603883 1801556 752000000 51.134 20835809 5815 BV 4321456 1772260 595000000 222.849 19714620 1163 
1STPER 0.382 0.361 0.852 0.008 0.159 5815 1STPER 0.363 0.342 0.846 0.045 0.149 1163 
DUAC 0.481 0 1 0 0.500 5815 DUAC 0.218 0 1 0 0.413 1163 
DUCC 0.503 1 1 0 0.500 5815 DUCC 0.261 0 1 0 0.439 1163 
ROLESEP 0.905 1 1 0 0.293 5815 ROLESEP 0.916 1 1 0 0.278 1163 
DUNC 0.348 0 1 0 0.477 5815 DUNC 0.174 0 1 0 0.379 1163 
INDPER 0.350 0.333 0.750 0.030 0.049 5815 INDPER 0.348 0.333 0.750 0.125 0.047 1163 
SPER 0.336 0.361 0.970 0 0.238 5815 SPER 0.318 0.342 0.920 0 0.227 1163 
SSIZE 4.138 3.000 13.000 1 1.398 5815 SSIZE 4.129 3.000 13.000 2.000 1.406 1163 
TINTPER 0.059 0.022 0.680 0 0.084 5815 TINTPER 0.056 0.020 0.606 0 0.080 1163 
TPER 0.501 0.477 1 0.025 0.170 5815 TPER 0.493 0.480 1 0.098 0.135 1163 
DERATIO 1.624 1.023 1913.082 -1671.430 35.598 5815 DERATIO 0.748171 1.101172 692.6346 -1671.43 53.532 1163 
Panel B: 2004 Panel E: 2007           
BSIZE 9.802236 9 19 5 2.205945 1163 BSIZE 9.402408 9 18 3 2.015788 1163 
BV 3227951 1497286 390000000 20707.63 13059092 1163 BV 5478974 2050941 719000000 1942.958 24002662 1163 
1STPER 0.425 0.412 0.850 0.023 0.166 1163 1STPER 0.356 0.338 0.838 0.008 0.151 1163 
DUAC 0.180 0 1 0 0.384 1163 DUAC 0.818 1 1 0 0.386 1163 
DUCC 0.222 0 1 0 0.416 1163 DUCC 0.815 1 1 0 0.388 1163 
ROLESEP 0.905 1 1 0 0.294 1163 ROLESEP 0.900 1 1 0 0.300 1163 
DUNC 0.146 0 1 0 0.353 1163 DUNC 0.531 1 1 0 0.499 1163 
INDPER 0.341 0.333 0.600 0.083 0.047 1163 INDPER 0.357 0.333 0.750 0.030 0.052 1163 
SPER 0.391 0.439 0.956 0 0.248 1163 SPER 0.298 0.319 0.838 0 0.226 1163 
SSIZE 4.228 4.000 13.000 2.000 1.451 1163 SSIZE 4.095 3.000 12.000 2.000 1.360 1163 
TINTPER 0.034 0.006 0.585 0 0.066 1163 TINTPER 0.077 0.050 0.545 0 0.085 1163 
TPER 0.398 0.379 1 0.087 0.119 1163 TPER 0.565 0.552 1 0.068 0.155 1163 
DERATIO 1.506 0.966 237.718 -49.486 8.635 1163 DERATIO 1.187 1.006 244.252 -316.136 14.069 1163 
Panel C: 2005 Panel F: 2008           
BSIZE 9.644884 9 19 5 2.047 1163 BSIZE 9.251935 9 18 4 1.936421 1163 
BV 3662179 1594586 521000000 18739.95 17099804 1162 BV 6330282 2146261 752000000 51.134 27167370 1163 
1STPER 0.411 0.393 0.838 0.042 0.161 1163 1STPER 0.356267 0.336 0.852 0.037 0.153 1163 
DUAC 0.202 0 1 0 0.402 1163 DUAC 0.988822 1 1 0 0.105 1163 
DUCC 0.240 0 1 0 0.427 1163 DUCC 0.976784 1 1 0 0.151 1163 
ROLESEP 0.919 1 1 0 0.273 1163 ROLESEP 0.88736 1 1 0 0.316 1163 
DUNC 0.162 0 1 0 0.368 1163 DUNC 0.729149 1 1 0 0.445 1163 
INDPER 0.345 0.333 0.571 0.091 0.043 1163 INDPER 0.361017 0.333 0.600 0.143 0.052 1163 
SPER 0.376 0.410 0.956 0 0.244 1163 SPER 0.297565 0.314 0.970 0 0.228 1163 
SSIZE 4.192 4.000 13.000 2.000 1.443 1163 SSIZE 4.047291 3.000 12.000 1 1.319 1163 
TINTPER 0.040 0.007 0.588 0 0.071 1163 TINTPER 0.088402 0.053 0.680 0 0.102 1163 
TPER 0.418 0.397 1 0.087 0.123 1163 TPER 0.630754 0.623 1 0.025 0.185 1163 
DERATIO 1.617 1.034 100.446 -91.881 6.364 1163 DERATIO 3.062211 1.044 1913.082 -50.898 56.202 1163 
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Table 4-1 reports an increase in firm size of the non-financial Chinese 
listed companies. In panel B, which represents the year 2004, the average BV 
is 3,227,951 (1000RMB). In panel F, which represents the year 2008, the 
average BV has increased to 6,330,282 (1000RMB). This reflects the fact that 
the total assets of Chinese listed companies were expanding during the period 
2004 to 2008. 
Figures in table 4-1 indicate that the ownership structure of Chinese listed 
companies was experiencing dramatic changes during the period from the fiscal 
year 2004 to the fiscal year 2008. Firstly, there is a decrease in SPER which 
represents state ownership. In panel B, the average value of SPER is 39.14%, 
and this has decreased to 29.76% in panel F. However, table 4-1shows an 
upward trend in the maximum value of SPER.  Changes of the value of SPER 
indicate that the state is concentrating its influence on some specific industries, 
thereby allowing more companies to become private companies. These 
changes reflect the fact that the Chinese government is amending its influence 
on the Chinese economy. Secondly, table 4-1 reports changes in ownership 
concentration of Chinese listed companies. In panel A, the average value of 
1STPER, the proxy for ownership concentration, is 42.51%. In panel F, this 
figure has decreased to 35.63%.  Thirdly, table 4-1 reports that the percentage 
of tradable shares of Chinese listed companies has increased. Panel B reports 
the average proportion of tradable shares (TPER) is 39.8%, and this figure has 
increased to 63.1% in panel F. Changes of TPER and 1STPER indicate that 
market liquidity in the Chinese market is rising, since the supply of shares has 
been increased. This increase will drive more investors to join the Chinese 
market. Finally, as a consequence of the increase in tradable shares, table 4-1 
indicates that there is an increase in institutional ownership. In panel B, the 
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average value of TINTPER is 3.39%, and it has increased to 8.84% in panel F. 
This improvement means that institutional investors are becoming important 
market participants in the Chinese market. Table 4-1 indicates that Chinese 
listed companies were optimizing their ownership structure during the period 
fiscal years 2004 to 2008, and are thus trying to reduce the influence of single 
shareholders.  
Compared with ownership structure, the characteristics of the board of 
directors of Chinese listed companies were not experiencing the same 
significant changes during the same period. The relevant codes and laws 
require all of the Chinese listed companies to have a board of directors, and the 
board of directors acts behalf of shareholders to manage those companies. 
Table 4-1 indicates that BSIZE, which represents size of the board of directors, 
remains relatively stable. The average value of BSIZE is 9.80 in panel B. In 
panel B, the largest board of directors contains 19 directors, and the smallest 
one only contains 5 directors. The average value of BSIZE has slightly 
decreased to 9.29 in panel F. In panel F, the maximum value of BSIZE is 18, 
and the minimum value of BSIZE is 4. The relevant codes of the Chinese 
market require that the minimum proportion of independent directors on a board 
of directors is one third. During the period from the fiscal year 2004 to the fiscal 
year 2008, the majority of Chinese listed companies fully complied with this 
requirement. However, few of them wanted to increase board independence. 
From panel B to panel F, the INDPER has increased from just 34.08% to 
36.10%. Although role separation is not a mandatory regulation by the Chinese 
market regulatory authority, from year 2004 to year 2008, the majority of 
Chinese listed companies adopted the role separation leadership structure. The 
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average value of ROLESEP is 90.46% in panel B, and it has slightly decreased 
to 88.74% in panel F.  
Table 4-1 demonstrates that more Chinese listed companies are 
establishing board subcommittees. In panel B, 17.97% of companies have an 
audit committee, 22.18% of companies have a compensation committee, and 
14.61% of companies have a nomination committee. In panel F, 98.88% of 
companies have appointed an audit committee, 97.67% of companies have 
appointed a compensation committee, and 72.91% of companies have 
appointed a nomination committee.  
Besides the board of directors, another important component of the 
corporate governance mechanism in Chinese listed companies is the board of 
supervisors. Figures of table 4-1 indicate that changes of the board of 
supervisors are similar to that of the board of directors. In panel B, the average 
value of SSIZE is 4.23 and it has slightly decreased to 4.05 in panel F. Thus, 
the board of supervisors also retains its stability in our sample.  
During 2004 to 2008, the average leverage of Chinese listed companies, 
which is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, is 1.6241335. In 2004, the 
average D/E ratio of Chinese listed companies is 1.505868, and it has been 
dramatically decreased to 0.7488171 in 2006. However, this figure is 
dramatically increased to 3.062211 in 2008. 
Overall, figures of table 4-1 reflect the fact that the Chinese listed 
companies are experiencing dramatic changes of ownership structure during 
the period from the fiscal year 2004 to the fiscal year 2008. Additionally, table 4-
1 indicates that the number of companies which have established board 
subcommittees is increasing. However, figures of table 4-1 reveal that the 
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Chinese listed companies are not inclined to change boards of directors and 
boards of supervisors. These figures show that the main reforms of the 
corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies are in the 
changes of the ownership structure in the period 2004 to 2008. 
4.4. Correlations between the variables 
Table 4-2 presents the correlations between the variables. The correlation 
matrix shows that SPER is highly correlated to the 1STPER (0.62). Additionally; 
DUAC, DUCC, and DUNC are highly correlated to each other (0.71, 0.74, and 
0.91). The high correlation between the variables may cause a concern for 
multicollinearity in the regression estimation. One solution for the 
multicollinearity is to omit one of the variables, which are highly correlated. To 
reduce the influence of multicollinearity on the results, the original regression 
model (mentioned in section 4.7) is refined with one of the two highly correlated 
variables, (i.e. either SPER or 1STPER in the regression model).  
4.5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to find the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance in Chinese listed companies, and 
the relationship between a corporate governance mechanism and information 
leakage in the Chinese securities market. Thus, this thesis has chosen 
epistemology as its research philosophy and developed a series of testable 
hypotheses that are related to the relevant theories. As a result, the research 
approach of this thesis qualifies as using a deductive approach. Additionally, 
this thesis has adopted a quantitative research method to find empirical results 
to test the hypotheses.  
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To measure the information leakage that might be caused by insider 
trading in the Chinese listed companies, this thesis has adopted event study. 
The event study is employed to test the abnormal return during the period of 
pre-announcement. If the significant cumulative abnormal return (CAR) appears 
in the period of pre-announcement, it will reflect the phenomenon of inside 
information leakage. Additionally, this thesis has also employed run-up index 
and normalized abnormal volume to measure the phenomenon of information 
leakage in Chinese securities market. 
Finally, this chapter provided descriptive statistics to reflect the recent 
developments of corporate governance of the Chinese listed companies. The 
statistics reveal that, during the last few years, the Chinese listed companies 
have been changing their ownership structure. For instance, the proportion of 
state ownership and the ownership of majority (holding) shareholders is 
decreasing, while the proportion of institutional ownership and tradable shares 
is increasing.  
The purpose of this thesis is to empirically evaluate effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance and information leakage in Chinese 
companies. The next three chapters will represent and discuss the empirical 
results of this thesis. Chapter 5 represents and discusses the empirical 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Chinese 
companies. Chapter 6 empirically evaluates the problem of information leakage 
in Chinese securities market. Chapter 7 reports and interprets the empirical 
relationship between corporate governance and information leakage in Chinese 
companies.  
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Table 4-2 Pearson correlation matrix 
Correlation 
 t-Statistic 
Probability 
Firm size 
Debt-to-
equity 
Ownership 
concentration 
state 
ownership  
Institution
al ownership 
tradable 
shares 
size of 
BOD 
Independence 
of BOD 
Leadership 
of BOD 
Audit 
Committee 
Compensation 
Committee 
nomination 
committee 
Size of 
BOS 
Firm size 
1 
           
  
-----  
           
  
-----  
           
  
Debt-to-equity 
-0.0044 1 
          
  
-0.3079 -----  
          
  
0.7582 -----  
          
  
Ownership 
concentration 
0.2549 0 1 
         
  
18.3262 -0.0029 -----  
         
  
0 0.9977 -----  
         
  
State 
ownership 
0.2598 0.0010 0.6222 1 
        
  
18.7035 0.0686 55.2553 -----  
        
  
0 0.9453 0 -----  
        
  
Institutional 
ownership 
0.2824 0.0017 -0.0759 -0.1220 1 
       
  
20.4712 0.1178 -5.2941 -8.5444 -----  
       
  
0 0.9063 0 0 -----  
       
  
Tradable 
share 
-0.0369 -0.0100 -0.5760 -0.4301 0.2956 1 
      
  
-2.5675 -0.6921 -48.9876 -33.1262 21.5097 -----  
      
  
0.0103 0.4889 0 0 0 -----  
      
  
Size of BOD 
0.2667 -0.0137 0.0220 0.1804 0.0696 -0.0761 1 
     
  
19.2373 -0.9558 1.5287 12.7550 4.8481 -5.3030 -----  
     
  
0 0.3392 0.1264 0 0 0 -----  
     
  
Independence 
of BOD 
0.0108 0.0033 -0.0360 -0.1027 0.0693 0.0922 -0.2691 1 
    
  
0.7476 0.2309 -2.5071 -7.1759 4.8303 6.4356 -19.4250 -----  
    
  
0.4547 0.8174 0.0122 0 0 0 0 -----  
    
  
Leadership of 
BOD 
0.0426 -0.0022 0.0853 0.1113 -0.0180 -0.0606 0.0434 -0.0460 1 
   
  
2.9637 -0.1516 5.9551 7.7866 -1.2524 -4.2220 3.0170 -3.2042 -----  
   
  
0.0031 0.8795 0 0 0.2105 0 0.0026 0.0014 -----  
   
  
Audit 
Committee 
0.1301 0.0091 -0.0819 -0.0494 0.2415 0.3000 -0.0226 0.1064 -0.0283 1 
  
  
9.1209 0.6303 -5.7136 -3.4381 17.3021 21.8685 -1.5721 7.4424 -1.9663 -----  
  
  
0 0.5285 0 0.0006 0 0 0.1160 0 0.0493 -----  
  
  
Compensation 
Committee 
0.1131 0.0093 -0.0849 -0.0492 0.2272 0.2895 -0.0238 0.1014 -0.0192 0.9115 1 
 
  
7.9162 0.6474 -5.9233 -3.4274 16.2189 21.0315 -1.6545 7.0846 -1.3377 154.1055 -----  
 
  
0 0.5174 0 0.0006 0 0 0.0981 0 0.1810 0 -----  
 
  
Nomination 
committee 
0.0704 0.0051 -0.0842 -0.0524 0.1583 0.2274 -0.0194 0.0899 -0.0206 0.7368 0.7109 1   
4.9059 0.3533 -5.8766 -3.6455 11.1480 16.2362 -1.3508 6.2787 -1.4303 75.7575 70.2821 -----    
0 0.7239 0 0.0003 0 0 0.1768 0 0.1527 0 0 -----    
Size of BOS 
 
0.1842 -0.0066 0.0635 0.2233 0.0049 -0.0661 0.3113 -0.0976 0.0504 -0.0084 -0.0029 -0.0051 1 
13.0301 -0.4606 4.4250 15.9311 0.3392 -4.6052 22.7768 -6.8155 3.5105 -0.5874 -0.1993 -0.3540 -----  
0 0.6451 0 0 0.7345 0 0 0 0.0005 0.5570 0.8420 0.7233 -----  
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Chapter 5.  Corporate 
governance and firm 
performance 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter reports and discusses the empirical results of the regression 
models which represent the relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanism and firm performance of Chinese listed companies. Because of the 
state influence on the Chinese economy, the full sample will be divided between 
state owned companies and private companies. In state owned listed 
companies, the majority (holding) shareholders or the largest shareholder is the 
state (Qu and Wang, 2005). Compared with state owned listed companies, the 
majority (holding) shareholder or largest shareholder in private companies is the 
non-state investor (Qu and Wang, 2005). From the end of year 2005, the 
Chinese government and market regulatory agency pressured all of the 
Chinese listed companies to enter the process of new market reform. Thus, 
regressions of the three samples have considered the influence of market 
reform on empirical results.  
Firstly, the firm size (LNBV) and the debt-to-equity ratio (DERATIO), which 
are control variables, do not affect firm performance which is measured by 
return on equity (ROE). The LNBV and DERATIO have negative effects on firm 
performance that is measured by return on asset (ROA). Additionally, LNBV has 
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a negative effect on firm performance that is measured by Tobin‟s Q (Q). This is 
inconsistent with previous research (e.g. Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Vaona and 
Pianta, 2008; Rochina-Barrachina et al., 2010).  
Secondly, the estimation of dummy variable indicates that there is a 
negative relationship between the reform dummy variable and firm performance 
in Chinese listed companies. It means that the firm performance of Chinese 
listed companies after market reform is better than that of Chinese listed 
companies before market reform. In other words, market reform motivates 
Chinese listed companies to enhance their firm performance. This is consistent 
with the purpose of this market reform, which is to increase the effect of the 
market mechanism on Chinese listed companies in order to improve their firm 
performance. 
Thirdly, previous studies have shown that institutional ownership will help 
companies to achieve good firm performance. Hovey et al. (2003) and Lin et al. 
(2007) show that the institutional investors have the ability to monitor the 
managerial activities of managers, and they also have the ability to reduce the 
influence of inside large shareholders, such as the majority (holding) 
shareholder. This will reduce the conflicts of interest among corporate 
participants of Chinese listed companies, and thus increase their firm 
performance. 
Fourthly, the empirical results show that the boards of directors do not 
affect firm performance of the Chinese listed companies. Under the influence of 
large shareholders, especially the majority (holding) shareholder, the 
composition of the board of directors and the board of supervisors is influenced 
by the interests of those large shareholders (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; 
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Kang et al., 2008; Zhou, 2009). Additionally, compared with the board of 
directors, the board of supervisors lacks power (Tian and Estrin, 2005). Thus, 
the board of directors and the board of supervisors do not affect firm 
performance of Chinese listed companies. 
Fifthly, previous studies have suggested that state ownership is a central 
factor that can damage firm performance of Chinese listed companies (Chen et 
al., 2007b; Li et al. 2008). Due to state control, poorly-performing CEOs cannot 
be replaced immediately. Additionally the state negatively influences the 
compensation level set for executives (Rehbein, 2007). Previous studies also 
indicate that the inappropriate ownership concentration is a factor in damaging 
firm performance of listed companies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; López-de-
Foronda et al., 2007). However, empirical results indicate that state ownership 
(SPER) and ownership concentration (1STPER) do not affect firm performance 
in Chinese listed companies.  
Although the Chinese market has experienced reform for over 30 years, 
the influence of the state on the national economy is still substantial. As a result 
of this, some listed companies will be advantaged by state ownership. However, 
state ownership is not beneficial to all of listed companies. Thus, there is no 
significant linear relationship between the SPER and firm performance in 
Chinese listed companies. The unsophisticated corporate governance 
mechanism causes a serious conflict of interest between shareholders and 
executives. In this case, ownership concentration or the large holding 
shareholder will be a solution to the problem. Large shareholders will exert 
substantial supervision pressure on the executives of listed companies to 
motivate them to increase firm performance. However, ownership concentration 
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will exacerbate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders. 
Thus, ownership concentration will damage company efforts to increase firm 
performance. This may explain the lack of significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance in Chinese listed companies. 
Sixthly, the proportion of tradable shares has a negative effect on firm 
performance in Chinese listed companies. This is inconsistent with the purpose 
of the reduction of non-tradable shares. Xu et al. (2005),  Tomasic and Fu 
(2006) and Song (2008) state that non-tradable shares restrict the corporate 
governance mechanism in Chinese listed companies. Thus, the reduction of 
non-tradable shares should motivate the development of corporate governance 
mechanisms to increase firm performance of Chinese listed companies. 
However, the reduction of non-tradable shares exacerbates the problem of the 
free-rider, which is caused by the diffused nature of small investors. This will 
reduce the efficiency of corporate governance, and thus impair firm 
performance. 
Finally, although previous studies find that subcommittees do not properly 
work in Chinese listed companies (Lin et al., 2008), the empirical results of this 
thesis find that the use of subcommittees will increase company performance of 
Chinese listed companies.  
5.2. Regression Analysis 
5.2.1. Definition 
To understand and describe the relationship between one given variable 
and other variable(s), a useful tool is regression analysis. Brooks (2008:27) 
states that „regression is an attempt to explain movements in variables by 
 129 
 
reference to movements in one or more variables‟. Gujarati (1999:123) also 
states that „regression analysis is concerned with the study of the relationship 
between one variable called the explained, or dependent, variable, and one or 
more other variables, called independent, or explanatory, variables‟. 
Regression analysis cannot suggest a causative relationship between 
dependent and independent variables. Since, „causality must be justified, or 
inferred, from the theory that underlies the phenomenon that is tested 
empirically‟ (Gujarati, 1999:124).  
5.2.2. Simple and multiple linear regressions 
A typical linear regression model contains one dependent variable and one 
independent variable. The two-variable regression model is called the simple 
regression model, since „the dependent variable is a function of just one 
explanatory variable‟ (Gujarati, 1999:134).  
             
Practically, however, dependent variables cannot be completely explained 
by a single explanatory variable. Therefore, the single explanatory variable will 
be extended to multiple explanatory variables. Multi-regression is „a regression 
in which more than one dependent, or explanatory, variable is used to explain 
the behaviour of the dependent variable‟ (Gujarati, 1999:1354).  
                                    
Corporate governance is a complex term covering various factors. Boards 
of directors, subcommittees, and ownership structure will influence the effect of 
the corporate governance mechanism on firm performance and corporate 
 130 
 
transparency. Thus, the single linear regression cannot completely describe the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and information 
leakage, or the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and 
firm performance. Thus, the multivariable linear regression will be suitable for 
this thesis. 
5.2.3. Estimation of parameters 
5.2.3.1. OLS 
To use the regression model to solve a specific problem, researchers have 
to calculate the value of each parameter. The function of a parameter is to 
demonstrate how the explanatory variables affect the explained variable. Among 
the various estimation methods, the most useful one is the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS).   
The method of OLS entails taking each vertical distance from the 
point to the line, squaring it and then minimising the total sum of the 
areas of squares. This can be viewed as equivalent to minimising the 
sum of the areas of the squares drawn from the points to the line 
(Brooks, 2008:31).  
OLS is a popular method of estimating a parameter in linear regression 
analysis and as a consequence of its nature is called BLUE (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators) (Gujarati, 1999; Brooks, 2008). This property makes OLS 
more advanced than the other estimation methods. Gujarati (1999) states that 
the property of OLS will not be impaired as the number of variables is increased, 
and therefore, OLS is also useful in the multivariable regression model. In this 
thesis the multivariable regression model is selected. Thus, an estimation 
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method is needed in which the estimation accuracy will not be influenced by an 
increased number of variables. The property of BLUE in OLS makes it a good 
choice of estimation method.  
5.2.3.2. Assumptions of OLS 
To ensure the OLS can properly generate precise estimators, the linear 
regression model has to fit the following assumptions: “1)         ; 
2)            
   ; 3)               ; 4)               ; and 
5)         
  ” (Brooks, 2008:129-130). 
The first assumption requires that the average value of the error term is 
zero, and this assumption will not be violated if a constant term is included in 
the regression equation. Under the second assumption, the variance of the 
error term is required to be constant. This assumption is also named the 
assumption of homoscedasticity (Brooks, 2008). If the assumption is violated 
and the variance of the error term is not constant, this phenomenon is known as 
heteroscedasticity (Brooks, 2008). If the problem of heteroscedasticity is 
ignored the estimators will no longer be BLUE. Under the third assumption, 
there should be no covariance between error terms over time (Brooks, 2008). In 
other words, error terms should not be correlated with each other. If the 
assumption is violated, this phenomenon is known as auto-correlation or serial 
correlation (Brooks, 2008). If the issue of auto-correlation is ignored, estimators 
in the regression model will no longer be BLUE. Under the fourth assumption, to 
ensure that the parameters are BLUE, the variables are not correlated with the 
error term (Brooks, 2008). This final assumption requires the error term to be 
normally distributed (Brooks, 2008). 
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5.2.3.3. Multicollinearity 
Besides the five assumptions discussed above, another issue, which is 
called multicollinearity, also reduces the effectiveness of using OLS. If the 
explanatory variables are independent beyond the influence of other explanatory 
variables, „they would be said to be orthogonal‟ (Brooks, 2008:170). Under this 
circumstance, „adding or removing a variable from a regression equation would 
not cause the values of the coefficient of the other variables to change‟ (Brooks, 
2008:170).  
Researchers expect there to be no relationship between explanatory 
variables. In practice, however, the relationship between variables is non-zero. 
Thus, changing variables will lead to a change in the value of the coefficient of 
the regression equation. Fortunately, „this will generally be relatively benign in 
the sense that a small degree of association between explanatory variables will 
almost always occur but will not cause too much loss of precision‟ (Brooks, 
2008:171). Gujarati (1999:319) also proposes that under imperfect 
multicollinearity, ‟OLS estimators still remain BLUE even though one or more of 
the partial regression coefficients in a multiple regression can be individually 
statistically insignificant‟. However, if the correlation between explanatory 
variables is above the appropriate level, the problem of correlation between 
explanatory variables will have a serious effect on the regression equation. 
Multicollinearity is defined as a phenomenon in which „the explanatory variables 
are highly correlated with each other‟ (Brooks, 2008:171).  
Multicollinearity can be divided into two categories: perfect multicollinearity 
and near multicollinearity (Brooks, 2008). Perfect multicollinearity is the 
phenomenon where there is an exact relationship between two or more 
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independent variables (Brooks, 2008). Under this circumstance, it is impossible 
to estimate the parameter of explanatory variables, since these estimators are 
biased. The consequences of perfect multicollinearity include:  
1) large variance and standard error of OLS,  
2) wider confidence interval,  
3) high R², but low t-ratio,  
4) the „OLS estimators and their standard errors become very sensitive 
to small changes in the data; that is they tend to be unstable‟ 
(Brooks, 2008:172).  
To detect the potential multicollinearity among variables, a common 
method useful to multicollinearity detection is the coefficient matrix. Gujarati 
(1999:323) states that high multicollinearity can be detected through the 
phenomenon „high pair-wise correlation among explanatory variables‟.  
To reduce the influence of multicollinearity, Brooks (2008:173) suggests a 
number of ways which include:  
1) ignore it, if the model is otherwise adequate,  
2) drop one of the collinear variables,  
3) transform the highly correlated variables into a ratio and 
include only the ratio and not the individual variables in the 
regression, for dealing with the existence of multicollinearity.  
Besides the solutions of multicollinearity above, Brooks (2008) also 
states that partial multicollinearity would be caused by the data rather than by 
the model. Therefore, as the sample increases, the problem of multicollinearity 
can be reduced. 
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5.2.4. T-test 
Brooks (2008:58) states that „the significance level is also sometimes 
called the size of the test and it determines the region where the null hypothesis 
under test will be rejected or not rejected‟. The common significance level in 
financial research is 5%, which means that „a result as extreme as this or more 
extreme would be expected only 5% of the time as a consequence of chance 
alone‟ (Brooks, 2008:58). Besides the 5% significance level, 1% and 10% 
significance are also used as the criteria for null hypotheses rejection. t-test is 
the most popular technique for judging the null hypotheses.  
t = 
 ̂  
     ̂ 
 
If  ̂and   have the same value, the |t| value would be zero, in which case 
the null hypothesis is accepted.  If |t| deviates from zero, the incidence of 
rejection of the null hypothesis also increases. If |t| is higher than the criteria, 
the null hypothesis is rejected. The aim of this thesis is to test empirically the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance, and the relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanism and information leakage. To reject or accept the testable 
hypotheses, it is necessary to know the significance level of the parameters of 
the model. 
5.2.5. Panel techniques 
In financial research, there are two types of panel estimator approaches 
that can be employed: fixed effects model and random effects models. 
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To decide which technique is more suitable for the panel data, the 
Hausman test is employed. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is the 
random effect model is more suitable, and the alternative hypothesis is the fixed 
effect model is more suitable.  The results of the Hausman test obey the chi-
square distribution. If it is lower than the critical value, the null hypothesis will be 
rejected and the fixed effects model will be more suitable for panel data.  
5.2.6. Two-stage-least-square (2SLS) 
The endogeneity will cause the usual OLS estimation to generate a biased 
result.  Under this circumstance, it is necessary to adopt the instrument 
variables method (IV), which is also known as two-stage-least-square (2SLS) 
(Brooks, 2008; Baltagi, 2009; Hill et al., 2011). „The name comes from the fact 
that it can be calculated using two least squares regressions‟ (Hill et al., 
2011:455). 
5.3. Regression model 
Firm profitability = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3LNTPER + 
β41STPER + β5SPER + β6LNTINTPER + β7LNBSIZE + β8INDPER + 
β9ROLESEP + β10LNSSIZE + β11DUAC + β12DUCC + β13DUNC + β14 
DUREFORM + є 
 
BV: total asset of the listed companies. 
DERATIO: the debt over the equity. 
TPER: proportions of the tradable shares of the ownership structure of Chinese 
listed companies. 
1STPER: proportions of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. 
SPER: the total state ownership. 
TINTPER: the proportions of tradable institutional ownership.   
BSIZE: the number of directors on the board of Chinese listed companies. 
SSIZE: the number of members of the board of supervisors. 
INDPER: proportion of independent directors on the board.  
ROLESEP: if CEO and Chairman is not the same individual =1, otherwise =0.  
DUAC: if the company establish audit committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUCC: if the company establish compensation committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUNC:  if the company establish nomination committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUREFORM:  if the year is 2004 and 2005 = 1, otherwise = 0. 
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Table 4-2 shows the correlation between each variable. Thus, the initial 
regression model will be changed to reduce the influence of multicollinearity on 
the estimations.  
Corporate governance and firm performance 
M1: Firm profitability = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3LNTPER + 
β41STPER + β5LNTINTPER + β6LNBSIZE + β7INDPER + 
β8ROLESEP + β9LNSSIZE + β10DUAC + є 
M2: Firm profitability = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3LNTPER + 
β41STPER + β5LNTINTPER + β6LNBSIZE + β7INDPER + 
β8ROLESEP + β9LNSSIZE + β10DUCC + є 
M3: Firm profitability = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3LNTPER + 
β41STPER + β5LNTINTPER + β6LNBSIZE + β7INDPER + 
β8ROLESEP + β9LNSSIZE + β10DUNC + є 
M4: Firm profitability = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3LNTPER + 
β4SPER + β5LNTINTPER + β6LNBSIZE + β7INDPER + β8ROLESEP 
+ β9LNSSIZE + β10DUAC + є 
M5: Firm profitability = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3LNTPER + 
β4SPER + β5LNTINTPER + β6LNBSIZE + β7INDPER + β8ROLESEP 
+ β9LNSSIZE + β10DUCC + є 
M6: Firm profitability = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3LNTPER + 
β4SPER + β5LNTINTPER + β6LNBSIZE + β7INDPER + β8ROLESEP 
+ β9LNSSIZE + β10DUNC + є 
 
Firm profitability-ROE/ROA/Tobin’s Q 
In this thesis, firm profitability is measured by either return on equity (ROE) 
or return on asset (ROA). One purpose of a corporate governance mechanism 
is to align corporate managerial activities with the interests of shareholders; this 
in turn improves firm performance. Thus, the second regression model of this 
thesis is adopted to analyse the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanism and firm performance. Due to the unsophisticated capital market in 
China, market based measure may not be valid to reflect the true performance 
of Chinese listed companies (Peng, 2004). In China, the average holding period 
of stock is 1-2 months; this is lower than that in other developed market, such 
as the US market (Peng, 2004). Under this circumstance, the market based 
measures „tend to be less informationally efficient‟ (Tenev and Zhang, 2002, 
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cited in Peng, 2004:461). Chang and Wong (2004) also state that noise trading 
in the emerging market may cause a market-based measurement to be 
problematic. Secondly, Chinese market participants pay more attention to the 
accounting measurement rather than the market based measurement(Peng, 
2004). However, as the market is developing, especially the elimination of non-
tradable shares, the proportion of tradable shares in the total shares that are 
issued by companies is increasing. Under this circumstance, to ensure the 
robustness of regression, this thesis uses the market based proxy to measure 
the firm performance of Chinese listed companies. In this thesis, the Tobin‟s Q 
will be employed as a proxy of firm performance of Chinese listed companies. 
The ratio Tobin‟s Q was first developed by James Tobin in 1969 (Tobin, 1969). 
Tobin‟s Q is a ratio between market value of a company and the replace value 
of its physical asset. To calculate Tobin‟s Q of Chinese listed companies, this 
thesis quotes calculation from Hovey et al.(2003). Because of the limited of data 
on Chinese securities market, Hovey et al. (2003) suggests that the total asset 
can be used as a proxy of replacement value of Chinese listed companies. At 
the same time, they suggest that the market value of Chinese listed companies 
is the „share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue at year-
end‟ (Hovey et al., 2003:116). 
Control variables 
Debt-to-Equity ratio (DERATIO) 
New projects or investments will generate revenue, thereby increasing the 
profitability of companies. Companies have to employ various funds to finance 
new projects and investments. Firstly, companies will prefer to use the internal 
fund. If the internal fund is inadequate, companies will issue new debt to gather 
the fund. If the fund from debt financing is still short for the demand of new 
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projects or investments, companies will prefer to issue the convertible debt or 
the debt with warrant. The last financing preference of companies is an equity 
issue. Meyers (1984) define this choosing order of corporate financing as the 
pecking order theory of capital structure.  According to this order, debt financing 
is one of the most important financing methods of companies.  
Capital structure will influence firm profitability, since companies raise 
funding through various sources to finance their projects and investments. 
Thus, it is necessary to consider the influence of capital structure on firm 
performance. Because of the importance of debt financing, it will be set as a 
control variable in this thesis. In this thesis, the debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio is 
chosen as a proxy of debt ratio.  
Firm Size (LNBV) 
Imperfect market competition can lead to large companies having 
innovation advantages (Acs and Audretsch, 1987), and firm size can thus 
enhance the productivity growth as a consequence of the innovations (Rochina-
Barrachina et al., 2010). Compared with the small companies, the large 
companies prefer to enlarge their market share via innovation and therefore to 
increase their firm performance (Vaona and Pianta, 2008). Thus, the second 
control variable of this thesis is firm size. Empirical results will be presented in 
the following section. 
2SLS for ROE and Tobin’s Q 
The Tobin‟s Q is a market oriented proxy of firm performance. It will be 
influenced by the accounting based proxy of firm performance, since investors 
will use the accounting based measure to decide on their investment. Thus, it is 
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necessary to include an accounting based proxy of firm performance in the 
regression of Tobin‟s Q. In this thesis, the ROE is employed as an independent 
variable in the regression of Tobin‟s Q, and the regression of Tobin‟s Q is 
estimated by the 2-stage-least-sqaure (2SLS). 
5.4. Empirical results 
To ensure the robustness of the results, this thesis use three proxies to 
measure performance of Chinese listed companies. They are return on equity 
(ROE), return on asset (ROA), and Tobin‟s Q.  
Figures of table 5-1 reflect the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance that is measured by the ROE in 
the full sample. The proportions of institutional ownership (LNTINTPER) in a 
company‟s ownership structure have a positive effect on ROE. However, the 
proportions of tradable shares (LNTPER) in a company‟s ownership structure 
have a negative effect on ROE. In the company separate CEO from the 
chairman of a board of directors (ROLESEP), this leadership structure has a 
positive effect on ROE. The audit committee (DUAC) has a positive effect on 
ROE in the full sample. However, the compensation committee (DUCC) and the 
nomination committee (DUNC) do not affect ROE in the full sample. The 
dummy variable of market reform (DUREFORM) has a negative effect on ROE. 
In other words, this means that the ROE in the post-reform period is better than 
that in the pre-reform period. The firm size (LNBV) and leverage (DERATIO) do 
not affect ROE in the full sample. The ownership concentration (1STPER), the 
state ownership (SPER), the size of a board of directors (LNBSIZE), board 
independence (INDPER), and the size of a board of supervisors (LNSSIZE) do 
not affect ROE in the full sample.  
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Figures of table 5-2 reflect the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance, which is measured by ROA, in the full sample. The firm 
size (LNBV) and the leverage (DERATIO) have a negative effect on ROA in the 
full sample. Ownership concentration (1STPER) and the state ownership 
(SPER) do not affect ROA in the full sample. The percentage of institutional 
ownership (LNTINTPER) in the ownership structure of a company has a 
positive effect on ROA. However, the percentage of tradable shares (LNTPER) 
in the ownership structure of a company has a negative effect on ROA. Board 
subcommittees (DUAC, DUCC, and DUNC) have positive effects on ROA in the 
full sample. The dummy variable of market reform (DUREFORM) has a 
negative effect on ROA in the full sample. In the other words, the pre-reform 
ROA is lower than that of post-reform. This is similar to that of table 5-1. 
Variables of the board of directors (LNBSIZE, INDPER, and ROLESEP) and the 
board of supervisors (LNSSIZE) do not affect ROA in the full sample. 
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Table 5-1 corporate governance and firm performance (ROE) in 
Chinese listed companies 
 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + ε 
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM +  ε   
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM +  ε 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM +  ε 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM +  ε 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM +  ε 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Dependent variable: ROE  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.074 -0.065 -0.04 -0.073 -0.064 -0.039 
  (-1.693)* (-1.491) (-0.917) (-1.677)* (-1.471) (-0.896) 
Leverage (debt to equity) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.325) (0.306) (0.288) (0.325) (0.306) (0.286) 
Ownership concentration 0.143 0.151 0.161     
  (0.580) (0.613) (0.653)     
State ownership     0.071 0.071 0.069 
     (0.382) (0.378) (0.366) 
institutional ownership 0.110 0.111 0.113 0.111 0.111 0.113 
  (8.792)*** (8.837)*** (8.972)*** (8.814)*** (8.861)*** (8.994)*** 
tradable shares -0.408 -0.391 -0.350 -0.416 -0.400 -0.360 
  (-5.407)*** (-5.224)*** (-4.695)*** (-5.677)*** (-5.494)*** (-4.976)*** 
Size of BOD -0.065 -0.071 -0.075 -0.067 -0.073 -0.078 
  (-0.446) (-0.487) (-0.518) (-0.464) (-0.507) (-0.540) 
Independence of BOD -0.141 -0.113 -0.050 -0.139 -0.110 -0.047 
  (-0.345) (-0.276) (-0.122) (-0.339) (-0.269) (-0.115) 
Leadership of BOD -0.170 -0.171 -0.174 -0.169 -0.170 -0.173 
  (-2.295)** (-2.309)** (-2.349)** (-2.284)** (-2.297)** (-2.337)** 
Audit committee 0.081   0.082    
  (2.224)**   (2.240)**    
Compensation committee  0.058   0.059   
   (1.587)   (1.596)   
Nomination committee   -0.027   -0.026 
    (-0.672)   (-0.650) 
Size of BOS -0.034 -0.037 -0.047 -0.037 -0.041 -0.050 
  (-0.292) (-0.323) (-0.406) (-0.320) (-0.352) (-0.435) 
Market reform -0.159 -0.162 -0.173 -0.156 -0.160 -0.170 
  (-4.201)*** (-4.307)*** (-4.610)*** (-4.152)*** (-4.247)*** (-4.537)*** 
C -1.250 -1.351 -1.640 -1.226 -1.327 -1.611 
  (-1.706)* (-1.848)* (-2.243)** (-1.678)* (-1.819)* (-2.209)** 
R² 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 
Adj.  R² 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 5-2 corporate governance and firm performance (ROA) in 
Chinese listed companies 
 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.585 -0.570 -0.544 -0.583 -0.568 -0.541 
  (-14.750)*** (-14.391)*** (-13.685)*** (-14.756)*** (-14.390)*** (-13.679)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
  (-2.648)*** (-2.691)*** (-2.701)*** (-2.620)*** (-2.664)*** (-2.675)*** 
Ownership concentration 0.229 0.252 0.248     
  (0.870) (0.956) (0.937)     
State ownership     0.238 0.239 0.232 
     (1.200) (1.201) (1.1573) 
institutional ownership 0.111 0.113 0.116 0.112 0.114 0.117 
  (8.250)*** (8.326)*** (8.564)*** (8.3235)*** (8.402)*** (8.637)*** 
tradable shares -0.552 -0.513 -0.448 -0.556 -0.519 -0.454 
  (-6.823)*** (-6.364)*** (-5.567)*** (-7.090)*** (6.637)*** (-5.825)*** 
Size of BOD 0.043 0.025 0.015 0.042 0.023 0.013 
  (0.279) (0.160) (0.094) (0.272) (0.148) (0.082) 
Independence of BOD 0.164 0.235 0.352 0.170 0.242 0.359 
  (0.373) (0.535) (0.798) (0.387) (0.551) (0.814) 
Leadership of BOD -0.136 -0.139 -0.145 -0.134 -0.137 -0.143 
  (-1.714) (-1.738) (-1.806) (-1.690)* (-1.713)* (-1.781)* 
Audit committee 0.269   0.270    
  (6.957)***   (6.981)***    
Compensation committee  0.223   0.224   
   (5.710)***   (5.726)***   
Nomination committee   0.110   0.111 
    (2.607)***   (2.628)*** 
Size of BOS -0.022 -0.032 -0.044 -0.029 -0.039 -0.052 
  (-0.177) (-0.253) (-0.355) (-0.23) (-0.312) (-0.412) 
Market reform -0.245 -0.256 -0.285 -0.248 -0.258 -0.286 
  (-6.150)*** (-6.418)*** (-7.181)*** (-6.248)*** (-6.494)*** (-7.256)*** 
C 4.844 4.705 4.470 4.832 4.696 4.463 
  (6.974)*** (6.763)*** (6.391)*** (6.960)*** (6.753)*** (6.383)*** 
R² 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Adj.  R² 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Figures of table 5-3 describe the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance, which is measured by the 
Tobin‟s Q, in the full sample. ROE has a positive effect on the Tobin‟s Q. the 
firm size (LNBV) has a negative effect on Tobin‟s Q. Ownership concentration 
(1STPER) and state ownership (SPER) do not affect Tobin‟s Q in the full 
sample. The percentage of institutional ownership (LNTINTPER) in a 
company‟s ownership structure has a positive effect on its Tobin‟s Q. However, 
the percentage of tradable shares (LNTPER) in a company‟s ownership 
structure has a negative effect on its Tobin‟s Q. Board subcommittees (DIUAC, 
DUC, and DUNC) have a positive effect on Tobin‟s Q in the full sample. The 
dummy variable of market reform (DUREFOM) has a negative effect on Tobin‟s 
Q. This means that the Tobin‟s Q in the pre-reform period is lower than that in 
the post-reform period. This is similar to that of the other two tables. Like table 
5-2, variables of the board of directors (LNBSIZE, INDPER, and ROESEP) and 
the board of supervisors (LNSSIZE) do not matter to Tobin‟s Q in the full 
sample.  
Figures of the table 5-4 reflect the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance, which is measured by ROE, in 
the sample of state owned listed companies. Proportions of the institutional 
ownership (LNTINTPER) have a positive effect on ROE of state owned listed 
companies. However, there is a negative relationship between the proportions 
of the tradable shares (LNTPER) and ROE of state owned listed companies. 
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Table 5-3 corporate governance and firm performance (Tobin's 
Q) in Chinese listed companies 
 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1ROE+ β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C           
            
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
 Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company 
=1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is 
log (number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
 
Dependent variable: Tobin‟s Q 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
ROE 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.084 0.085 0.086 
  (2.050)** (2.057)** (2.056)** (2.051)** (2.059)** (2.059)** 
Firm size -0.371 -0.360 (0.334) -0.370 -0.359 -0.333 
  (-19.215)*** (-18.616)*** (-17.182)*** (-19.235)*** (-18.627)*** (-17.185)*** 
Ownership 
concentration 
0.028 0.043 0.034     
  (0.247) (0.376) (0.294)     
State ownership     -0.018 -0.017 -0.034 
     (-0.217) (-0.202) (-0.416) 
institutional 
ownership 
0.060 0.061 0.063 0.060 0.061 0.063 
  (10.189)*** (10.302)*** (10.682)*** (10.183)*** (10.301)*** (10.668)*** 
tradable shares -0.391 -0.366 -0.312 -0.395 -0.372 -0.319 
  (-10.832)*** (-10.139)*** (-8.615)*** (-11.274)*** (-10.593)*** (-9.0601)*** 
Size of BOD 0.098 0.087 0.076 0.096 0.085 0.073 
  (1.472) (1.298) (1.1205) 91.445) (1.264) (1.080) 
Independence of 
BOD 
0.170 0.215 0.305 0.170 0.216 0.305 
  (0.9070 (1.148) (1.607) (0.908) (1.150) (1.607) 
Leadership of BOD 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.009 
  (0.406) (0.375) (0.251) (0.408) (0.376) (0.2540 
Audit committee 0.196   0.196    
  (11.545)***   (11.543)***    
Compensation 
committee 
 0.168   0.168   
   (9.745)***   (9.739)***   
Nomination 
committee 
  0.080   0.080 
    (4.283)***   (4.294)*** 
Size of BOS 0.062 0.052 0.040 0.062 0.052 0.041 
  (1.169) (0.977) (0.748) (1.169) (0.972) (0.754) 
Market reform -0.414 -0.421 -0.442 -0.412 -0.419 -0.439 
  (-23.492)*** (-23.830)*** (-24.893)*** (-23.498)*** (-23.801)*** (-24.837)*** 
C 5.554 5.449 5.199 5.563 5.461 5.213 
  (17.060)*** (16.663)*** (15.732)*** (17.105)*** (16.714)*** (15.792)*** 
R² 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.63 
Adj.  R² 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.51 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 5-4 corporate governance and firm performance (ROE) in 
state owned listed companies  
 
 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C                        
                                                                                                                                
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
 Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Dependent variable: ROE  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.075 -0.065 -0.047 -0.079 -0.069 -0.052 
  (-1.505) (-1.306) (-0.963) (-1.586) (-1.385) (-1.046) 
Leverage (debt to equity) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.3123) (-0.329) (-0.351) (-0.311) (-0.328) (-0.351) 
Ownership concentration 0.350 0.351 0.353     
  (1.208) (1.212) (1.217)     
State ownership     0.404 0.403 0.400 
     (1.3870 (1.384) (1.374) 
institutional ownership 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.095 0.095 
  (6.657)*** (6.688)*** (6.728)*** (6.717)*** (6.748)*** (6.787)*** 
tradable shares -0.292 -0.275 -0.250 -0.279 -0.262 -0.237 
  (-3.35)*** (-3.191)*** (-2.900)*** (-3.126)*** (2.960)*** (-2.685)*** 
Size of BOD -0.034 -0.036 -0.036 -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 
  (-0.206) (-0.215) (-0.217) (-0.183) (-0.193) (-0.195) 
Independence of BOD -0.299 -0.268 -0.226 -0.293 -0.261 -0.220 
  (-0.648) (-0.582) (-0.491) (-0.634) (-0.567) (-0.4779) 
Leadership of BOD -0.201 -0.203 -0.206 -0.199 -0.200 -0.203 
  (-2.032)** (-2.048)** (-2.077)** (-2.008)** (-2.024)** (-2.052)** 
Audit committee 0.041   0.042    
  (1.011)   (1.022)    
Compensation committee  0.014   0.014   
   (0.334)   (0.339)   
Nomination committee   -0.043   -0.043 
    (-0.973)   (-0.955) 
Size of BOS -0.009 -0.012 -0.019 -0.017 -0.021 -0.027 
  (-0.068) (-0.097) (-0.148) (-0.134) (-0.163) (-0.214) 
Market reform -0.174 -0.178 -0.181 -0.178 -0.181 -0.184 
  (-3.955) (-4.025) (-4.126)*** (-4.018)*** (-4.084)*** (-4.180)*** 
C -1.292 -1.414 -1.626 -1.256 -1.378 -1.588 
  (-1.537) (-1.685)* (-1.940)** (1.497) (-1.646) (-1.899) 
R² 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Adj.  R² 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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There is a negative relationship between the role separation (ROELSEP) and 
ROE in the state owned listed companies. After market reform (DUREFORM), 
companies perform better in the market. Firm size (LNBV), the leverage 
(DERATIO), ownership concentration (STPER), state ownership (SPER), the 
size of a board of directors (LNBSIZE), board independence (INDPER), board 
subcommittees (DUAC, DUCC, and DUNC), and the size of a board of 
supervisors do not affect ROE in the state owned listed companies.   
The relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and ROA 
in state owned listed companies is described by figures of table 5-5. The firm 
size (LNBV) and the leverage (DERATIO) have a negative effect on ROA in 
state owned listed companies. However, the negative effect of leverage on ROA 
is significant at the 10% significance level. Ownership concentration (1STPER) 
has a positive effect on ROA at the 10% significance level. State ownership 
(SPER) has an insignificant effect on ROA in this sample. Proportions of the 
institutional ownership (LNTINTPER) have a positive effect on ROA. However, 
proportions of the tradable shares have a negative effect on ROA. The size of a 
board of directors (LNBSIZE) and board independence (INDPER) do not affect 
ROA in state owned listed companies. Role separation (ROLESEP) has a 
negative effect on ROA. However, it is significant at the 10% significance level. 
The audit committee (DUAC) has a positive effect on ROA in this sample. 
However, the other two subcommittees (compensation committee-DUCC and 
nomination committee-DUNC) do not affect ROA in this sample. The size of a 
board of supervisors (LNSSIZE) does not affect ROA in state owned listed 
companies. Finally, the dummy variable of market reform (DUREFORM) has a 
negative effect on ROA in this sample. This means that market reform 
increases ROA in state owned listed companies. 
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Figures of table 5-6 reflect the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanism and Tobin‟s Q in state owned listed companies. ROE has a positive 
effect on Tobin‟s Q in state owned listed companies. Firm size (LNBV), 
proportions of institutional ownership (LNTINPTER), and board subcommittees 
(DUAC, DUCC, and DUNC) have a positive effect on Tobin‟s Q in state owned 
listed companies. Proportions of tradable shares (LNTPER) have a negative 
effect on Tobin‟s Q in this sample. The dummy variable of reform (DUREFORM) 
has a negative effect on Tobin‟s Q. This means that the Tobin‟s Q post-reform 
is better than that of pre-reform. Other variables (1STER, SPER, LNBSIZE, 
INDPER ROLESEP, and LNSSIZE) do not affect Tobin‟s Q in state owned 
listed companies.  
The relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance in private listed companies, which is measured by ROE, is 
described by figures from Table 5-7. Firstly, there is a negative relationship 
between firm size (LNBV) and ROE in this table.  Leverage (DERATIO) and 
ownership concentration (1STPER) do not affect ROE in private listed 
companies. State ownership (SPER) has a positive effect on ROE in private 
listed companies. However, this positive effect in not very strong, since the 
significance level is 10%. Institutional ownership (LNTINTPER) has a positive 
effect on the ROE of private listed companies. However, more tradable shares 
(LNTPER) in the ownership structure of private listed companies will decrease 
the ROE. The audit committee (DUAC) and the compensation committee 
(DUCC) have a positive effect on ROE of private listed companies. Variables of 
the board of directors and the board of supervisors (LNBSIZE, INDPER, 
ROLESEP, and LNSSIZE) do not affect ROE of private listed companies. The 
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factor of market reform (DUREFORM) also does not affect ROE in private listed 
companies.   
Figures of table 5-8 reflect the effect of the corporate governance 
mechanism of private listed companies on their ROA. Firstly, firm size (LNBV) 
and leverage (DERATIO) have a negative effect on ROA of private listed 
companies. Ownership concentration and state ownership (1STPER and 
SPER) are factors in affecting ROA. Like other tables LNTINTPER (LNTPER) 
has a positive (negative) effect on ROA of private listed companies. Board 
subcommittees (DUAC, DUCC, and DUNC) have positive effects on ROA of 
private listed companies. The factor of market reform (DUREFORM) has a 
negative effect on ROA. This means that ROA of private listed companies in the 
post-reform period is better than that in the pre-reform period. Variables of the 
board of directors and the board of supervisors (LNBSIZE, INDPER, ROLESEP, 
and LNSSIZE) do not affect ROA of private listed companies. 
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Table 5-5 corporate governance and firm performance (ROA) in 
state owned listed companies 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C                        
                                                                                                                                
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
 
Dependent variable: ROA 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.310 -0.293 -0.266 -0.313 -0.296 -0.269 
  (-5.857)*** (-5.554)*** (-5.067)*** (-5.883)*** (-5.577)*** (-5.095)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
  (-1.862)* (-1.892)* (-1.922)* (-1.863)* (-1.894)* (-1.923)* 
Ownership concentration 0.527 0.531 0.528     
  (1.702)* (1.716)* (1.704)*     
State ownership     0.479 0.478 0.472 
     (1.530) (1.528) (1.508) 
institutional ownership 0.099 0.100 0.101 0.100 0.101 0.102 
  (6.530)*** (6.576)*** (6.640)*** (6.597)*** (6.643)*** (6.705)*** 
tradable shares -0.372 -0.341 -0.301 -0.366 -0.336 -0.297 
  (-3.971)*** (-3.674)*** (-3.251)*** (-3.817)*** (-3.526)*** (-3.123)*** 
Size of BOD 0.088 0.086 0.083 0.091 0.089 0.086 
  (0.493) (0.470) (0.462) (0.510) (0.495) (0.478) 
Independence of BOD -0.228 -0.171 -0.103 -0.216 -0.159 -0.092 
  (-0.458) (-0.344) (-0.206) (-0.435) (-0.320) (-0.184) 
Leadership of BOD -0.198 -0.202 -0.205 -0.194 -0.197 -0.200 
  (-1.857)* (-1.889)* (-1.915)* (-1.815)* (-1.846)* (-1.872)* 
Audit committee 0.108   0.108    
  (2.437)**   (2.448)**    
Compensation committee  0.063   0.063   
   (1.415)   (1.416)   
Nomination committee   0.021   -0.020 
    (-0.433)   (-0.410) 
Size of BOS 0.092 0.085 0.076 0.079 0.072 0.063 
  (0.680) (0.630) (0.562) (0.585) (0.533) (0.467) 
Market reform -0.194 -0.199 -0.208 -0.192 -0.197 -0.205 
  (-4.118)*** (-4.222)*** (-4.418)*** (-4.060)*** (-4.159)*** (-4.350)*** 
C 0.790 0.585 0.261 0.844 0.637 0.317 
  (0.883) (0.654) (0.292) (0.944) (0.714) (0.355) 
R² 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Adj.  R² 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 5-6 corporate governance and firm performance (Tobin's 
Q) in state owned listed companies 
  
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1ROE+ β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C                        
                                                                                                                                
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
 
Dependent variable: Tobin‟s Q 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
ROE 0.169 0.170 0.175 0.170 0.172 0.178 
  (2.404)** (2.417)** (2.460)** (2.434)** (2.451)** (2.501)** 
Firm size -0.236 -0.233 -0.228 -0.236 -0.232 -0.227 
  (-23.078)*** (-22.810)*** (-22.322)*** (-23.083)*** (-22.814)*** (-22.341)*** 
Ownership concentration 0.069 0.081 0.093     
  (0.911) (1.073) (1.227)     
State ownership     0.067 0.082 0.108 
     (0.823) (1.008) (1.334) 
institutional ownership 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.083 0.084 0.085 
  (14.878)*** (14.933)*** (15.080)*** (14.875)*** (14.939)*** (15.097)*** 
tradable shares -0.351 -0.338 -0.314 -0.348 -0.334 -0.306 
  (-10.651)*** (-10.245)*** (-9.479)*** (-9.814)*** (-9.396)*** (-8.558)*** 
Size of BOD 0.079 0.077 0.072 0.077 0.075 0.069 
  (1.597) (1.563) (1.447) (1.557) (1.517) (1.404) 
Independence of BOD -0.057 -0.037 0.011 -0.056 -0.035 0.013 
  (-0.320) (-0.207) (0.060) (-0.312) (-0.198) (0.071) 
Leadership of BOD -0.035 -0.037 -0.039 -0.035 -0.037 -0.039 
  (-1.067) (-1.123) (-1.171) (-1.063) (-1.121) (-1.1803) 
Audit committee 0.139   0.139    
  (8.046)***   (8.016)***    
Compensation committee  0.113   0.113   
   (6.621)***   (6.582)***   
Nomination committee   0.045   0.044 
    (2.534)**   (2.484)** 
Size of BOS 0.046 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.041 0.041 
  (1.480) (1.389) (1.374) (1.418) (1.315) (1.283) 
Market reform -0.357 -0.368 -0.393 -0.356 -0.367 -0.392 
  (-20.179)*** (-20.909)*** (-22.850)*** (-20.212)*** (-20.926)*** (-22.856)*** 
C 3.874 3.853 3.844 3.875 3.853 3.843 
  (21.374)*** (21.209)*** (21.093)*** (21.322)*** (21.155)*** (21.035)*** 
R² 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 
Adj.  R² 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 5-7 corporate governance and firm performance (ROE) in 
private listed companies 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
                                                                                                                                
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
  
Dependent variable: ROE 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  -0.271 -0.273 -0.207 
  (-2.573)** (-2.593)*** (-1.985)** 
Leverage (debt to equity) 0.017 0.017 0.019 
  (1.369) (1.337) (1.473) 
Ownership concentration -0.521 -0.495 -0.479 
  (-0.919) (-0.872) (-0.841) 
State ownership  1.015 1.014 0.962 
  (1.649)* (1.648)* (1.559) 
institutional ownership 0.147 0.146 0.153 
  (5.389)*** (5.347)*** (5.606)*** 
tradable shares -0.607 -0.599 -0.501 
  (-3.761)*** (-3.749)*** (-3.139)*** 
Size of BOD -0.031 -0.061 -0.068 
  (-0.106) (-0.206) (-0.231) 
Independence of BOD 0.845 0.880 0.941 
  (0.966) (1.006) (1.071) 
Leadership of BOD -0.120 -0.115 -0.125 
  (-0.991) (-0.957) (-1.035) 
Audit committee 0.182    
  (2.361)**    
Compensation committee   0.194   
    (2.475)**   
Nomination committee    0.012 
     (0.139) 
Size of BOS 0.150 0.151 0.112 
  (0.552) (0.556) (0.410) 
Market reform -0.110 -0.112 -0.134 
  (-1.400) (-1.434) (-1.716) 
C 0.957 1.010 0.308 
  (0.577) (0.609) (0.186) 
R² 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Adj.  R² 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 5-8 corporate governance and firm performance (ROA) in 
private listed companies 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
                                                                                                                                
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
  
Dependent variable: ROA 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  -1.030 -1.023 -1.005 
  (-14.468)*** (-14.351)*** (-13.877)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
  (-1.988)** (-2.022)** (-1.966)** 
Ownership concentration -0.515 -0.444 -0.436 
  (-0.903) (-0.776) (-0.751) 
State ownership  0.971 0.958 0.863 
  (1.545) (1.520) (1.351) 
institutional ownership 0.141 0.139 0.153 
  (5.069)*** (4.997)*** (5.442)*** 
tradable shares -0.681 -0.630 -0.511 
  (-4.131)*** (-3.846)*** (-3.088)*** 
Size of BOD 0.080 -0.004 -0.019 
  (0.276) (-0.012) (-0.062) 
Independence of BOD 1.235 1.315 1.398 
  (1.409) (1.497) (1.568) 
Leadership of BOD -0.060 -0.051 -0.070 
  (-0.479) (-0.408) (-0.552) 
Audit committee 0.493    
  (6.434)***    
Compensation committee   0.475   
    (6.083)***   
Nomination committee    0.288 
     (3.394)*** 
Size of BOS -0.025 -0.034 -0.058 
  (-0.090) (-0.121) (-0.204) 
Market reform -0.189 -0.204 -0.260 
  (-2.422)*** (-2.608)*** (-3.316)*** 
C 10.605 10.674 10.753 
  (8.479)*** (8.512)*** (8.443)*** 
R² 0.66 0.66 0.65 
Adj.  R² 0.50 0.49 0.48 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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The table 5-9 reports the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanism and Tobin‟s Q in private listed companies. ROE does not affect 
Tobin‟s Q in private listed companies. The firm size (LNBV) has a negative 
effect on Tobin‟s Q in private listed companies. Ownership concentration and 
state ownership (1STPER and SPER) have insignificant effects on Tobin‟s Q in 
private listed companies. Proportions of institutional ownership (LNTINTPER) in 
the ownership structure have a positive effect on Tobin‟s Q. Proportions of 
tradable shares (LNTPER) in the ownership structure have a negative effect on 
Tobin‟s Q of private listed companies. The audit committee and the 
compensation committee (DUAC and DUCC) have positive effects on Tobin‟s Q 
of private listed companies. However, the nomination committee (DUNC) does 
not affect Tobin‟s Q of private listed companies. The dummy variable of market 
reform (DUREFORM) has a negative effect on Tobin‟s Q, which means that the 
Tobin‟s Q of private listed companies in the pre-reform period is lower than that 
in the post-reform period. Although board independence has a positive effect on 
Tobin‟s Q, the significance level is only 10%. Other variables of the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors (LNBSIZE, ROLESEP, and LNSSIZE) do 
not affect Tobin‟s Q in private listed companies.  
Generally, firm size and leverage (LNBV and DERATIO) will not affect 
ROE, but have negative effects on ROA and Tobin‟s Q. Ownership 
concentration and state ownership (1STPER and SPER) do not affect the three 
proxies of firm performance. Institutional ownership (LNTINTPER) is a factor in 
improving firm performance. Greater proportions of tradable shares (LNTPER) 
will decrease firm performance. The board of directors (LNBSIZE, INDPER, and 
ROLESEP) does not affect firm performance. Although the role separation has 
a negative effect on ROE in table 5-1 and table 5-4, and board independence 
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has a positive effect on Tobin‟s Q in table 5-9, the board of directors does not 
affect firm performance in general. Board subcommittees have a positive effect 
on firm performance. Like the board of directors, the board of supervisors also 
does not affect firm performance of Chinese listed companies. The dummy of 
market reform has a negative effect on firm performance. In other words, this 
means that market reform increases firm performance of Chinese listed 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155 
 
Table 5-9 corporate governance and firm performance (Tobin's 
Q) in private listed companies 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 ROE + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C                                                                                                                               
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 ROEO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 ROE + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that if there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO is separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Dependent variable: Tobin‟s Q 
  M1 M2 M3 
ROE 0.012 0.011 0.012 
  (0.459) (0.415) (0.427) 
Firm size -0.360 -0.350 -0.314 
  (-8.471)*** (-8.213)*** (-7.355)*** 
Ownership concentration 0.122 0.152 0.177 
  (0.498) (0.616) (0.709) 
State ownership  -0.079 -0.084 -0.126 
  (-0.286) (-0.306) (-0.454) 
institutional ownership 0.052 0.052 0.058 
  (4.3257)*** (4.351)*** (4.807)*** 
tradable shares -0.394 -0.366 -0.291 
  (-5.517)*** (-5.137)*** (-4.074)*** 
Size of BOD 0.156 0.130 0.123 
  (1.225) (1.018) (0.951) 
Independence of BOD 0.630 0.688 0.742 
  (1.651)* (1.798)* (1.917)* 
Leadership of BOD 0.002 0.004 -0.005 
  (0.028) (0.077) (-0.084) 
Audit committee 0.191    
  (5.627)***    
Compensation committee  0.164   
   (4.752)***   
Nomination committee   0.039 
    (1.042) 
Size of BOS 0.028 0.015 -0.017 
  (0.238) (0.131) (-0.141) 
Market reform -0.428 -0.435 -0.456 
  (-12.585)*** (-12.795)*** (-13.345)*** 
C 5.067 4.998 4.669 
  (7.603)*** (7.463)*** (6.913)*** 
R² 0.68 0.68 0.67 
Adj.  R² 0.55 0.54 0.53 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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5.5. Discussion and interpretation 
The purpose of this section is to discuss and interpret the empirical results 
presented in section 5.4. 
5.5.1. Firm size, leverage and firm performance 
Balasubramanian et al. (2010) state that in an emerging market,  firm size 
is a factor that increases the quality of corporate governance. Previous studies 
also indicate that firm size will help companies gain innovation advantages in an 
emerging market (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Vaona and Pianta, 2008; Rochina-
Barrachina et al., 2010). Thus, there should be a positive relationship between 
firm size and firm performance in Chinese listed companies. Appropriate 
leverage of companies will help them to increase firm performance, since debt 
financing will support the operation of companies, thereby increasing firm 
performance.  However, empirical results of section 5.4 indicate that firm size 
(LNBV) and debt-to-equity ratio (DERATIO) do not affect firm performance 
(ROE) of Chinese listed companies or have negative effects on firm 
performance (ROA/Q).  
Firm size may help Chinese listed companies to increase the quality of the 
corporate governance mechanism in their companies. A good corporate 
governance mechanism is costly. Thus, only large companies are able to afford 
the cost of building a good corporate governance mechanism. Chinese market 
is not a sophisticated market, thus, firm size may help companies to gain the 
competitive advantages, such as innovation, financing, and human resource. 
Thus, firm size is a factor in improving firm performance (ROE). However, in 
some Chinese listed companies firm size may reduce firm performance. In 
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some Chinese listed companies the problem of „insider control‟ is very serious, 
and it will be exacerbated in the large companies (Li et al., 2005; Cornett, 2007). 
Under this circumstance, firm size will decrease the quality of corporate 
governance mechanism, thereby lowering firm performance (ROE). Thus, firm 
size will have an insignificant effect on firm performance (ROE) in general term.  
Additionally, empirical results (table 5-2, table 5-3, table 5-5, table 5-6, 
table 5-8 and table 5-9) indicate that firm size (LNBV) has negative effects on 
return on asset (ROA) and Tobin‟s Q (Q) in the Chinese listed companies.   
In the Chinese market, the large companies will have a higher debt ratio 
(Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2009; Chen, 2010). circumstance, 
they will have more debt in their capital structure. In other words, the 
proportions of equity in the capital structure of Chinese listed companies will 
decrease as the firm size increases. As a result, the debt asset will disperse the 
profitability of Chinese listed companies if it is measured by the return on asset 
(ROA) (Xu et al., 2009). Hovey (2007) also indicates that the ROA is negatively 
correlated with the leverage of the Chinese listed companies. Thus, there is a 
negative relationship between firm size and return on asset in the Chinese listed 
companies. In this thesis, firm size is measured by total asset of listed 
companies. Because the proxy of replacement value is the value of companies‟ 
total asset, large listed companies will have a higher replacement value, or in 
other words, those companies will have a larger denominator in the formula of 
Tobin‟s Q. This will lower the value of Tobin‟s Q of large listed companies. 
Additionally, the negative relationship between firm size and Tobin‟s Q may 
indicate that Chinese investors recognise the lumbering nature of some large 
listed SOEs (Hovey, et al., 2003).  
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The insignificant (negative) relationship between debt-to-equity ratio and 
return on equity (return on asset) indicates that debt financing cannot help 
Chinese listed companies to increase firm performance in general term or that it 
lowers firm performance of Chinese listed companies. Fan and Ye (2004) 
indicate that the majority of debtors of Chinese listed companies are state 
owned banks and they are less inclined to monitor listed companies. Under this 
circumstance, debtors of Chinese listed companies cannot motivate them to 
increase firm performance. Thus, the leverage of listed companies does not 
affect their performance, and this is the reason that there is a negative 
relationship between DERATIO and ROA.   
5.5.2. Ownership structure and firm 
performance 
The empirical results of section 5.2 indicate that ownership structure 
significantly affects firm performance of the Chinese listed companies. Thus, in 
discussing the effect of the corporate governance mechanism on firm 
performance of the Chinese companies, their ownership structure must be 
considered. This section will discuss the effect on firm performance in the 
Chinese market of 1) the proportion of tradable shares, 2) state ownership, 3) 
ownership concentration and 4) institutional share ownership. 
5.5.2.1. Tradable shares and firm performance 
Tomasic and Jian (2006), and Wei and Geng (2008) point out that non-
tradable shares made the market mechanism incapable of influencing Chinese 
listed companies. Thus the regulatory agency in the Chinese market decided to 
reduce the proportion of non-tradable shares. The empirical results of section 
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5.2 reject the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the 
proportion of tradable shares (LNTPER) and firm performance of Chinese listed 
companies, since it shows there is a negative relationship between them. The 
purpose of the elimination of non-tradable shares is to reduce the negative 
effect of stock segmentation on firm performance of Chinese listed companies. 
Stock segmentation is a historical problem in the Chinese market and has been 
criticized by its participants for a long time. However, the empirical results in this 
section (tables 5-1 to 5-9) indicate that the reduction of non-tradable shares has 
a negative effect on firm performance of Chinese listed companies. One 
possible reason for this is that although the elimination of non-tradable shares 
increases market liquidity in the Chinese securities market and disperses 
company ownership, it also exacerbates the problem of free-riders in that 
market. Under a dispersed ownership structure, the majority of shareholders are 
unable to monitor the managerial activities of executives. Hansmann and 
Kraakman (2004) find that a dispersed ownership structure will exacerbate the 
conflict of interest between executives and shareholders, since the owners are 
unable to monitor the executives. Under this circumstance, the problem of free-
riders means that executives are less monitored by the shareholders.   
The elimination of non-tradable shares attracts more investors to join the 
Chinese securities market. The majority of Chinese investors are individual and 
small investors (Zhang et al., 2010), and they are less concerned about the 
quality of corporate governance of  Chinese listed companies. As a result, these 
new investors lack the ability to monitor the companies and drive the 
managerial team to align managerial activities with the interest of the company. 
Additionally, the elimination of non-tradable shares motivates the holders of 
non-tradable shares to sell their shares in the market. Because of the original 
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price gap between non-tradable and tradable shares (Zhang, 2009b), holders of  
non-tradable shares will gain more profit from the market if there is no trading 
restriction. Under this circumstance, the elimination of non-tradable shares 
gives these shareholders an opportunity to receive a price premium between 
non-tradable and tradable shares. These shareholders are less likely to pay 
attention to the managerial teams of listed companies, so the executives will not 
be monitored by the shareholders. Thus, the elimination of non-tradable shares 
will exacerbate the conflict of interest between shareholders and the managerial 
team, thereby increasing agency cost. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the 
elimination of non-tradable shares will improve performance of Chinese listed 
companies.  
However, the negative relationship between proportion of tradable shares 
and performance of Chinese listed companies should not make the elimination 
of non-tradable shares appear to be an adverse policy. For instance, the 
elimination of non-tradable shares leads to more outside investors having 
opportunities to take part in the process of corporate decision making in 
Chinese listed companies. Additionally, the elimination of non-tradable shares 
will motivate more M&A activities in the Chinese market. These activities will 
drive Chinese listed companies to adopt a good corporate governance 
mechanism, which in future will strengthen its effect on firm performance. Under 
this circumstance, corporate governance mechanisms will have more 
opportunities to influence the performance of Chinese listed companies. Thus, 
although to some extent the elimination of non-tradable shares is not a factor in 
improving firm performance during the sample period studied, it may in the long 
run affect firm performance of Chinese listed companies. 
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5.5.2.2. State ownership and firm performance 
Besides stock segmentation, another criticism of the ownership structure 
of Chinese listed companies is state ownership. Chen et al. (2007) and Xu et al. 
(2005) state that state ownership impairs firm performance of Chinese listed 
companies. Figures of table 5-1 to 5-9 indicate that state ownership does not 
affect performance of listed companies. Thus, the hypothesis that state 
ownership will impair firm performance in Chinese listed companies cannot be 
accepted 
Although economic reform promotes the development of the market 
mechanism in the Chinese market, the influence of the Chinese government is 
unlikely to be quickly reduced in the foreseeable period (cs.com.cn, 2010; Zhao, 
2010). Thus, the state still plays an important role in Chinese economics. Under 
this circumstance, the Chinese government is able to influence resource 
allocation in the Chinese market. Therefore, companies that are owned by the 
state will be given priority in getting resources. For instance, in some specific 
industries (e.g. oil, power/grid, minerals/mining, and defence), the leading 
companies are state owned. Thus, state ownership is a factor in improving firm 
performance in some Chinese listed companies.  
On the other hand, as the Chinese market is developing, the market 
mechanism is increasing its influence on it. Under this circumstance, the 
weakness of state ownership might be exacerbated. Compared with private 
market participants, the state‟s managerial decisions are oriented by non-
commercial factors. Additionally, the managerial efficiency of non-state owned 
companies might be higher than that of state owned companies. For instance, 
private listed companies have more need to increase managerial efficiency (Yi, 
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2007). Greater managerial efficiency will help companies to maximise the 
output with minimum input, thereby increasing firm performance.  
These opposing effects of state ownership on firm performance mean that 
state ownership does not to affect firm performance in Chinese listed 
companies in general. 
5.5.2.3. Ownership concentration and firm 
performance 
Ownership concentration is another feature of the ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies. Large shareholders hold substantial shares in listed 
companies, thereby leaving other shareholders with no opportunities to 
influence the management of those companies. Conventional wisdom indicates 
that the unchallengeable shareholders will impair the quality of corporate 
governance and thus impair firm performance. Previous papers support this 
opinion with evidence from the developed market (Yeh, 2005; Dahya et al., 
2008). However, results of section 5.4 indicate that ownership concentration 
(1STPER) does not affect firm performance (ROE/ROA/Q) in Chinese listed 
companies.  
Currently, the majority of Chinese investors are individual investors (Zhang 
et al., 2010).  Thus, they do not have ability to monitor the listed companies 
(Tang et al., 2004). Hence, the majority of shareholders of Chinese listed 
companies fail to impose supervisory pressure on the company‟s executives, 
thereby causing managerial activities to be aligned with the interests of those 
executives. Recent market reform of the Chinese market allows more individual 
and small investors to become shareholders of Chinese listed companies, 
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thereby decreasing the supervisory pressure from shareholders. Ownership 
concentration causes shareholder-monitoring to be restricted to the large 
shareholders, especially the majority (holding) shareholders. This will increase 
the deterrent effect of shareholder monitoring and therefore drive the executives 
to reduce their self-interested activities. A company which has a low incidence 
of self-interested activities will have low agency cost, and thus better firm 
performance in the market.  
However, the weakness of inappropriate ownership concentration cannot 
be ignored. Inappropriate ownership concentration will exacerbate the conflicts 
of interest between shareholders of companies. Under this circumstance, it 
increases the agency cost of companies, and thus, decreases firm 
performance. Figures of table 4-1 (page 109) indicate that the 1STPER is highly 
correlated to the SPER. Thus, in state owned companies, in which the state is 
holding shareholder, the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance 
should be similar to that of state ownership. The majority of Chinese private 
listed companies are managed by the whole family (Li et al., 2005). Thus, there 
is a blood relationship between large shareholders and corporate executives. 
Under this managerial hierarchy, the interests of executives are similar to that of 
the large shareholders, and vice versa. In this case, ownership concentration 
will not be a factor in driving the corporate executives to increase firm 
performance.   
Generally, the opposite effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance mean that 1STPER does not affect firm performance 
(ROE/ROA/Q) in Chinese listed companies. 
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5.5.2.4. Institutional ownership and firm 
performance 
Institutional ownership is a solution to the problem of the free rider, since it 
concentrates ownership and increases the influence of shareholders who can 
drive corporate executives to increase firm performance (Admati et al., 1994; 
Lin et al., 2007). The empirical results section in 5.2 (tables 5-1 to 5-9) support 
the hypothesis that institutional ownership is a positive factor in the 
improvement of firm performance of Chinese listed companies, since 
LNTINTPER positively affects firm performance.  
The majority of Chinese investors are small investors and they lack the 
power to monitor the managerial activities of the Chinese listed companies, 
which would in turn motivate the executives to increase firm performance (Tang 
et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2010). Instead, institutional investors in effect 
represent the small shareholders in monitoring the corporate managerial teams. 
Institutional investors can impose supervisory pressure on the corporate 
executives of the Chinese listed companies, to drive them to increase firm 
performance. 
Additionally, institutional ownership will reduce the negative influence of 
majority (holding) shareholders on firm management. Market reform removes 
the trading restrictions on non-tradable shares, thereby leading to institutional 
investors being able to take part in the process of corporate decision making. 
This ensures that the process of decision making will not be monopolised by the 
majority (holding) shareholders. Thus, institutional ownership reduces the 
conflict of interest between the shareholders of listed companies, reduces 
agency cost and increases firm performance of those companies. As the market 
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develops, institutional investors will improve the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms, thereby further helping Chinese listed companies to 
achieve better firm performance.  
5.5.3. Board of directors and firm performance 
In contemporary listed companies, the performance and effectiveness of 
the corporate governance mechanism depend on the board of directors, since it 
represents the corporate shareholders in monitoring the companies. Thus, the 
board of directors will determine the quality of the corporate governance 
mechanism and influence firm performance of the listed companies. Previous 
studies consider that the performance of a board of directors will be determined 
by its size, independence, and leadership structure (Lakhal, 2003; Ragothaman 
and Gollakota, 2009). Previous studies of other developed markets indicate that 
the characteristics of a board of directors will affect firm performance (e.g. 
Jensen, 1993; Mura, 2006; Schmid and Zimmermann, 2008). Thus, this thesis 
also adopts the same three variables to evaluate the effects of the board of 
directors on firm performance of Chinese listed companies. However, in the 
tables presented in section 5.4, LNBSIZE, INDPER, and ROELSEP have no 
significant effect on firm performance of Chinese listed companies. Thus, the 
board of directors is not a factor in increasing performance in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Members of the board of directors should be nominated by a majority of the 
shareholders to ensure that the board will act objectively on behalf of 
shareholder interest. If the process of nomination for board membership is 
influenced by only a few insiders, such as executives and majority (holding) 
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shareholder, the board of directors will not properly represent the company‟s 
shareholders. In Chinese listed companies, board members are nominated by 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of shareholders. However, the special 
ownership structure of Chinese listed companies (the inappropriate ownership 
concentration discussed in section 2.3 and 2.4), means that the AGM is 
seriously influenced by the majority shareholders, who nominate their affiliated 
people to work as members of the board (Huang et al., 2006; Kang et al., 2008; 
Zhang, 2009a; Zhou, 2009). This phenomenon breaches managerial discretion 
and compromises the independence of a board of directors. It also means that 
the board of directors is influenced by the interests of large shareholders, 
especially the majority (holding) shareholders. Thus it can be said that the effect 
of a board of directors on firm performance of Chinese listed companies is partly 
determined by the attitude of the larger shareholders. 
5.5.3.1. Board size and firm performance 
In western listed companies, such as in the UK or US, board size 
determines the performance of a board of directors and therefore influences the 
performance of the companies (Lakhal, 2003). However, the results presented in 
tables 5-1 - 5-9 indicate that in Chinese listed companies, board size does not 
affect firm performance. One possible reason for this phenomenon is the 
influence of large shareholders, especially the majority (holding) shareholder. 
Because of the influence of the large shareholders who nominate them, 
members of the board align their activities with the interests of those 
shareholders. In state owned listed companies, the government nominates 
officials to work as members of the board of directors (Huang et al., 2006). In  
private listed companies, family members will be nominated to work as members 
of the board of directors (Li et al., 2005). Although market reform is beginning to 
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disperse the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies, table 4-1 
indicates that the average holding percentage of the largest shareholder of 
Chinese listed companies is 38%, which means that the influence of large 
shareholders on listed companies cannot be reduced immediately (Kang et al., 
2008). Thus, board size does not currently affect the performance of Chinese 
listed companies. 
5.5.3.2. Role separation of the Chairman and CEO 
and firm performance 
Previous studies indicate that the leadership structure, and whether CEO 
and chairman roles are separated or combined, will affect the efficiency of a 
board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Schmid and Zimmermann, 2008). 
Role separation of the CEO and the chairmen will affect the interaction between 
the board of directors and the managerial team in a company, thereby further 
affecting firm performance of this company.  
However, empirical results from tables 5-1 to 5-9, in section 5.2, indicate 
that role separation of CEO and chairman does not affect firm performance. As 
mentioned above (Zhang, 2009; Zhou, 2009), majority (holding) shareholders 
have substantial influence in Chinese listed companies. They control the 
process of corporate nomination to the boards of those companies. Both CEO 
and chairman of the boards are nominated and appointed by the majority 
(holding) shareholders. This ensures that majority (holding) shareholders have 
firm control of managerial activities. Thus, the CEO and chairman of Chinese 
listed companies have less managerial discretion than their western 
counterparts. Managerial activities are driven by the attitude of the majority 
(holding) shareholders of the Chinese listed companies. This phenomenon leads 
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to there being no significant relationship between the role separation of CEO 
and chairman of directors and firm performance of the Chinese listed companies. 
Thus, role separation has no significant effect on firm performance of Chinese 
listed companies.  
5.5.3.3. Independent directors and firm performance 
The previous empirical results indicate that there is a negative relationship 
between board independence and firm performance (e.g. Fernandes, 2005; 
Mura, 2006), since the independent status of some directors means they may be 
unqualified for the role, and thus make decisions that reduce firm performance. 
However, the empirical results of this thesis find that there is no significant 
relationship between board independence and firm performance.  
The main reason for this phenomenon is still the influence of majority 
(holding) shareholders and over-powerful corporate executives. The process of 
nominating independent directors in Chinese listed companies is seriously 
affected by the majority (holding) shareholders and these over-powerful 
corporate executives (Kang et al., 2008). Under this circumstance, independent 
directors of Chinese listed companies cannot be classified as truly independent, 
since their independence has been impaired. These independent directors 
cannot really increase the quality of the corporate governance mechanism, or 
influence firm performance of the Chinese listed companies.  
Another important reason that board independence has no significant 
effect on firm performance is the low proportion of independent directors on the 
board. The code of corporate governance in the Chinese market requires listed 
companies to ensure that the minimum proportion of independent directors on a 
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board of directors is 1/3. Table 4-1 (page 109) indicates that the average 
percentage of independent directors on the board in Chinese listed companies is 
around 1/3. In other words, in Chinese listed companies, the majority of board 
members are non-independent directors.   
Thirdly, a shortage of human resource restricts the effect of independent 
directors on firm performance. Besides the influence of majority (holding) 
shareholders, the shortage of qualified people also reduces the quality of 
independent directors (Wei and Geng, 2008; Gu, 2009),as many independent 
directors lack the relevant skill and ability to work as qualified directors of 
Chinese listed companies.  
Finally, the legal system in the Chinese market fails to define the duty and 
responsibilities of independent directors (Clarke, 2006). This makes independent 
directors of the Chinese listed companies less likely to monitor corporate 
executives. The code of corporate governance in the Chinese market fails to 
provide a clearly duty for independent directors (Gu, 2009), and as yet there is 
no upgraded code to solve this problem. Thus, low board independence leads to 
independent directors having no significant effect on firm performance.  
Overall, the boards of directors of Chinese listed companies cannot be 
considered a factor in improving their company performance due to the 
substantial influence of majority (holding) shareholders. Thus, to increase the 
effectiveness of the board of directors on firm performance of Chinese listed 
companies, the influence of majority (holding) shareholders should be restricted 
to protect the managerial independence of those boards.   
5.5.4. Subcommittees and firm performance 
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In a good corporate governance mechanism, an important component is 
the board subcommittee. Board subcommittees work as assistants to the boards 
of the listed companies and help the directors increase their performance and 
efficiency. The advantage of using board subcommittees is to reduce the 
influence of corporate managerial teams and large shareholders on the board of 
directors. Previous studies find that using board subcommittees will increase the 
quality of the corporate governance mechanism of companies (e.g. Bizjak and 
Anderson, 2000; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Laplante and Tong, 2007), thereby 
increasing firm performance of the listed companies.  
In general, tables 5-1 to 5-9 indicate that board subcommittees, which are 
audit committee, compensation committee, and nomination committee, have 
positive effects on firm performance of Chinese listed companies.  
The previous studies mentioned in the first paragraph of this section find 
that the audit committee will ensure the quality of internal audit and increase 
corporate transparency, and that the compensation committee will ensure the 
remuneration efficiency and also increase corporate transparency. Table 4-1 
indicates that after market reform, more Chinese listed companies began to 
appoint audit, compensation, and nomination committees. This means that 
Chinese listed companies began to consider the quality of their corporate 
governance mechanisms. Under this circumstance, the audit and compensation 
committees will have more opportunities to affect firm performance. Compared 
with state owned listed companies, private companies are more likely to comply 
with the requirements of the market mechanism. To do this, private companies 
will strengthen their corporate governance mechanisms. In this way, the use of 
audit and compensation committees positively affects firm performance in 
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private companies. In state owned listed companies, the substantial influence of 
the government means that the market mechanism has little effect on firm 
management  (Kang et al., 2008). In this case, the use of board subcommittees 
does not affect firm performance in state owned listed companies.  
The empirical results cannot really support the hypothesis that the 
nomination committee positively affects firm performance. This could be due to 
the reason discussed above. In Chinese listed companies, large shareholders 
and executives are over-powerful, and they control the management of 
companies (Wei and Geng, 2008). Under this circumstance, the nomination 
committee cannot effectively influence the process of board nomination, and so 
it does not affect firm performance (ROE) of Chinese listed companies. 
5.5.5. Board of supervisors and firm 
performance 
Besides the board of directors and its subcommittees, another important 
component of the corporate governance mechanism in Chinese listed 
companies is the board of supervisors. Previous studies state that the board of 
supervisors of Chinese listed companies will not have an effect on firm 
performance (Tian and Estrin, 2005; Deloitte-China, 2010), since it lacks real 
monitoring power. Empirical results from tables 5-1 to 5-9 in section 5.4 indicate 
that there is no significant relationship between the size of the supervisory board 
and firm performance. These are consistent with previous studies that 
mentioned in section 4.3.  
 172 
 
Although the laws and codes of the Chinese market define the board of 
supervisors as an important internal monitoring institution, in practice, the board 
of supervisors cannot effectively monitor the executives of Chinese listed 
companies. As mentioned in previous sections, the board of supervisors lacks 
any real monitoring power in the Chinese listed companies (Kang et al., 2008). 
In Chinese listed companies, the board of supervisors almost works as a 
consultant to the board of directors (Zhou, 2011). Although the board of 
supervisors has recently been given more genuine monitoring power, the 
managerial hierarchy of Chinese listed companies will reduce the effect of this. 
Additionally, the problem of duty duplication between the board of supervisors 
and the independent directors also causes the board of supervisors to have no 
significant effect on the firm performance of Chinese listed companies (Gu, 
2009; Jiang, 2009). The influence of majority (holding) shareholders also results 
in no significant relationship between the board of supervisors and firm 
performance. Majority (holding) shareholders can influence the process of 
nomination to the board of supervisors and therefore provide the opportunity of 
controlling it in their own interests (Li et al., 2005; Kang et al., 2008).  Thus, a 
board of supervisors cannot affect the quality of a corporate governance 
mechanism and thereby influence firm performance.  
5.5.6. Market reforms and firm performance 
At the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, there was a series of 
reforms in the Chinese market. These reforms include the reform of the 
ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and new legislation. To 
measure the effects of this series of market reforms on firm performance in 
Chinese listed companies, the regression model introduces the year dummy 
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variable.  Empirical results of section 5.4 indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between the year dummy and firm performance in Chinese listed 
companies. This means that firm performance during the post-reform period is 
better than that of the pre-reform period. In other words, the series of market 
reforms help Chinese listed companies to increase their firm performance.  
After market reform, Chinese listed companies begin to be concerned 
about the quality of the corporate governance mechanism. Figures of table 4-1 
indicate a trend showing that Chinese listed companies begin to increase the 
quality of corporate governance mechanisms after market reform. For instance, 
the proportion of institutional investors is increasing, and more companies have 
established board subcommittees. These activities will increase the quality of 
corporate governance in Chinese listed companies and therefore decrease their 
agency cost. Lower agency cost means companies will achieve a better 
performance in the market. New legislation motivates small shareholders and 
market regulators to more effectively monitor listed companies. New legislation 
gives more power to small shareholders and market regulators. This will 
motivate them to have more interest in monitoring listed companies and drive 
them increase firm performance. Generally speaking, the market reform that 
started at the end of 2005 is a factor in the improving performance of Chinese 
listed companies.  
5.6. Robustness test 
 To ensure the robustness of the empirical results reported in this chapter, 
this thesis employs the pooled OLS technique to estimate the regression 
models of this chapter again. Results of the pooled OLS technique will be 
summarised in this section. 
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All of results of the pooled OLS estimation are listed in appendix 1-9. 
Firstly, empirical results indicate that firm size has a positive effect on ROE, but 
has negative effects on ROA and Q. The debt-to-equity ratio has a positive 
effect on ROE, but has negative effects on ROA in Chinese listed companies. 
The ownership concentration has a positive effect on firm performance in the 
full sample and the sample of state owned companies, but this effect does not 
exist in the sample of private companies. State ownership has a positive effect 
on firm performance especially in state owned listed companies. However, this 
effect also does not hold in private listed companies. A greater institutional 
ownership helps Chinese listed companies to get better firm performance in the 
market. There is a negative relationship between the proportion of tradable 
shares and firm performance in Chinese listed companies and this result is 
opposite to the initial purpose of the policy of elimination of non-tradable shares. 
Characteristics of the board of directors and the board of supervisors are not 
factors in determining firm performance of Chinese listed companies. The audit 
committee and the compensation committee have positive effects on firm 
performance in Chinese listed companies, especially in private listed 
companies. However, the nomination committee will have no effect on firm 
performance in Chinese listed companies. Finally, there is a negative 
relationship between the market reform dummy and the firm performance of 
companies. This means that firm performance of the post-reform period is better 
than that of the pre-reform period.  
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter reports and discusses the empirical results of the relationship 
between the corporate governance mechanism and firm performance.  
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Because of the characteristics of the Chinese market, in which the state 
plays an important role, the full sample was divided into two sub-samples - the 
sample of state owned listed companies, and that of private listed companies. 
Additionally, regression models of this chapter also considered the influence of 
market reforms, which started at the end of 2005, on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanism and firm performance in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Firstly, the control variables: firm size (LNBV) and debt-to-equity ratio 
(DERATIO) are found not to affect firm performance, which is measured by the 
return on equity (ROE) in Chinese listed companies. This is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies of the emerging markets where large companies will 
have innovation advantages (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Vaona and Pianta, 
2008). Large companies in the emerging markets also have good corporate 
governance mechanisms to reduce any conflicts of interest and increase firm 
performance (Balasubramanian, et al. 2010). Additionally, firm size and debt-to-
equity ratio were found to have negative effects of firm performance, which is 
measured by the return on asset (ROA) and Tobin‟s Q (Q), in Chinese listed 
companies.  
Secondly, the dummy variable of market reform is found to have a 
negative effect on the firm performance of Chinese listed companies. This 
means that after market reform, Chinese listed companies performed better in 
the Chinese market than in the pre-reform period. This result is consistent with 
the initial purpose of the new market reforms that increase the firm performance 
of Chinese listed companies 
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Thirdly, the empirical results report that there is a positive relationship 
between the proportion of institutional share ownership and firm performance 
(tables 5-1 to 5-9). This is consistent with previous studies which find that 
institutional ownership positively affects firm performance of Chinese listed 
companies (Hovey, 2003; Lin et al. 2007). Institutional investors reduce the 
problem of the free-rider and impose performance pressure on the executives of 
Chinese listed companies, thereby driving those companies to achieve good 
firm performance in the market. Additionally, the institutional investor will reduce 
the influence of large shareholders and ameliorate any conflicts of interest 
between shareholders, and thereby increase firm performance.  
Fourthly, the empirical results indicate that board of directors and board of 
supervisors do not affect firm performance of the Chinese listed companies 
(table 5-1 to table 5-9). These results are not consistent with the hypotheses 
that those boards have a positive effect on firm performance. Because of the 
influence of large shareholders, especially the majority (holding) shareholder, 
nomination and appointment of boards of directors and of supervisors are 
determined by the interests of the large shareholders in the Chinese listed 
companies (Rajagopalan and Zhang,2008; Kang et al., 2008; Zhou, 2009). 
Additionally, compared with the board of directors, the board of supervisors is 
underpowered (Tian and Estrin, 2005: Kang et al., 2008). Thus, the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors do not affect firm performance in Chinese 
listed companies. 
Fifthly, state ownership is not found to decrease firm performance of 
Chinese listed companies (tables 5-1 to 5-9). This is inconsistent with the 
prediction that state ownership has a negative effect on firm performance (Chen 
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et al.2007b; Li et al. 2008). In the Chinese market, some of the listed companies 
need state ownership to gain competitive advantage to increase their firm 
performance. However, state ownership also reduces the operational efficiency 
of other listed companies, thereby lowering firm performance. Thus, in 
generally, state ownership does not affect firm performance in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Additionally, the empirical results of this chapter also reject the hypothesis 
that ownership concentration will decrease firm performance of Chinese listed 
companies  On the one hand,  ownership concentration will reduce the conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers in Chinese listed companies, 
since Chinese investors are unable to monitor executives effectively (Tang et 
al., 2004). On the other hand, ownership concentration will exacerbate the 
conflict of interest between shareholders, thereby decreasing firm performance 
(Dahya et al., 2008). These opposing effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance lead to the insignificant effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance in Chinese listed companies. 
Sixthly, the empirical results of this chapter (table 5-1 to 5-9) indicate that 
there is a negative relationship between the proportion of tradable shares and 
firm performance in Chinese listed companies. The elimination of non-tradable 
shares release large amounts of non-tradable shares to the market and attract 
plenty of new investors to join the market. However, this process also 
exacerbates the problem of the free-rider, which will damage the quality of the 
corporate governance mechanism. Currently, the majority of Chinese investors 
are individual investors (Tang et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2010). Thus, the 
problem of the free-rider in the Chinese market might be serious. Under this 
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circumstance, there is a negative relationship between the proportion of 
tradable shares and firm performance.  
Finally, the empirical results find that there is a positive relationship 
between subcommittees and firm performance (table 5-1 to 5-9). This is 
consistent with studies in the developed market (Bizjak and Anderson, 2000; 
Ruigrok et al., 2006; Laplante and Tong, 2007). As the market developed, more 
Chinese listed companies began to pay attention to the issue of corporate 
governance. Thus, subcommittees now have more opportunities to influence 
firm performance of Chinese listed companies.  
In the next two chapters, the phenomenon of information leakage in the 
Chinese market will be empirically evaluated, and the relationship between 
corporate governance and information leakage in the Chinese securities market 
will be empirically assessed. Because of the unsophisticated corporate 
governance in Chinese companies, asymmetric information is a serious 
problem in the Chinese securities market. Executives in Chinese companies are 
less monitored by shareholders, since most of them are individual and small 
shareholders (Zhang et al., 2010). At the same time, the problem of illegal 
insider trading is serious in the Chinese securities market (Huang, 2007). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a relationship between illegal insider trading 
and information leakage. Therefore, there might be serious information leakage 
in the Chinese securities market. This thesis plans to empirically examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and information leakage in the 
Chinese market. Chapter 6 will empirically evaluate the problem of information 
leakage in the Chinese securities market. Chapter 7 will empirically assess the 
relationship between corporate governance and information leakage, in order to 
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evaluate the effectiveness of corporate governance arrangements in Chinese 
companies.  
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Chapter 6. Is there informed 
trading around corporate 
earnings announcements? 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter empirically evaluated the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance in Chinese companies. Another purpose of 
this thesis is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
information leakage in the Chinese market. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is 
to empirically examine the extent of the problem of information leakage in the 
Chinese market.  
Previous studies in the Chinese market indicate that there is a significant 
CAR before the announcement of a merger and acquisition, which disappears 
after the announcement date (Tuan et al., 1995; Shi and Jiang, 2003; Yan and 
Zhao, 2006). Thus, they suggest that the content of announcements is leaked to 
the market prior to the announcement date and there might have been illegal 
insider trading activities in the market. Zhang and Liu (2005) find that before an 
announcement there are changes in trading volume, and this suggests there is 
undetected insider trading in the Chinese securities market.  
In this thesis, a corporate earnings announcement is set as the event, 
since earnings announcements are an important corporate disclosure. Earnings 
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announcements reveal information that will help the investors in their evaluation 
of the companies.  
Results of event study indicate that there are significant CARs, increase in 
run-up index and trading volume prior to an earnings announcement date in the 
Chinese securities market. According to the previous studies (mentioned above), 
this could be the result of information leakage in the market, and there might 
have been illegal insider trading activity as well.  
6.2. Information environment of the 
Chinese capital market 
One feature of a sophisticated capital market is the availability of 
information or the transparency of companies. Greater information availability 
will facilitate the resource allocation in a capital market, and increase the 
transparency of companies. Greater transparency of listed companies will 
reduce the information asymmetry between companies and investors. This will 
reduce the incidence of fraudulent activity, which is a result of the information 
asymmetry. As one of the outstanding developing markets in the world, the 
Chinese capital market is trying to improve the availability of information to 
increase market efficiency. Practically, however, it will take a long time to 
achieve this aim.  
The Chinese securities market used to be characterised by low 
information availability, low transparency, and serious information asymmetry. 
Thus, the regulatory agency of the Chinese securities market issued a series of 
rules to increase the availability of information on Chinese listed companies. 
One purpose of these rules is to motivate those companies to increase the 
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quality and frequency of information disclosure, thereby increasing the quality of 
the information environment in the Chinese capital market. Although Chinese 
listed companies are improving the quality of information disclosure, market 
participants are still dissatisfied with the accuracy and timeliness of the 
disclosures (Yang, 2010a; Yang, 2010b). 
In the Chinese market, listed companies are reluctant to disclose negative 
news; or in other words, Chinese listed companies are highly motivated to 
suppress negative news. One explanation of this phenomenon is the political 
incentives that will cause Chinese listed companies to suppress the negative 
news (Piotroski et al., 2010). Currently, the majority of Chinese listed 
companies are still controlled or influenced by the state (Piotroski et al., 2010). 
Under this circumstance, these companies are under less pressure to disclose 
negative news promptly, since these companies are not pure business entities. 
The state acts as a majority shareholder in most of the Chinese listed 
companies, and this ownership structure might result in listed companies having 
less incentive to disclose negative news. The politically astute managers of 
these listed companies want to retain their reputation through the suppression 
of negative news (Piotroski et al., 2010). At some political events, such as the 
meeting of Communist Party, the listed companies will control the release of 
bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006).  
In the Chinese market, some listed companies become involved in 
earnings management (Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2004). Gu (2010) 
argue that Chinese listed companies want to manage the actual earnings in 
order to comply with the forecasted earnings. Through earnings management, 
companies will provide a relatively better performance report to investors. 
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However, this practice will hide the weaknesses of companies, thereby 
misleading investors. Thus, the practice of earnings management exacerbates 
information asymmetry between companies and investors, since investors 
receive managed information from companies. Earnings management reduces 
the quality of the information environment in the Chinese capital market. 
Additionally, earnings management exacerbates the problem of related party 
transactions in the Chinese stock market. Piotroski and Wong (2010) find that 
Chinese listed companies have a strong willingness to boost their earnings via 
related party transactions between them and their unlisted parent companies. 
This will help them to provide an outstanding financial report and avoid being 
delisted from the exchange. Through related party transactions, listed 
companies hide their inefficient management. 
To reduce the information asymmetry between listed companies and 
investors, the CSRC requires listed companies to disclose the performance 
forecasting. The purpose of performance forecasting is to reduce the effect of 
an unexpected loss on stock price. However, in fact, the performance 
forecasting cannot reduce the information asymmetry between listed companies 
and investors in the Chinese market. The major issue in performance forecasts 
of  Chinese listed companies is the large spread between the forecast and the 
reality (Zhao, 2005). For instance, the forecast result may be quite different to 
the result of the official announcement. Under this circumstance, performance 
forecasting cannot reduce information asymmetry between listed companies 
and investors in Chinese capital market. Additionally, the performance 
forecasting of Chinese listed companies has the following issues (Yang et al., 
2002): 
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 The performance forecasting contains limited information. In other 
words, investors cannot get more information about the 
performance of listed companies from the forecasting. 
 The forecasting lacks reason for unexpected losses. 
 Only companies that wish to refinance in the capital market will 
provide performance forecasting.  
A good quality information environment also depends on the media. 
However, in the Chinese market, the media lacks independence. In China, the 
entire media industry is controlled by the government, which includes both local 
and national levels. The result of this is that the media have no desire to reveal 
the fraud cases in listed companies, especially in the state owned listed 
companies. Although the government issues licences to private media 
companies, their reporting behaviour is also influenced by political factors. 
Additionally, the corruption in the Chinese market will reduce the effectiveness 
of the media in improving the quality of the information environment. Through 
the complicated guanxi network in the Chinese market, private companies will 
influence local government. Under this circumstance, local government will seek 
to hide news of fraud cases in some private listed companies by influencing the 
local media. Some large private companies are able to affect the national media. 
Thus, the potential for the media to succeed in improving the quality of the 
information environment is limited. 
Overall, there is serious information asymmetry between companies and 
investors in the Chinese capital market. Under this circumstance, the 
profitability of illegal transaction will be attractive to market participants.  
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6.3. Information leakage and insider 
trading 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981:855) indicate that the significant „abnormal 
price movements can be interpreted as prima facie evidence of the market‟s 
reaction to information in advance of its public announcement‟.  
Previous studies in the US market found that registered insiders, whose 
transactions are monitored by the SEC, have the ability to outperform the 
market  (Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976). This means that these registered insiders 
possess special information which helps them to do this. However, these 
studies only focus on the performance of registered insiders, whose trading 
data can be collected and whose activities are watched closely by the 
regulators.  
The trading activities of people who can access non-public information 
through registered insiders, such as the trading activities of the insider‟s family 
and friends, are not effectively regulated by the market regulatory agency 
(Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). Because it is hard to directly monitor trading that 
is motivated by inside information, the price movements prior to a major event 
can be evidence of such trading activities (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). 
Mandelker (1974) states that positive returns just prior to the announcement 
date of a merger will be evidence that good news has leaked to the market. The 
trading that is based upon the leaked information is illegal insider trading 
(Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). Through research in the US market, Keown and 
Pinkerton (1981) found evidence that insiders usually seek to carry out insider 
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trading through a third party, to avoid being detected by the market regulatory 
agency. 
In the Chinese securities market, insider trading activity is banned by the 
market regulatory agency (Huang, 2007). However, weak market regulatory 
performance and efficiency make this regulation ineffective in detecting insider 
trading activities in that market (Huang, 2007; Shen, 2008). In the Chinese 
securities market, insider trading activities are widespread and the majority of 
the market participants believe that insider trading activity is becoming an open 
secret (Huang, 2007).  
Huang (2007) indicates that the insiders in the Chinese securities market 
will include traditional insiders, such as directors and executives, and other 
likely insiders, such as the staff of the market regulatory agency, the securities 
companies, and other people who have access to the inside information. Thus, 
the scope for insiders in the Chinese securities market is very large; hence, the 
market regulatory agency will face more regulatory difficulties than other 
markets. Additionally, there is a trend that more and more insider trading in the 
Chinese securities market is committed by individuals (Huang, 2007). This will 
increase the difficulties of regulation, since the regulatory agent cannot monitor 
the activities of all individuals. The China Securities Regulation Commission 
(CSRC) states that the majority of insider trading cases  are characterised by 
information leakage (cs.com.cn, 2010). Insiders will leak the information to 
affiliated individuals, and these individuals will use the illegal information. For 
instance, a recent insider trading case in the Chinese securities market 
indicated that the traditional insiders leaked information to their affiliated people, 
and then this information was dispersed to other investors (Zhou, 2011).  The 
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corporate insiders leak the material information to other affiliated people to 
persuade them to trade shares before the information disclosure. Through the 
third party transaction, insiders try to reduce the risk of being caught by the 
market watchdog. To avoid being detected by the market watchdog, insiders 
complete their transaction through an affiliated account. Through affiliated 
accounts, transactions of insiders will not be monitored by the market regulatory 
agency, since their names will not appear in the transaction. Thus, this will 
increase difficulties of insider trading regulation, thereby reducing the risk of 
being caught by the watchdog. When affiliated people receive the inside 
information, they convey this information to more affiliated investors. Thus, the 
information is dispersed in the market. 
Insiders leak the information to other people who then become informed 
traders. These informed traders may trade shares prior to the announcement 
date to ensure the profitability of their information. Thus, the abnormal return 
prior to the announcement date may reflect the trading of these informed 
traders. 
6.4. Event study 
A key feature of financial markets is that they are sensitive to information. 
Therefore, information announcements can cause market volatility. „Economists 
are frequently asked to measure the effect of an economic event on the value of 
a firm‟ (Campbell, 1997:149). 
6.4.1. Abnormal Return and Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
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6.4.1.1. Abnormal return 
Abnormal return of individual stock can be measured by the difference 
between expected return of stock i on event date, Ri,t, and the expected return 
on event date E [Ri,t]. Thus the equation of abnormal return of stock on the 
event day is: 
ARi,t = Ri,t – E[Ri,t] 
To calculate the abnormal return of each security, a most important 
precondition is the estimate of the normal return of each security. Campbell et 
al.(1997) state that calculations of normal return can be divided into two 
different categories statistical and economic. The difference between statistical 
and economic calculation is that the former category depends on statistical 
assumption while the latter depends on economic argument (Campbell et al., 
1997). Campbell et al. (1997:154) state that „the potential advantage of 
economic models is not the absence of statistical assumptions, but the 
opportunity to calculate more precise measures of the normal return using 
economic restrictions‟. 
Constant-Mean-Return Model 
Rit= µi + ξit 
E[ξit] = 0   Var [ξit] = (σξi)² 
„Where Rit, the ith element of Rt, is the period-t return on security i, ξitis the 
distribution term, and (σξi)² is the (i, i) element of Ω‟ (Campbell et al., 1997:154). 
Although the core principle of the constant-mean-return model is very simple, 
Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) argue that the results that are generated by the 
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constant-mean-return model are similar to the results that are generated by 
other sophisticated models. 
Market Model 
Campbell et al. (1997:155) state that the market is „a statistical model 
which relates the return of any given security to the return of the market 
portfolio‟.  
Rit= αi + βiRmt+ єit 
E[єit] = 0   Var [єit] = (σєi)² 
„Where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security I and the market 
portfolio, respectively, and єit is the zero mean disturbance term. αi, βi, and (σєi)² 
are the parameters of the market model‟ (Campbell et al., 1997:155) 
Compared with the constant-mean-return model, the market model is 
definitely more sophisticated. The market model removes the effect of market 
return volatility, and thus reduces the abnormal return variance. Campbell et al. 
(1997:155) proposed that the market model „leads to increased ability to detect 
event effects‟. 
6.4.1.2. Cumulative Abnormal Return 
To measure the effect of an event on market return, the individual 
abnormal return of stock is calculated. In order to draw an overall conclusion of 
the effect of the event on the market, each abnormal return observation must be 
cumulated (Campbell et al., 1997). Campbell et al. (1997:160) proposed the 
„aggregation is along two dimensions – through time and across securities‟. 
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Cumulative abnormal return is employed to accommodate multiple sampling 
intervals within the event window. CAR can be defined as the cumulative 
abnormal return of individual stock between trading day [t1]and trading day [t2] in 
event window (t1<=t2) 
            ∑       
  
    
 
The above formula is only applied to a single event. In fact the research 
sample for financial event study always includes many events. Thus, the 
formula must be extended to the whole sample, which contains many event 
observations. Campbell et al. (1997:161) proposes that „to aggregate across 
securities and through time‟, one assumption is that the abnormal returns of 
different securities should not correlate to each other. „The absence of any 
overlap and maintained distributional assumptions imply that the abnormal 
returns and the cumulative abnormal returns will be independent across 
securities‟ (Campbell et al., 1997:161).  
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         
 
 
∑    ̂        
 
   
 
6.4.1.3. T- test 
The t-statistic is for the null hypothesis of no abnormal return associated 
with the earnings announcement in month t is computed as: 
  
   
 ̂     
 
 ̂  (ARt) is the estimated cross-sectional standard deviation of average 
abnormal return in month t. To test the null hypothesis of non-abnormal return 
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associated with earnings announcement over the time interval from month T1 to 
month T2, the equation of t - statistic is: 
t=CAR T1,T2 √∑ σ̂ ARt 2
  
    
̂
⁄  
(Lin and Howe, 1990:1277). 
Previous studies about merger profitability use the event study method, 
and they find a significant cumulative abnormal return prior to the 
announcement date (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Tuan et al., 1995). They state 
that this will prove that inside information is leaked to the market prior to the 
public announcement, and it may generate the problem of illegal insider trading. 
Thus, this thesis also employs the event study to measure the CAR before 
corporate annual earnings announcement in the Chinese securities market. 
In this thesis, the corporate annual earnings announcements of the 
Chinese listed companies will be chosen as the events. An earnings 
announcement is an important corporate disclosure in the securities market, 
since it affects investor behaviour (Leuz et al., 2003; DeFond et al., 2007). The 
content of annual earnings announcements will help investors evaluate a 
company‟s performance, and thus help them to decide their investment 
strategy. Therefore, annual earnings announcements are an important kind of 
corporate disclosure. In other words, the content of earnings announcements 
can be seen as material information about companies. Ball and Brown (1968), 
Beaver (1968), and Ball and Kothari (1991) state that an earnings 
announcement will affect the abnormal stock returns and abnormal variability of 
stock return. Thus, the corporate annual earnings announcement is the event 
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for the purposes of this thesis. Seyhun(1986), Jenter(2005), and Adriana et al., 
(2010) state that insiders will trade shares in a short window prior to the 
earnings announcement, as a result of a trade-off between the revenue of 
capitalising on foreknowledge of the announcement and the risk of regulatory 
detection and reputation loss. Previous research in the US market found that 
there is information leakage prior to the announcement date (Jackson and 
Madura, 2003; Dedman, 2004).  
As one of the largest emerging securities market in the world, the Chinese 
securities market has serious information asymmetry. Additionally, the 
unsophisticated regulatory mechanism of the Chinese securities market means 
that the legal penalties are less than the profit of illegal trading activities. Thus, 
there is a serious insider trading problem in the Chinese securities market 
(Huang, 2007).  
Huang (2007) discusses the characteristics of insider trading activities in 
the Chinese securities market. He indicates that besides the traditional insiders, 
such as executives, directors, and majority (holding) shareholder, insiders also 
include other potential insiders, such as securities regulators, listed companies, 
and securities companies. Besides the traditional insider trading activities when 
insiders trade their company‟s shares based on inside information, Huang 
(2007) indicates that in the Chinese securities market, the potential insiders 
listed above also benefit illegally from insider trading activities. Additionally, the 
complex personal relationships between Chinese market participants make it 
hard for insiders and potential insiders to be detected. For instance, Huang 
(2007) indicates that insiders borrow other investors‟ accounts to avoid being 
detected by the market regulatory agency. Thus, the network of insiders in the 
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Chinese securities market is very complex, since it includes traditional insiders 
and more „likely insiders‟. Under this circumstance, insider trading will be 
difficult to detect. Thus, information leakage prior to a corporate earnings 
announcement in the Chinese securities market may generate more insider 
trading activities than in other markets. 
The window of the event study is the period 30 days prior to the corporate 
announcement day (-30, 0). If there are significant CARs prior to the 
announcement date, it will be evidence of inside information leakage in the 
market. To complete the event study, the estimation window in this thesis is the 
period that from the day (-231) to the day (-31). The estimation window will help 
to estimate the daily abnormal return and then to find the cumulative abnormal 
return. 
6.4.2. Price run-up index 
To measure the impact of run-up in stock prices, this thesis employs the 
portfolio run-up index, which was introduced by Jarrell and Poulsen in 1989 
(Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). 
Firstly, this thesis measures the unanticipated premium from day t to day 
+1, CAR (t, 1). Jarell and Poulsen (1989:230) define the unanticipated premium 
as „the average additional premium received by shareholders between day t 
and the day following‟ the announcement, and thus, reflects the „value of the 
additional information contained in the period‟ around the companies‟ 
announcement date. The stock price will be driven by the new information.  The 
purpose of unanticipated premium is to measure the market‟s activity at the in-
play announcement. If the market has anticipated the forthcoming 
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announcement, run-up will exist. To some extent, if there is greater run-up, 
there will be less unanticipated premium.  
Secondly, this thesis calculates a portfolio run-up index for each day t from 
thirty days before to ten days after the announcement date: 
[CAR (-30, t) / CAR (-30, +1)] * 100 
„The run-up index equals the percentage of the eventual premium that has 
been observed as of day t‟ (Jarell and Poulsen, 1989:230). Day +1 is set as the 
standard for measuring run-up, since, on the first day after the announcement 
date, market participants will get the opportunity to learn, react, and trade 
shares based on the information from the announcement. 
6.5. Trading volume 
Besides the event study, this thesis also measures changes in trading 
volume around the announcement day. This will provide alternative way to 
study the market‟s reactions to the corporate information disclosure. Previous 
studies of the Chinese securities market also measure the abnormal trading 
volume before the corporate announcement (Shi and Jiang, 2003; Yan and 
Zhao, 2006). They find that there is an abnormal changes in the trading volume 
before the material information disclosure in the Chinese securities market. 
Thus, they suggest there might be insider trading activities prior to the 
announcement in that market. Therefore, this thesis adopts this strategy to 
measure the changing of trading volume around the date of the corporate 
earnings announcement.  
In this thesis, normalized abnormal volume (NAV) is employed to measure 
the changing of trading volume. This method was also introduced by Jarrell and 
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Poulsen(Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). The purpose of NAV is to compare the 
trading volume around the announcement date to that of a clean period. The 
clean period is defined as a period in which no earnings announcement should 
have affected trading. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989:231) state that the calculation 
of trading volume should use the natural logarithm of the daily volume, since the 
„stock volume is positively skewed‟.  
In this thesis, the set of NAV will be similar to that of event study. The 
clean period is from day -231 to day -31. The daily trading volume for each 
company during the period from day -30 to day 10 to that of the clean period will 
be compared.  
The NAV for stock i on day tis: 
        
          
    
(Bajo, 2010:6) 
The average daily trading volume for each firm i over the clean period is: 
     
 
   
∑               
   
      
 
The standard deviation of mean log trading volume      is: 
      √
 
   
∑            
    
   
   
 
6.6. Empirical results of information 
leakage, Run-up Index, and NAV 
The full sample of event study covers the period from 2004 to 2008. At the 
end of 2005, Chinese listed companies began to abolish non-tradable shares. 
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Because of this, the full sample is divided into pre-reform and post-reform 
samples. Table 6-1 reports statistics of the event. In the full sample, there are 
5680 announcement disclosures, which contain 4920 containing positive news 
and 760 with negative news. In the pre-reform sample, the total number of 
announcement disclosures is 2301. It contains 1956 containing positive news 
and 345 with negative news. There are 3379 announcement disclosures in the 
post-reform sample. The number containing positive news is 2964 and the 
number with negative news is 415. 
Table 6-1 Numbers of event 
Panel A: Full sample 
All news 5680 
Positive news  4920 
Negative news  760 
Panel B: Pre-reform 
All news 2301 
Positive news  1956 
Negative news  345 
Panel C: Post-reform 
All news 3379 
Positive news  2964 
Negative news  415 
 
To reduce the incidence of insider trading activities in Chinese market, the 
market watchdog is increasing the quality of market regulation (Zhao, 2010). 
One of its strategies is the new registration procedure. To register a trading 
account in a security exchange, individuals or institutions have to submit their ID 
information (China Securities Regulation Commission, 2006). Thus, corporate 
insiders will be monitored by the market regulatory agency if they want to trade 
shares on their account. However, the risk of being caught by the market 
regulator is still low (Huang, 2007). Thus, market participants in the Chinese 
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market are more focused on seeking the sources of inside information. This is 
the situation where traditional insiders leak information to third parties, who are 
related to traditional insiders. As mentioned in section 6.3, even in the 
developed market, the market watchdog cannot effectively monitor the 
transactions of third parties. The performance and efficiency of the Chinese 
market regulatory agency is weak (Shen, 2008). Thus, the regulatory agency of 
the Chinese securities market cannot effectively monitor third party transactions. 
Through third party transactions, the illegal profits made by traditional insiders 
will not be detected by the market regulatory agency. Thus, significant pre-
announcement abnormal returns may reflect illegal insider trading activities.  
If significant cumulative abnormal returns prior to an announcement date 
can be detected, it may suggest that the inside information has been leaked and 
may be associated with insider trading. In this thesis, event study is used to 
calculate the cumulative abnormal return around the earnings announcement 
date in the Chinese securities market. The event window is set from the day (-
30) to the announcement date. The estimation window is the period covering 
the day (-231) to the day (-31).  
Table 6-2 shows the results of information leakage that are calculated by 
the market model and the constant-mean-return model. Figures of panels A-1 to 
C-2 are calculated by the market-model. Figures of panels D-1 to F-2 are 
calculated by the constant-mean-return method.  
Figures of panels A-1 and A-2 reflect the CARs in pre-announcement and 
post-announcement periods of the full sample. Under the column of all news, 
CAR (-30, -25) is 0.008681, and it has been increased to CAR (-30, 0) 0.020814 
at announcement day. After the announcement day, the CAR (0, 5) is -
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0.006766, and it is increased to CAR (0, 10) 0.000655 at day (10). Under the 
column of positive news, the CAR (-30, -25) is 0.0011642 and it has been 
increased to CAR (-30, 0) 0.035520. There is an upward trend in post-
announcement information leakage under the column of positive news. CAR (0, 
5) is -0.006191, and it has been increased to CAR (0, 10) -0.000021 at day 
(10). Under the column of negative news, CAR (-30, -25) is -0.009320, and it is 
decreased to CAR (-30, 0) -0.074386 at day (0). After the announcement day, 
the CAR (0, 5) is -0.010486, and it is increased to CAR (0, 10) 0.005028 at day 
(10). 
Panels B-1 and B-2 show figures of the CARs in the pre-announcement 
and the post-announcement periods in the pre-reform sample. Under the 
column of all news, there is a downward trend in information leakage, since 
CAR (-30, -25) is 0.002493, and CAR (-30, 0) is -0.004385. In the post 
announcement period, CAR (0, 5) is -0.002449, and it is increased to CAR (0, 
10) 0.007910 at day (10).  Under the column of positive news, CAR (-30, -25) is 
0.003674, and it is increased to CAR (-30, 0) 0.013810 at the announcement 
day. After the announcement day, CAR (0, 5) is 0.000024, and CAR (0, 10) is 
0.008001. Under the column of negative news, there is a downward trend in 
information leakage. For instance, CAR (-30, -25) is -0.004203, and CAR (-30, 0) 
is -0.107540. After the announcement day, the CAR (0, 5) is -0.016466, and it is 
increased to (0, 10) 0.007394.  
Panels C-1 and C-2 report CARs in the pre-announcement and the post-
announcement periods of the post-reform sample. In the pre-announcement 
period, CAR (-30, -25) of all news is 0.012893, CAR (-30, -25) of positive news 
is 0.016599, and CAR (-30, -25) of negative news is -0.009320. CAR (-30, 0) of 
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all news is 0.020814, CAR (-30, 0) of positive news is 0.037970, and CAR (-30, 
0) of negative news is -0.046825. In the post-announcement period, CAR (0, 5) 
of all news is -0.009703, CAR (0, 5) of positive news is -0.010290, and CAR (0, 
5) of negative news is -0.005515. CAR (0, 10) of all news is -0.004284, CAR (0, 
10) of positive news is -0.005312, and CAR (0, 10) of negative news is 
0.003061. 
Figures from panels D-1 and D-2 represent CARs in the pre-
announcement and the post-announcement periods of the full sample. Under 
the column of all news, there is an upward trend in information leakage, since 
CAR (-30, -25) is 0.010699, and CAR (-30, 0) is 0.026225. In post-
announcement period, CAR (0, 5) is 0.004931, and the CAR (0, 10) is 
0.021598. Under the column of positive news, CAR (-30, -25) is 0.012628 and 
CAR (-30, 0) is 0.039274. After the announcement day, CAR (0, 5) is 0.005961, 
and CAR (0, 10) is 0.023088. Under the column of negative news, CAR (-30, -
25) is -0.001790, and CAR (-30, 0) is -0.058250. After the announcement day, 
CAR (0, 5) is -0.001736, and CAR (0, 10) is 0.011953. 
Panels E-1 and E-2 report CARs in the pre-announcement and the post-
announcement periods in the pre-reform sample. Under the column of all news, 
CAR (-30, -25) is 0.000874, and CAR (-30, 0) is -0.004969. In the post-
announcement period, CAR (0, 5) is 0.002019, and CAR (0, 10) is 0.018363.  
Under the column of positive news, CAR (-30, -25) is 0.001260, and CAR (-30, 
0) is 0.002276. After the announcement day, CAR (0, 5) is 0.002126, and CAR 
(0, 10) is 0.016563. Under the column of negative news, CAR (-30, -25) is -
0.001312, and CAR (-30, 0) is -0.046048. In the post-announcement period, 
CAR (0, 5) is 0.001414, and CAR (0, 10) is 0.028564.  
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Panels F-1 and F-2 report CARs in the pre-announcement and the post-
announcement periods of the post-reform sample. Before the announcement 
day, CAR (-30, -25) of all news is 0.017389, CAR (-30, -25) of positive news is 
0.02013, and CAR (-30, -25) of negative news is -0.002188. CAR (-30, 0) of all 
news is 0.047468, CAR (-30, 0) of positive news is 0.06369, and CAR (-30, 0) 
of negative news is -0.068394. In the post-announcement period, CAR (0, 5) of 
all news is 0.006914, CAR (0, 5) of positive news is 0.008492, and CAR (0, 5) 
of negative news is -0.004354. CAR (0, 10) of all news is 0.023801, CAR (0, 10) 
of positive news is 0.027393, and CAR (0, 10) of negative news is -0.001856.  
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Table 6-2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
ARi,t = Ri,t – E[Ri,t]                ∑              
 
Day Mean t Mean t Mean t Day Mean t Mean t Mean t 
  All News Positive News Negative News   All News Positive News Negative News 
Panel A-1: CARs Pre-announcement  Panel D-1: CARs Pre-announcement  
 (-30, -25) 0.009*** 9.320 0.011*** 11.333 -0.009*** -4.125  (-30, -25) 0.011*** 9.252 0.013*** 10.266 -0.002 -0.538 
 (-30, -20) 0.013*** 9.831 0.018*** 12.528 -0.019*** -6.034  (-30, -20) 0.012*** 7.210 0.016*** 9.068 -0.015*** -3.239 
 (-30, -15) 0.015*** 8.835 0.021*** 11.946 -0.029*** -7.048  (-30, -15) 0.017*** 8.301 0.023*** 10.280 -0.019*** -3.489 
 (-30, -10) 0.019*** 9.826 0.027*** 12.782 -0.031*** -6.599  (-30, -10) 0.024*** 9.518 0.032*** 12.126 -0.032*** -4.694 
 (-30, -5) 0.021*** 9.294 0.033*** 13.681 -0.054*** -8.810  (-30, -5) 0.023*** 7.912 0.035*** 11.128 -0.051*** -6.195 
 (-30, 0) 0.021*** 8.286 0.036*** 13.470 -0.074*** -10.816  (-30, 0) 0.026*** 8.037 0.039*** 11.346 -0.058*** -6.441 
Panel A-2: CARs Post-announcement  Panel D-2: CARs Post-announcement      
 (0,5) -0.007*** -5.824 -0.006*** -5.082 -0.010*** -2.889  (0,5) 0.005*** 3.612 0.006*** 4.115 -0.002 -0.432 
 (0,10) 0.001 0.432 0.000 -0.013 0.005 1.061  (0,10) 0.022*** 11.998 0.023*** 12.141 0.012** 2.206 
Panel B-1: CARs Pre-announcement Panel E-1: CARs Pre-announcement 
 (-30, -25) 0.002** 2.019 0.004*** 2.719 -0.004 -1.402  (-30, -25) 0.001 0.907 0.001 0.907 -0.001 -0.366 
 (-30, -20) -0.002 -1.459 0.000 0.066 -0.017*** -3.835  (-30, -20) -0.001 0.186 0.000 0.186 -0.008* -1.660 
 (-30, -15) -0.004* -1.790 0.000 0.173 -0.027*** -4.872  (-30, -15) 0.002 1.357 0.003 1.357 -0.005 -0.885 
 (-30, -10) -0.001 -0.564 0.005 1.757 -0.035*** -5.887  (-30, -10) 0.008*** 3.865 0.011*** 3.865 -0.005 -0.702 
 (-30, -5) -0.002 -0.748 0.011*** 3.560 -0.076*** -8.953  (-30, -5) 0.002 2.155 0.007 2.155 -0.026*** -3.018 
 (-30, 0) -0.004 -1.270 0.014*** 3.941 -0.108*** -10.761  (-30, 0) -0.005 0.676 0.002 0.676 -0.046*** -4.512 
Panel B-2: CARs Post-announcement Panel E-2: CARs Post-announcement 
 (0,5) -0.002 -1.431 0.000 0.014 -0.016*** -2.790  (0,5) 0.002 1.104 0.002 1.132 0.001 0.237 
 (0,10) 0.008*** 3.415 0.008*** 3.379 0.007 0.967  (0,10) 0.018*** 7.412 0.017*** 6.480 0.029*** 3.604 
Panel C-1: CARs Pre-announcement Panel F-1: CARs Pre-announcement 
 (-30, -25) 0.013*** 9.797 0.017*** 11.734 -0.014*** -4.124  (-30, -25) 0.017*** 11.112 0.020*** 11.112 -0.002 -0.411 
 (-30, -20) 0.023*** 12.548 0.030*** 14.709 -0.021*** -4.655  (-30, -20) 0.021*** 10.132 0.026*** 10.132 -0.020*** -2.784 
 (-30, -15) 0.027*** 11.433 0.035*** 13.831 -0.030*** -5.131  (-30, -15) 0.028*** 10.851 0.036*** 10.851 -0.031*** -3.498 
 (-30, -10) 0.033*** 11.844 0.041*** 13.879 -0.027*** -3.908  (-30, -10) 0.034*** 11.615 0.046*** 11.615 -0.054*** -4.947 
 (-30, -5) 0.037*** 11.527 0.047*** 13.882 -0.036*** -4.152  (-30, -5) 0.038*** 11.225 0.054*** 11.225 -0.072*** -5.442 
 (-30, 0) 0.038*** 10.921 0.050*** 13.494 -0.047*** -5.056  (-30, 0) 0.047*** 12.129 0.064*** 12.129 -0.068*** -4.811 
Panel C-2: CARs Post-announcement Panel F-2: CARs Post-announcement 
 (0,5) -0.010*** -6.200 -0.010*** -6.159 -0.006 -1.232  (0,5) 0.007*** 3.588 0.008*** 4.123 -0.004 -0.802 
 (0,10) -0.004** -2.147 -0.005** -2.507 0.003 0.518  (0,10) 0.024*** 9.476 0.027*** 10.277 -0.002 -0.252 
Where * is 10% significance level, ** is % significance level, and *** is 1% significance level. Where * is 10% significance level, ** is % significance level, and *** is 1% significance level. 
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Table 6-3 shows the portfolio run-up index of the full sample, the pre-
reform sample, and the post-reform sample. Figures of panel A are calculated 
by the market model. Figures of panel B are based on the constant mean 
model. 
Under the first column of panel A, from day (-30) to day (0), the run-up 
index has been increased from 2.234 to 118.517. After the announcement day, 
the run-up index has been increased from 105.133 at day (5) to 147.383 at day 
(10). Under the column of positive news in the full sample, there is an increase 
in the pre-announcement run-up index as it has been increased from 5.459 at 
day (-30) to 108.298 at day (0). At the post-announcement period, it has been 
increased from 105.164 at day (5) to 123.976 at day (10). The value of run-up 
index of negative news in full sample is 10.679 at day (-30), 92.280 at day (-1), 
91.755 at day (0), 105.215 at day (5), and 86.078 at day (10). Figures of the 
run-up index of the pre-reform sample are shown in the fourth to the sixth 
columns.  Under the column of all news, there is an increase in the run-up 
index. From day (-30) to day (0), it has been increased from -50.835 to 59.802. 
However, after the announcement day, it has been decreased to -85.906 at day 
(10). Under the column of positive news, the value of run-up index is 39.118 at 
day (-30), and it has been increased to 115.045 at day (0). After the 
announcement day, it has been increased to 212.800 at day (10). If it is 
negative news, there is also an upward trend in run-up index. It has been 
increased from 1.507 at day (-30) to 87.907 at day (10). In the post-reform 
sample, the run-up index of all news is -5.443 at day (-30), 126.055 at day (-1), 
110.023 at day (0), 97.938 at day (5), and 113.641 at day (10). The run-up 
index of positive news in the post-reform sample is -0.272 at day (-30), 120.276 
at day (-1), 107.149 at day (0), 98.155 at day (5), and 108.855 at day (10). If it is 
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negative news the run-up index will be 28.084 at day (-30), 88.581 at day (-1), 
91.390 at day (0), 99.345 at day (5), and 82.607 at day (10). Figures in panel B 
are based on the constant mean model. Generally speaking, the trend of 
changes in value of run-up index of panel B is similar to that of panel A. 
Table 6-3 Run-up index 
 
Full sample Pre-reform Post-reform 
Day 
All 
news 
Positive 
News 
Negative 
News All news 
Positive 
News 
Negative 
News 
All 
News 
Positive 
News 
Negative 
News 
Panel A: Market Model 
-30 2.234 5.459 10.679 -50.835 39.118 1.507 -5.443 -0.272 28.084 
-25 49.430 34.946 11.496 -34.001 30.606 3.593 37.360 35.684 26.493 
-20 73.774 54.570 23.477 33.736 0.998 14.686 67.977 63.687 40.159 
-15 82.826 64.673 35.283 50.507 3.193 22.976 78.148 75.139 58.638 
-10 108.021 81.334 38.128 18.626 38.392 30.128 95.089 88.646 53.311 
-5 119.763 99.677 67.158 30.194 90.445 65.253 106.806 101.249 70.772 
-4 126.751 106.590 73.949 43.011 98.666 75.396 114.637 107.938 71.202 
-3 132.470 112.540 80.274 38.062 113.993 82.245 118.813 112.293 76.535 
-2 140.231 119.134 84.977 30.267 128.451 87.399 124.324 117.548 80.382 
-1 143.656 124.040 92.280 21.979 146.145 94.230 126.055 120.276 88.581 
0 118.517 108.298 91.755 59.802 115.045 91.947 110.023 107.149 91.390 
5 105.133 105.164 105.215 55.379 146.341 108.308 97.938 98.155 99.345 
10 147.383 123.976 86.078 -85.906 212.800 87.907 113.641 108.855 82.607 
Panel B: Constant-Mean-Return Model 
-30 1.809 2.237 3.623 -3.694 12.838 1.140 1.379 1.946 5.195 
-25 40.987 32.013 2.970 -16.015 47.478 2.550 36.534 31.588 3.236 
-20 45.738 40.709 24.431 16.623 14.106 15.887 43.464 41.440 29.838 
-15 66.135 58.131 32.228 -38.055 126.266 9.990 57.996 56.259 46.300 
-10 90.601 81.569 52.338 -150.782 395.768 9.024 71.744 72.933 79.749 
-5 89.500 88.339 84.580 -29.652 245.061 50.671 80.192 84.031 106.038 
-4 94.518 93.378 89.690 9.102 201.463 65.346 87.845 90.407 105.095 
-3 100.796 98.302 90.229 21.886 194.921 72.480 94.632 95.646 101.461 
-2 107.897 104.023 91.486 32.352 200.606 81.548 101.996 101.369 97.775 
-1 113.960 109.537 95.222 47.090 199.680 91.705 108.737 107.060 97.448 
0 100.466 99.562 96.633 91.014 85.756 89.476 99.728 99.941 101.163 
5 132.782 124.596 98.101 10.110 279.779 88.958 123.199 120.331 103.887 
10 196.656 168.032 75.392 -289.219 823.753 36.202 158.701 150.010 100.193 
 
Table 6-4 reports the percentage of companies whose daily trading 
volume is significantly larger than the historical mean at 95 per cent confidence 
level. Panel A shows figures of the full sample. Panels B and C show figures of 
pre and post reform samples. 
In panel A, there is an increase in the percentage of companies whose 
daily trading volume is significantly larger than the historical mean. 30 days prior 
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to the announcement day, there are only 11.7% of companies with a daily 
trading volume significantly larger than their historical mean. However, at day (-
1), 19.58% of the companies have a daily trading volume that is significantly 
larger than the historical mean, and this has been increased to 23% 10 days 
after the announcement day. Under the column of positive news in panel A, 
11.63% of companies have a daily trading volume that is significantly larger 
than the historical mean at day (-30). It is increased to 19.48% at day (1) and 
26.21% at day (0). 10 days after the announcement day, 24.01% of companies 
have a daily trading volume that is larger than the historical mean. Under the 
column of negative news, 12.28% of companies have a daily volume that is 
significantly larger than the historical mean at day (30). At day (-1), 20.49% of 
companies have a daily volume that is larger than the historical mean. After the 
announcement day, there is an upward trend in the number of companies that 
show a daily volume larger than the historical mean, and this figure is increased 
to 25.3% 10 days after the announcement is released.  
Under the column of all news in panel B, 11.72% of companies have a 
daily trading volume that is significantly larger than their historical mean at day 
(-30), and this figure is increased to 17.36% at day (-1). At day (0), 24% of 
companies have a daily trading volume that is significantly larger than the 
historical mean. 10 days after the announcement day, this figure is increased to 
24.85 %. Under the column of positive news, 11.70% of companies have a 
trading volume that is greater than the historical mean 30 days prior to the 
announcement day. At day (-1), this figure is increased to 18.75%. After the 
announcement, the figure is increased to 23.96% at day (10). If it is negative 
news, 8.52% of companies have a daily trading volume that will be significantly 
larger than the historical mean 30 days before the announcement. At day (-1) 
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the figure is increased to 6.79%, and it is increased to 27.94% at day (0). After 
the announcement day, there is an upward trend in this figure, and it is 
increased to 30.8% at day (10).  
Figures of panel C represent the post-reform sample. Under the column of 
all news, 11.70% of companies have a daily trading volume that is significantly 
larger than the historical mean at day (-30), and it is increased to 21.01% at day 
(-1). After the announcement day, the figure is decreased from 27.58% at day 
(0) to 23.71% at day (10). Under the column of positive news, there is an 
upward trend in the percentage of companies that have a daily trading volume 
that is larger than the historical mean. At day (-30), the figure is 11.00% and it is 
increased to 20.71% at day (-1). After the announcement day, there is a 
downward trend in this figure. It decreases from 27.63% at day (0) to 22.27% at 
day (10). Under the column of negative news, 15.54% of companies have a 
daily trading volume that is significantly larger than the historical mean 30 days 
before the announcement day. At day (-1), 23.41% of companies have a daily 
trading volume that is larger than the historical mean.  At day (0), 26.94% of 
companies have a daily trading volume that is significantly greater than the 
historical mean, but this percentage is decreased to 20.91% at day (10). 
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Table 6-4 Normalized Abnormal Volume (NAV) 
 
        
          
    
 
Where      is the mean of log volume for each firm i over the clean period: 
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And      is the standard deviation of the mean log volume,  
      √
 
   
∑            
    
   
   
 
The clean period is (-230, -31), and the event window is (-30, 0) 
Day 
NAV:      
All 
News 
Percent different 
from mean 
volume at 95 
percent 
confidence level 
NAV:  
Positive 
News 
Percent different 
from mean 
volume at 95 
percent 
confidence level 
NAV:  
Negative 
News 
Percent different 
from mean 
volume at 95 
percent 
confidence level 
Panel A: Full sample 
-30 0.325 11.70% 0.325 11.63% 0.327 12.28% 
-25 0.378 12.83% 0.377 12.52% 0.387 15.05% 
-20 0.388 10.98% 0.383 12.95% 0.424 13.81% 
-15 0.430 13.61% 0.419 13.52% 0.506 14.31% 
-10 0.456 16.34% 0.436 15.92% 0.598 19.49% 
-5 0.499 17.36% 0.479 16.66% 0.648 23.53% 
-4 0.525 17.33% 0.503 16.72% 0.685 21.80% 
-3 0.545 18.14% 0.521 17.51% 0.722 22.82% 
-2 0.573 18.96% 0.556 18.64% 0.701 21.35% 
-1 0.649 19.58% 0.633 19.48% 0.765 20.49% 
0 0.730 26.31% 0.736 26.21% 0.674 27.44% 
5 0.702 22.33% 0.686 21.85% 0.822 25.95% 
10 0.729 23.00% 0.713 24.01% 0.853 25.30% 
Panel B: Pre-reform 
-30 0.328 11.72% 0.377 11.70% 0.155 8.52% 
-25 0.234 9.34% 0.260 9.26% 0.037 9.85% 
-20 0.285 9.82% 0.300 9.93% 0.162 8.52% 
-15 0.376 11.76% 0.379 12.60% 0.359 12.45% 
-10 0.438 14.15% 0.433 14.83% 0.495 14.29% 
-5 0.480 15.30% 0.487 15.23% 0.462 16.12% 
-4 0.501 13.66% 0.507 14.47% 0.472 14.29% 
-3 0.539 15.32% 0.539 15.73% 0.573 17.65% 
-2 0.594 16.83% 0.592 17.81% 0.622 18.28% 
-1 0.714 17.36% 0.710 18.75% 0.734 16.79% 
0 0.933 24.00% 0.925 25.64% 1.022 27.94% 
5 0.789 22.64% 0.774 22.04% 0.904 25.97% 
10 0.844 24.85% 0.820 23.96% 1.035 30.80% 
Panel C: Post-reform 
-30 0.333 11.70% 0.344 11.00% 0.251 15.54% 
-25 0.469 15.07% 0.447 14.57% 0.641 18.96% 
-20 0.453 15.11% 0.433 14.77% 0.611 17.73% 
-15 0.463 14.80% 0.444 14.50% 0.612 17.08% 
-10 0.467 17.82% 0.440 17.04% 0.673 24.02% 
-5 0.512 19.40% 0.477 18.15% 0.785 29.41% 
-4 0.541 19.69% 0.502 18.60% 0.840 28.41% 
-3 0.549 19.96% 0.513 19.01% 0.830 27.58% 
-2 0.560 20.33% 0.535 19.85% 0.758 24.29% 
-1 0.608 21.01% 0.585 20.71% 0.787 23.41% 
0 0.625 27.58% 0.638 27.63% 0.513 26.94% 
5 0.648 22.17% 0.633 21.69% 0.765 26.24% 
10 0.657 23.71% 0.649 22.27% 0.720 20.91% 
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6.7. Cases of insider trading 
During the 2004 to 2008, there were two reported cases and one 
suspected case of insider trading according to the annual reports of the listed 
companies. One is the case of Hai Shen Pan (Da Tang Dian Xin 600198).The 
other is the case of Xin Qi She (Si Chuan Sheng Da 000835). The suspected 
case is the case of Li Li (600031 San Yi Zhong Gong). 
6.7.1. The case of Xin Qi She (Si Chuan Sheng 
Da 000835) 
The company asked its external audit company to audit the accounting 
information for the year 2006, between 8-Jan-2007 and 24-Jan-2007. The draft 
of annual report was generated on 3-Feb-2007. On 9-Feb-2007, the company‟s 
board of directors held its meeting to review and audit the content of the annual 
report. On 16-Feb-2007, this company disclosed its 2006 annual report to the 
market.   
Xin Qi She was the CEO and a director of this company. He attended the 
meeting of the board of directors to review and audit the draft 2006 annual 
report. During this meeting, members of the board of directors received the 
news from the draft annual report that there had been an increase in revenue in 
2006. This was positive news, which would increase the stock price of the 
company after disclosure to the market. Knowing this, Xin Qi She purchased 
shares in the company prior to the announcement date. The Administrative 
Sanction of the CSRC indicated that to avoid being detected by the market 
watchdog, Xin Qi She did not use his own account for this purchase (Chen et al., 
2009). The investigation by the CSRC indicates that he used another person‟s 
account to complete his transaction. The original owner of this account had died, 
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it had been controlled by Mr. She. Using this account, this ensured that his 
illegal transaction could avoid being detected by the regulators. Thus, he 
purchased the shares before the information disclosure and sold them on the 
day of the information disclosure. His activities broke the regulations on insider 
trading which prohibit insiders from trading the company shares using non-
public information. Additionally, the investigation of the CSRC found that this 
inside information had been leaked to his affiliated investors. Thus, he broke the 
rule prohibiting insiders from persuading other investors to trade shares of their 
company. The CSRC decided the final total penalty for this case was RMB 
312,302.76 (£31,000).  
Figures of table 6-5 indicate that after the end of annual report preparation 
in 2007, there is an increase in CARs. The CAR has increased from 0.1805 to 
0.2329 during day (-15) to day (-12). After the meeting of the board of directors, 
the CARs also appear on an upward trend. The CAR at day (-5) is 0.1411, and 
it has increased to 0.23333 at day (-3). Finally, after Xin Qi She‟s share 
purchase, there is an increase in CARs. The CAR at day (-2) is 0.2521 and it 
has increased to 0.3312 at the day before the announcement day. Because the 
information is leaked by corporate insiders, there is an increase in CARs after 
the trading of those insiders. It is possible that the inside information leaked to 
the market through other channels besides Mr. She, as after the board meeting 
there is also an increase in CARs. This suggests that other directors who 
attended the board meeting may have also leaked information to the market 
prior to the announcement date. Figures in the fourth and the fifth column also 
indicate that insider trading and information leakage will affect market activities. 
As the CARs increase, the NAV and run-up index also increases. From day (-16) 
to day (-12), the NAV has increased from 1.5927 to 3.1326. This means that the 
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trading volume during these days is significantly larger than the historical mean. 
From day (-4) to day (-1), the NAV also experiences an increase. The value of 
NAV has increased from 1.5338 to 2.4600. During the day (-15) to day (-12), the 
run-up index of this company has increased from 39.0791 to 55.1361. From 5 
days prior to the announcement day, the run-up index also experiences another 
increase, from 33.4014 to 78.3828. Changes in NAV before the announcement 
day suggest that there are reasons for that change in trading volume. 
Additionally, changes in the run-up index show that the content of the 
forthcoming corporate disclosure may be being incorporated into the stock price 
prior to the announcement day.  
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Table 6-5 Case of Xin Qi She 
Day Event CARs NAV Run-up index 
-30 
 
-0.0547 -0.1859 -12.9482 
-29 Start of preparation -0.0497 1.3339 -11.7589 
-28 
 
-0.0473 1.4299 -11.1851 
-27 
 
-0.0699 1.3547 -16.5523 
-26 
 
-0.0521 1.5203 -12.3410 
-25 
 
-0.0318 1.3429 -7.5211 
-24 
 
-0.0498 1.3277 -11.7847 
-23 
 
-0.0894 0.9460 -21.1583 
-22 
 
-0.0864 1.3426 -20.4493 
-21 
 
-0.0645 0.8288 -15.2730 
-20 
 
-0.0413 1.7266 -9.7859 
-19 
 
0.0369 2.3790 8.7345 
-18 
 
0.1057 2.4967 25.0155 
-17 End of preparation 0.0902 1.1335 21.3387 
-16 
 
0.1652 1.5927 39.0971 
-15 
 
0.1805 2.9067 42.7232 
-14 
 
0.2319 2.3005 54.8794 
-13 
 
0.2234 2.0108 52.8815 
-12 
 
0.2329 3.1326 55.1361 
-11 
 
0.1449 2.1375 34.3072 
-10 
 
0.1149 1.7275 27.1920 
-9 The draft finished on 3-Feb-2007 0.1299 0.8719 30.7361 
-8 
 
0.1513 0.5848 35.8051 
-7 
 
0.1471 0.7052 34.8073 
-6 
 
0.1374 0.6940 32.5236 
-5 Board meeting 0.1411 0.7947 33.4014 
-4 
 
0.2160 1.5338 51.1329 
-3 
 
0.2333 1.8822 55.2242 
-2 Purchase of Mr. She 0.2521 1.7123 59.6642 
-1 
 
0.3312 2.4600 78.3828 
0 Announcement & sale of Mr. She 0.4124 2.4953 97.6228 
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6.7.2. The case of Hai Shen Pan (Da Tang Dian 
Xin 600198) 
The 2006 annual report of this company was prepared from February to 
March of 2007. On 4-Apr-2007, the secretary to the board of directors informed 
members of the board the result of the 2006 annual report. On 27-Apr-2007, the 
company disclosed its 2006 annual report to the market. Before this disclosure 
of the earnings announcement, this company reported a gain in its performance 
forecasting. However, the earnings announcement indicated that the company 
had made a huge loss in 2006. Thus, there was an opportunity for insiders to 
benefit from insider trading. 
According to the Administrative Sanction of the CSRC, Hai Shen Pan used 
to be director of Da Tang Dian Xin and a member of the audit committee of this 
company (Qu and Wang, 2005). Due to his position in the company, he knew 
about the huge loss in 2006 and wished to avoid a personal loss, which would 
result from a decrease in stock price after the negative news was disclosed. To 
avoid this loss, he sold all the company shares in his account prior to the 
announcement date. He then told the CSRC that this transaction was an error. 
However, the CSRC rejected his explanation since there was no evidence to 
support his argument. At the same time, the CSRC found that he had leaked 
the negative news to his affiliated people prior to the announcement date. His 
activities had broken the relevant rules on insider trading in the Chinese 
securities market. Insiders are prohibited from trading shares using inside 
information, and insiders are also prohibited from persuading other investors to 
trade shares of the company. Thus, because of his activities, the CSRC decided 
to impose a penalty of RMB 30,000 (£3,000).  
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Figures of table 6-6 indicate that there are decreases in CARs after the 
secretary‟s notification and the sale of shares by Hai Shen Pan.  From day (-6) 
to day (-2), the CAR has decreased from -0.1549 to -0.2218. The decrease in 
CARs after the sales transaction may prove that Mr. Pan leaked the negative 
news to some investors in advance. Additionally, figures in table 6-4 indicate 
that after the information has been released internally, there is also a decrease 
in CARs. From day (-17) to day (-10), the CAR has decreased from -0.1400 to -
0.2651. This suggests that besides Hai Shen Pan, the inside information was 
leaked to the market by other people who knew the content of corporate annual 
report. Figures of NAV indicate that there is increase in trading volume prior to 
the announcement day. For instance, after the internal audit, the NAV is 
increased. From day (-19) to day (-10), the NAV has increased from -0.4805 to 
1.8243. After the sale of shares by Mr. Pan, there is also an increase in NAV. 
From day (-8) to day (-5), NAV has increased from   1.9457 to 2.3905. Thus, 
this may prove that the detected and the undetected insider trading will change 
the trading volume prior to the corporate announcement. The figures of the run-
up index also report an upward trend prior to the announcement day. After the 
internal notification of the audit result, this company experiences an increase in 
the run-up index. From day (-19) to day (-10), the run-up index has increased 
from 99.0447 to 216.0093. After sales by the insider, there is another increase 
in the company‟s run-up index. From day (-9) to day (-3), the value of the run-up 
index has increased from 153.3338 to 214.6165. To some extent, this means 
that information has leaked to the market and that the market participants have 
reacted and traded shares based on the leaked information. 
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Table 6-6 Case of Hai Shen Pan 
Day Event CARs NAV Run-up index 
-30 
 
-0.006 0.576 4.553 
-29 
 
-0.042 0.493 33.934 
-28 
 
-0.035 0.178 28.464 
-27 
 
-0.001 -0.333 0.819 
-26 
 
-0.022 0.482 17.747 
-25 
 
-0.014 -0.334 11.326 
-24 
 
-0.004 0.937 3.539 
-23 
 
-0.011 -0.032 9.135 
-22 
 
-0.067 -0.374 54.629 
-21 
 
-0.111 -0.032 90.406 
-20 The internal audit/draft of 2006 annual report was finished at Mar of 2007 0.119 -0.960 96.583 
-19 
 
-0.122 -0.481 99.045 
-18 
 
-0.138 2.493 112.415 
-17 Internal inform about the result of audit/draft of 2006 annual report -0.140 2.537 114.053 
-16 
 
-0.250 1.613 203.708 
-15 
 
-0.255 1.384 207.715 
-14 
 
-0.292 1.295 238.097 
-13 
 
-0.321 1.762 261.789 
-12 
 
-0.310 1.818 252.680 
-11 
 
-0.294 1.828 239.226 
-10 
 
-0.265 1.824 216.009 
-9 Sale of Mr. Pan -0.188 1.835 153.334 
-8 
 
-0.194 1.946 158.273 
-7 
 
-0.196 2.382 159.969 
-6 
 
-0.155 2.187 126.156 
-5 
 
-0.226 2.391 183.807 
-4 
 
-0.259 1.441 211.002 
-3 
 
-0.263 1.684 214.617 
-2 
 
-0.222 1.459 180.677 
-1 
 
-0.154 1.689 125.427 
0 Announcement -0.150 1.971 122.211 
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6.7.3. The case of Li Li (San Yi Zhong Gong 
600031) 
Ms Li Li is a member of staff of the CSRC. On 8th of March 2007, the 
company, San Yi Zhong Gong, disclosed its 2006 annual report to the market. 
However, it was reported in the media that one day before the announcement, 
there was message from Ms Li‟s phone to her mother. The content of this 
message was that the earning per share of this company in 2006 would be 
RMB1.16, and the dividend per share would be RMB 2. After the company 
announcement , the content of the message was found to be exactly similar to 
that of the company‟s disclosure (Xia, 2010). This activity was discovered by Ms 
Li‟s mother in law, who reported it to the media and the CSRC. Thus, market 
participants suspected that Ms Li Li had breached the regulation prohibiting 
insider trading in the Chinese market, since she is defined as an insider and she 
persuaded other investors to trade shares on non-public information. However, 
Ms Li Li denied this charge. Although this suspected case happened in 2007, 
the CSRC promised to investigate the case in 2010. After a short investigation, 
the CSRC declared that there was no evidence to prove that Ms Li‟s mother 
traded shares using non-public information(Shen, 2010). Additionally, the CSRC 
also declared that there was no evidence to prove that Ms Li had been involved 
in insider trading activities.  
There is no increase in CARs prior to the announcement in table 6-7. 
Figures under the column of NAV in table 6-7 indicate that the trading volume of 
this company is not significant larger than the historical mean during the pre-
event period. Figures under the column of the run-up index also indicate that 
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the announcement information is not incorporated into stock price before the 
announcement. Figures of table 6-7 suggest that there is no evidence of 
information leakage prior to the announcement.  
Overall, the first two reported cases reveal that corporate insiders of 
these Chinese listed companies used their information advantage to maximize 
their profit and minimize their loss. After the transactions by insiders, there are 
increases (decreases) in CARs, run-up index, and NAV. This suggests that 
insiders may leak information to their affiliated people and these people adopt 
the same trading pattern. Additionally, figures of both tables indicate that inside 
information may be leaked to the market through other channels, such as the 
undiscovered insiders. After the internal notification, there are changes in CARs, 
NAV, and run-up index. This suggests that inside information may be being 
leaked to the market by a range of people who are in receipt of the same 
information.
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Table 6-7 Case of Li Li 
Day Event CARs NAV Run-up index 
-30 
 
0.0086 0.5501 0.8292 
-29 
 
-0.0085 -0.9232 -0.8223 
-28 
 
-0.0345 -0.5416 -3.3283 
-27 
 
0.0025 0.4769 0.2384 
-26 
 
-0.0071 0.3093 -0.6895 
-25 
 
-0.0155 -0.2095 -1.4985 
-24 
 
-0.0518 -0.2859 -5.0037 
-23 
 
-0.0294 0.4191 -2.8328 
-22 
 
-0.0599 0.3776 -5.7785 
-21 
 
-0.0238 -0.6909 -2.2954 
-20 
 
0.0042 -0.2254 0.4081 
-19 
 
0.0132 -0.7045 1.2718 
-18 
 
-0.0160 -0.8934 -1.5484 
-17 
 
-0.0345 -1.0418 -3.3306 
-16 
 
-0.0638 -0.5259 -6.1543 
-15 
 
-0.0968 1.3132 -9.3381 
-14 
 
-0.0027 1.4816 -0.2600 
-13 
 
-0.0064 1.3256 -0.6203 
-12 
 
-0.0102 0.9786 -0.9806 
-11 
 
-0.0139 1.1231 -1.3409 
-10 
 
-0.0176 0.6701 -1.7011 
-9 
 
-0.0214 0.7979 -2.0614 
-8 
 
-0.0890 0.8839 -8.5912 
-7 
 
-0.0858 0.8025 -8.2848 
-6 
 
-0.1573 0.2839 -15.1828 
-5 
 
-0.1074 -0.2110 -10.3670 
-4 
 
-0.0950 -0.5216 -9.1686 
-3 
 
-0.0002 0.4984 -0.0195 
-2 
 
-0.0272 0.1071 -2.6297 
-1 Suspected information leakage 0.0275 0.0816 2.6575 
0 Announcement day 0.0448 0.4400 4.3193 
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6.8. Discussion and conclusion 
The results in panels A-1 and D-1 in table 6-2, which represent the sample 
of all news, indicate that the content of a corporate earnings announcement of 
Chinese listed companies will affect their stock price prior to the disclosure date. 
Figures for all news, positive news and negative news indicate that the 
information leakage is very significant. Before market reform, the results of 
panel B-1 and panel E-1 in table 6-2 show that the information leakage of all 
news is not significant, but that the information leakage of positive news and 
negative news is significant. The CAR (0, 10) of all news, positive news, and 
negative news is significant.  After market reform, figures of panels C-1 and D-1 
in table 6-2 indicate that more information leakage is significant in the column of 
all news, positive news, and negative news.  
Market reform removed the trading restrictions on the majority of shares in 
Chinese listed companies. Thus, more shares can be floated in the securities 
market. This increases market liquidity and reduces the transaction cost of the 
Chinese securities market. The increase in market liquidity creates opportunities 
for investors to complete transactions in a short time. This is important to 
investors who are able to access non-public information. Thus, if non-public 
information is leaked to the market prior to the announcement day, it may 
increase (decrease) the CARs prior to the positive (negative) news. The 
significant abnormal returns prior to the corporate announcement may be as a 
result of the widespread information leakage in Chinese securities market.  
If this is the case, the profitability of insider trading will be increased, since 
more shares will be floated on the market. Additionally, the market reform has 
 218 
 
attracted more investors to enter the securities market. The majority of the 
investors are individual and small investors, and they lack investment 
experience (Zhang et al., 2010). These investors will be more easily 
expropriated by illegal trading activities. Thus, the insider trading activities will 
be more attractive to the investors who have access to non-public information. 
An increase in significant information leakage might cause an increase in 
insider trading activities in Chinese securities market. 
Results from table 6-3 indicate that there is a significant increase in the 
run-up index prior to the announcement day. This may reflect the fact that 
before the earnings announcement is disclosed to the market, some market 
participants may receive the information and trade shares using this 
information.  The figures from the run-up index for post-announcement indicate 
that the run-up index remains stable. To some extent, it may mean that the 
remaining market participants who do not have access to the information of 
forthcoming announcements begin to trade shares. Compared with the pre-
reform sample, figures from the run-up index post-announcement, in the post-
reform sample, are lower than those in the pre-reform sample. As a result of the 
elimination of non-tradable shares, the market liquidity of the Chinese securities 
market has increased. To some extent, this reduces transaction costs in the 
market. Under this circumstance, investors who have access to the information 
of a forthcoming announcement may be more likely to react and trade shares 
prior to the announcement date. Thus, very few market participants react and 
trade shares on information after the announcement date.  
Overall, the run-up index of table (6-3) indicates that before the 
announcement date, information of corporate announcement might be leaked to 
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the market, and this leaked information may be incorporated into the stock 
price. To some extent, this phenomenon might comply with the definition of 
insider trading, since the investors are using non-public information to trade 
stocks prior to public disclosure. 
Figures of table 6-4 indicate that, in the pre-announcement period, there is 
an upward trend in the percentage of companies that have a daily trading 
volume that is significantly larger than the historical mean. After the 
announcement, due to the information disclosure, market participants begin to 
react and trade shares; thus, the trading volume of companies is significantly 
larger than the historical mean.  
The increase in NAV before the announcement day means that market 
participants begin to trade shares of listed companies before the news is 
released to the market. Because of the low quality of the information 
environment, there is serious information asymmetry in the Chinese securities 
market. Under this circumstance, the investors that have the ability to access 
the accurate, non-public, information will perform better than the other 
participants in the market. Thus, if investors have non-public information, they 
will trade shares before the market knows this news, to gain the value of non-
public information exclusively. Thus, the increase in NAV before the 
announcement day suggests that some investors with information prior to the 
announcement trade shares based on that information. This practice complies 
with the definition of an illegal insider trading practice, where traders exchange 
shares based on the non-public information. Thus, the increase in NAV prior to 
the announcement day may indicate that there are insider trading activities in 
the Chinese securities market. 
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The results from tables 6-5 and 6-6 indicate that insider transactions will 
trigger changes of CARs in the Chinese securities market, since insiders leak 
the content of annual reports to their affiliated investors prior to the corporate 
disclosure date. The investors who receive the information will trade shares 
using this information before the corporate announcement date. Both of the 
cases cited indicate that the insiders are intentionally concealing their trading 
activities from the market regulatory agency. Figures from tables 6-5 and 6-6 
also indicate that besides those caught for insider trading activities; the 
information might be leaked to the securities market through other, unobserved, 
channels. After the internal information exchange there are changes in CARs. 
This suggests that inside information may be being leaked to the market by 
other people who participate in the internal information exchange. Due to the 
low regulatory efficiency of the CSRC, the significant information leakage may 
be the result of unobserved information leakage, which is caused by undetected 
insider trading activities. Additionally, the run-up index and NAV of both 
reported cases of insider trading also indicate that the information about the 
corporate announcement may be leaked to the market prior to the public 
disclosure. As CAR changed, the NAV and run-up index increased. Thus, these 
two measures also suggest that there may be insider trading activities in 
Chinese securities market. Although the second company disclosed the 
performance forecasting to inform the market, this could not effectively reduce 
information asymmetry between the company and investors. Thus, there were 
still profitable opportunities for insider trading in this company.  
In a survey, Huang (2007) indicates that illegal insider trading activity is 
serious in the Chinese securities market, and that the majority of market 
participants believe that insider trading is widespread. He indicates that the 
 221 
 
scope of insiders in Chinese securities is large, and thus the insider network of 
the Chinese securities market is very complex. This will make it very difficult for 
the market regulator to effectively regulate illegal insider trading activities. 
The significant information leakage, increase in run-up index and NAV 
suggest that the content of corporate disclosure might be leaked to the market 
in advance. This will generate the opportunity for some investors to abuse the 
information and expropriate the rights of other shareholders. According to the 
characteristic of insider trading in the Chinese securities market, i.e. information 
leakage (cs.com.cn, 2010), an increase in the quality of information 
transparency will decrease information leakage and might reduce illegal insider 
trading activities.  
To increase the quality of information transparency, one possible solution 
is to increase the quality of the corporate governance in companies. The 
purpose of a corporate governance mechanism is to help the shareholder 
monitor the activities of the listed companies. A good corporate governance 
mechanism will motivate companies to increase the quality of information 
disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chen et al., 2007a). Better information 
disclosure will reduce the information asymmetry between companies and 
shareholders. Thus, to reduce information leakage that might result from 
leakage by corporate insiders, Chinese listed companies should increase the 
quality of corporate governance and thus reduce information asymmetry 
between companies and shareholders. 
 In this chapter, the extent of information leakage in Chinese securities 
market has been empirically evaluated. One of objectives of the thesis is to 
evaluate the effects of corporate governance on information leakage. Thus, it is 
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useful to measure the problem in the Chinese market. In next chapter, the 
relationship between corporate governance and information leakage will be 
empirically examined and discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 223 
 
Chapter 7. Corporate 
governance and information 
leakage 
7.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 6, the problem of information leakage in the Chinese market is 
empirically evaluated. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate and discuss 
the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and information 
leakage in Chinese listed companies. Because of the influence of the state, the 
full sample will be divided into a sample of state owned listed companies and 
one of private listed companies. From the end of 2005, there was a series of 
market reforms in the Chinese securities market. Thus, the regression models 
also consider the influence of these market reforms on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanism and information leakage.   
Balasubramanian et al. (2010) indicate that firm size will determine the 
quality of the corporate governance mechanism in emerging markets. Large 
companies tend to adopt a good corporate governance mechanism, which then 
reduces the information asymmetry between companies and shareholders. The 
empirical results of this chapter indicate that there is a negative relationship 
between firm size and information leakage in the Chinese listed companies.  
The proportion of non-tradable shares limits the extent to which the market 
mechanism can impact on listed companies (Tomasic and Fu, 2006). Thus, the 
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abolition of non-tradable shares will reduce information asymmetry, and lower 
the cumulative abnormal returns. However, in generally, the empirical results of 
this chapter indicate that the proportion of tradable shares (LNTPER) does not 
affect information leakage. As discussed in section 5.5.2.1, the abolition of non-
tradable shares will exacerbate the problem of the free-rider, since the majority 
of Chinese investors are individual investors (Zhang et al., 2009). This 
widespread ownership structure will exacerbate the problem of the free-rider 
and increase information asymmetry, which in turn may increase information 
leakage. However, the absence of non-tradable shares will provide the market 
mechanism with better opportunities to influence the listed companies. This will 
help Chinese listed companies to reduce information asymmetry and reduce 
information leakage. Thus, the elimination of non-tradable shares will have 
mixed effects on information leakage in Chinese listed companies.  
State ownership increases information asymmetry (Choi et al., 2010) and 
reduces the regulatory efficiency of the Chinese securities market (Berkman et 
al., 2009). However, the empirical results indicate that the proportion of state 
ownership (SPER) does not affect information leakage in the Chinese securities 
market. On the one hand, Li et al. (2005) indicate that state shareholders are 
less likely to expropriate the right of small shareholders. On the other hand, the 
proportion of state ownership is small in private companies. Under this 
circumstance, state ownership will not be able to influence information leakage 
in Chinese listed companies. 
Although ownership concentration will exacerbate the conflict of interest 
between large shareholders and small shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 
2004; López-de-Foronda et al., 2007), the empirical results of this chapter 
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indicate that ownership concentration does not affect information leakage in 
Chinese listed companies in generally. On the one hand, the inappropriate 
ownership concentration exacerbates the information asymmetry between 
companies and investors (Faccio et al., 2001; López-de-Foronda et al., 2007), 
thereby increasing information leakage. However, on the other hand, ownership 
concentration will reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
executives in Chinese listed companies, since the majority of Chinese investors 
are individual investors (Zhang et al. 2010). Thus, ownership concentration will 
reduce the information leakage. Under this circumstance, the ownership 
concentration will have no significant effect on information leakage in Chinese 
listed companies. 
In general, the effect of the proportion of institutional ownership 
(LNTINTPER) on information leakage is not significant. Before market reform, 
the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies led to institutional 
investors having few opportunities to influence firm management (Su, 2005). 
Thus, they were more likely to abuse their privileged information and capital 
advantage to expropriate the right of small shareholders and increase their 
wealth (Yue, 2005). Market reform removed trading restrictions on the shares of 
Chinese listed companies, and thus, institutional investors are more able to 
influence those companies. Lin et al. (2007) indicate that institutional investors 
will drive companies to increase corporate transparency and reduce information 
asymmetry. They will impose more supervisory pressure on Chinese listed 
companies to motivate them to increase the quality of their corporate 
governance mechanism, thereby having a negative effect on information 
leakage. Thus, in general, the institutional ownership does not affect information 
leakage in Chinese listed companies. 
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The composition of the board of directors and the board of supervisors is 
influenced by the interests of large shareholders, especially majority (holding) 
shareholders (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; Zhou, 2009). Because of this, 
neither boards of directors nor boards of supervisors can properly influence 
information asymmetry in listed companies, and therefore they have no 
significant effect on information leakage. The empirical results indicate that 
neither the board of directors nor the board of supervisors (LNBSIZE, INDPER, 
ROLESEP, and LNSSIZE) affect information leakage in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Board subcommittees (DUAC, DUCC, and DUNC) have negative effects 
on information leakage. Figures of table 4-1 indicate that Chinese listed 
companies are establishing board subcommittees. As a consequence of this, 
there will be more opportunities to affect the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms of Chinese listed companies. Thus, there is a negative relationship 
between board subcommittees and information leakage.  
There is a negative relationship between the dummy variable of market 
reform (DUREFORM) and information leakage This means that the information 
leakage in the post-reform period will be more serious than that in the pre-
reform period. Market reforms have increased market liquidity in the Chinese 
market since more shares have been released into it. However, the 
unsophisticated corporate governance mechanism and market regulation 
mechanism lead to the greater profitability of market fraud. Thus, there is more 
information leakage in Chinese market. 
7.2. Regression model 
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The purpose of this chapter is to test the empirical relationship between the 
information leakage and the corporate governance mechanism in Chinese listed 
companies. This chapter adopts the following regression model to test the 
empirical relationship.  
Information leakage = α + β1LNBV + β2LNTPER + β31STPER + β4SPER + 
β5LNTINTPER + β6LNBSIZE + β7INDPER + β8ROLESEP + β9LNSSIZE + 
β10DUAC + β11DUCC + β12DUNC +     DUREFORM +є 
 
 
Indicator of information leakage - Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Previous studies of the Chinese securities market use event study to 
measure the cumulative abnormal return prior to the announcement date of 
mergers and acquisitions (Shi and Jiang, 2003; Yan and Zhao, 2006). They 
found that there are significant CARs prior to the corporate announcement date. 
Thus, they suggest that this means that the inside information of companies 
might be leaked to the market prior to the announcement date, and that this may 
suggest that there is insider trading activity. Because of the importance of an 
earnings announcement, its content will be material to and will influence the 
stock price (Hung and Trezevant, 2007). Thus, in this thesis, the corporate 
LNBV: log form of total asset of the listed companies. 
LNTPER: log form of proportions of the tradable shares of the ownership 
structure of Chinese listed companies. 
1STPER: proportions of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. 
SPER: the total state ownership. 
LNTINTPER: log form of the proportions of tradable institutional ownership.   
LNBSIZE: log form of the number of directors on the board of Chinese listed 
companies. 
LNSSIZE: log form of the number of members of the board of supervisors. 
INDPER: proportion of the independent directors on the board.  
ROLESEP: if CEO and Chairman is not the same individual =1, otherwise =0.  
DUAC: if the company establish audit committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUCC: if the company establish compensation committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUNC:  if the company establish nomination committee =1, otherwise=0. 
DUREFORM:  if the year is 2004 and 2005 = 1, otherwise = 0. 
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earnings announcement is selected as the event and the abnormal returns prior 
to the announcement date will be calculated. As mentioned above (section 
4.5.1), the event window in this thesis from the day (-30) to day (0). Thus, the 
CAR (-30, 0) is the dependent variable of the regression model, which is 
employed to analyse the relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanism and pre-announcement abnormal returns in the Chinese securities 
market.  
Control variable – firm size (LNBV) 
Lakonishok et al.(2001) state that the stock pricing of large firms is more 
efficient than that of small firms, since large firms have low information 
asymmetry. Research findings show that a better corporate governance 
mechanism promotes voluntary information disclosure, which will reduce the 
information asymmetry between companies and shareholders (Gibbins et al., 
1990; Bujaki and McConomy, 2002; Lakhal, 2003). To reduce information 
asymmetry and thereby reduce information leakage, companies are advised to 
have a good governance mechanism. Balasubramanian et al. (2010) state that 
in the emerging markets, firm size is positively related to the quality of the 
corporate governance mechanism of companies. Xiao and Yuan (2007b) find 
that large firms in the Chinese market are more motivated to increase the quality 
of corporate information disclosure. Thus, the control variable of this regression 
is firm size. 
The table 4-2 of Chapter 4 detects the high correlation between variables. 
Thus the initial regression model will be divided into the following model to 
reduce the influence of multicollinearity on estimations. 
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M1: Information leakage = α +   LNBV +    1STPER +    LNTINTPER +    
LNTPER +    INDPER +    LNBSIZE +    ROLESEP +    DUAC +    
LNSSIZE +     DUREFORM + є 
M2: Information leakage = α +   LNBV +    1STPER +    LNTINTPER +    
LNTPER +    INDPER +    LNBSIZE +    ROLESEP +    DUCC +    
LNSSIZE +     DUREFORM + є 
M3: Information leakage = α +   LNBV +    1STPER +    LNTINTPER +    
LNTPER +    INDPER +    LNBSIZE +    ROLESEP +    DUNC +    
LNSSIZE +     DUREFORM + є 
M4: Information leakage = α +   LNBV +   SPER +   LNTINTPER + 
  LNTPER +   INDPER +   LNBSIZE +   ROLESEP +   DUAC +   LNSSIZE 
+     DUREFORM + є 
M5: Information leakage = α +   LNBV +   SPER +   LNTINTPER + 
  LNTPER +   INDPER +   LNBSIZE +   ROLESEP +   DUCC +   LNSSIZE 
+     DUREFORM + є 
M6: Information leakage = α +   LNBV +   SPER +   LNTINTPER + 
  LNTPER +   INDPER +   LNBSIZE +   ROLESEP +   DUNC +   LNSSIZE 
+     DUREFORM + є 
In following sections, empirical results will be listed and discussed. 
7.3. Empirical results 
In this section, the empirical results concerning the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanism and information leakage in the Chinese 
securities market are reported. The figures of tables 7-1 to 7-3 are calculated by 
the market model. The figures of tables 7-4 to 7-6 are calculated by the 
constant-mean-return model.  
Figures of table 7-1 show the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and the cumulative abnormal returns that is calculated 
by the market-model in the full sample. Firstly, the firm size (LNBV) has a 
negative effect on the CARs. Ownership concentration and state ownership 
(1STPER and SPER) do not affect CARs in the full sample. Proportions of 
institutional ownership and proportions of tradable shares (LNTINPER and 
LNTPER) have a negative effect on CARs. Variables of the board of directors 
(LNBSIZE, INDPER, and ROLESEP) do not affect CARs in the full sample. 
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Board subcommittees (DUAC, DUCC, and DUNC) have a negative effect on 
CARs in the full sample. The size of a board of supervisors (LNSSIZE) has a 
positive effect on CARs. However, the significance level is not very high. Finally, 
the dummy variable of market reform has a negative effect on CARs, which 
means that pre-reform CARs are lower than those of post-reform. 
Figures of table 7-2 show the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanism and the cumulative abnormal return that is calculated by the 
constant-mean-model in the full sample. Firstly, state ownership has a negative 
effect on CARs in the full sample. Secondly, there is a positive relationship 
between the size of a board of directors and the CARs. Finally, the dummy 
variable of market reform has a negative effect on CARS in the full sample. This 
result is similar to that of table 7-1. Other variables (LNBV, 1STPER, 
LNTINTPER, LNTPER, INDPER, ROLESEP, DUAC, DUCC, DUNC, and 
LNSSIZE) do not affect CARs in this table.  
Figures of table 7-3 show the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and the cumulative abnormal return that is calculated 
by the market-model in the sample of state owned listed companies. There is a 
negative relationship between the firm size (LNBV) and CARs in this sample. 
Board independence (INDPER) has a negative effect on CARs in this sample. 
However, the significance level of this positive effect is not high. The audit 
committee and compensation committee (DUAC and DUCC) have negative 
effects on CARs in this sample. However, the nomination committee (DUNC) 
does not affect CARs in this sample. Finally, there is a negative relationship 
between the dummy variables of market reform (DUREORM) and CARs in state 
owned listed companies. This means that the market reforms increase the 
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CARs in state owned listed companies. Other variables (1STPER, SPER, 
LNTINTPER, PNTPER, LNBSIZE, ROLESEP, and LNSSIZE) do not affect 
CARs in the sample of state owned listed companies. 
Figures of table 7-4 show the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and the cumulative abnormal returns that is calculated 
by the constant-mean-model in the sample of state owned listed companies. 
Generally speaking, the effects of corporate governance on information leakage 
in table 7-4 are similar to that in table 7-2  
Figures of table 7-5 report the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and CARS that is calculated by the market-model in 
the sample of private listed companies.  There is a negative relationship 
between the firm size (LNBV) and CARS. Proportions of the tradable shares 
(LNTPER) have a negative effect on CARS in private listed companies.  Board 
independence (INDPER) has a negative effect on CARS at 10% significance 
level. The audit committee and compensation committee (DUAC and DUCC) 
have negative effects on CARS in private listed companies. However, the 
nomination committee (DUNC) does not affect CARS in this table. There is a 
negative relationship between the dummy variable of market reform 
(DUREFORM) and CARS. This means that market reform increases the 
phenomenon of information leakage in private listed companies. Other variables 
(1STPER, SPER, LNTINTPER, PNTPER, LNBSIZE, ROLESEP, and LNSSIZE) 
do not affect CARs in the sample of private listed companies. 
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Table 7-1 corporate governance and information leakage - 
CARs (M) in Chinese listed companies 
 
 
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional ownership of company). 
1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of 
company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if 
there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the 
dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory 
board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-
reform = 1, otherwise = 0. 
Dependent variable: CARs(M) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.054 -0.057 -0.063 -0.056 -0.059 -0.065 
  (-5.9177)*** (-6.237)*** (-6.888)*** (-6.118)*** (-6.448)*** (-7.081)*** 
Ownership concentration -0.084 -0.088 -0.079     
  (-1.578) (-1.658) (-1.469)     
State ownership     0.030 0.028 0.036 
     (0.788) (0.730) (0.945) 
institutional ownership -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
  (-1.956)** (-2.033)** (-2.438)** (-1.967)** (-2.050)** (-2.437)** 
tradable shares -0.056 -0.063 -0.078 -0.046 -0.052 -0.067 
  (-3.402)*** (-3.830)*** (-4.718)*** (-2.856)*** (-3.284)*** (-4.214)*** 
Size of BOD 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.028 
  (0.426) (0.574) (0.773) (0.550) (0.701) (0.898) 
Independence of BOD 0.047 0.035 0.007 0.047 0.034 0.007 
  (0.532) (0.393) (0.073) (0.530) (0.389) (0.077) 
Leadership of BOD -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 
  (-0.773) (-0.750) (-0.686) (-0.780) (-0.756) (-0.695) 
Audit committee -0.083   -0.083    
  (-10.377)***   (-10.378)***    
Compensation committee  -0.078   -0.078   
   (-9.752)***   (-9.735)***   
Nomination committee   -0.060   -0.061 
    (-6.903)***   (-6.949)*** 
Size of BOS 0.048 0.051 0.053 0.049 0.052 0.053 
  (1.905)* (2.0209)** (2.071)** (1.933)* (2.053)** (2.087)** 
Market reform -0.153 -0.152 -0.144 -0.158 -0.156 -0.149 
  (-18.711)*** (-18.523)*** (-17.648)*** (-19.404)*** (-19.218)*** (-18.353)*** 
C 0.783 0.808 0.850 0.765 0.790 0.832 
  (5.121)*** (5.283)*** (5.514)*** (5.008)*** (5.169)*** (5.397)*** 
R² 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 
Adj.  R² 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 7-2 corporate governance and information leakage – 
CARs (C) in Chinese listed companies 
 
 
 
 
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C  
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional ownership of company). 
1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of 
company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if 
there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the 
dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory 
board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-
reform = 1, otherwise = 0. 
Dependent variable: CARs(C) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
  (-0.212) (-0.216) (-0.318) (-0.096) (-0.101) (-0.210) 
Ownership concentration -0.255 -0.258 -0.280     
  (-1.590) (-1.606) (-1.744)*     
State ownership     -0.229 -0.230 -0.242 
     (-2.299)** (-2.312)** (-2.435)** 
institutional ownership -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 
  (-1.298) (-1.314) (-1.422) (-1.583) (-1.601) (-1.728) 
tradable shares -0.043 -0.043 -0.065 -0.034 -0.034 -0.053 
  (-0.548) (-0.556) (-0.843) (-0.483) (-0.486) (-0.766) 
Size of BOD 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.322 0.321 0.324 
  (2.726)*** (2.718)*** (2.718)*** (3.011)*** (3.004)*** (3.024)*** 
Independence of BOD 0.476 0.472 0.415 0.441 0.437 0.377 
  (1.078) (1.069) (0.937) (0.999) (0.990) (0.852) 
Leadership of BOD 0.036 0.037 0.040 0.044 0.045 0.048 
  (0.542) (0.558) (0.592) (0.659) (0.674) (0.712) 
Audit committee -0.055   -0.053    
  (-1.223)   (-1.190)    
Compensation committee  -0.053   -0.052   
   (-1.213)   (-1.184)   
Nomination committee   0.028   0.030 
    (0.653)   (0.693) 
Size of BOS -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 0.008 0.008 0.010 
  (-0.252) (-0.245) (-0.244) (0.113) (0.121) (0.141) 
Market reform -0.996 -0.994 -0.971 -0.995 -0.993 -0.971 
  (-20.090)*** (-20.230)*** (-20.116)*** (-20.081)*** (-20.222)*** (-20.107)*** 
C -2.409 -2.407 -2.418 -2.566 -2.564 -2.582 
  (-6.303)*** (-6.291)*** (-6.321)*** (-6.569)*** (-6.559)*** (-6.607)*** 
R² 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Adj.  R² 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 7-3 corporate governance and information leakage – 
CARs (M) in state owned listed companies 
 
 
 
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C  
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional ownership of company). 
1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of 
company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if 
there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the 
dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory 
board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-
reform = 1, otherwise = 0. 
  
Dependent variable: CARs(M) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.059 -0.062 -0.070 -0.055 -0.059 -0.066 
  (-2.012)** (-2.129)** (-2.393)** (-1.889)* (-2.005)** (-2.266)** 
Ownership concentration -0.023 -0.028 -0.019     
  (-0.126) (-0.153) (-0.105)     
State ownership     -0.212 -0.214 -0.211 
     (-1.140) (-1.155) (-1.137) 
institutional ownership 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
  (0.912) (0.876) (0.793) (0.856) (0.820) (0.737) 
tradable shares 0.015 0.006 -0.011 -0.007 -0.017 -0.035 
  (0.269) (0.103) (-0.201) (-0.127) (-0.288) (-0.598) 
Size of BOD -0.083 -0.082 -0.077 -0.090 -0.089 -0.084 
  (-0.7901) (-0.779) (-0.731) (-0.852) (-0.841) (-0.794) 
Independence of BOD -0.528 -0.548 -0.582 -0.530 -0.549 -0.583 
  (-1.805)* (-1.874)* (-1.992)** (-1.811)* (-1.879)* (-1.997)** 
Leadership of BOD -0.068 -0.066 -0.066 -0.067 -0.065 -0.065 
  (-1.082) (-1.055) (-1.057) (-1.073) (-1.046) (-1.047) 
Audit committee -0.074   -0.074    
  (-2.806)***   (-2.809)***    
Compensation committee  -0.065   -0.065   
   (-2.454)**   (-2.463)**   
Nomination committee   -0.040   -0.040 
    (-1.377)   (-1.382) 
Size of BOS -0.087 -0.083 -0.079 -0.087 -0.083 -0.079 
  (-1.087) (-1.035) (-0.986) (-1.093) (-1.039) (-0.993) 
Market reform -0.138 -0.137 -0.131 -0.129 -0.128 -0.122 
  (-5.027)*** (-4.970)*** (-4.773)*** (-4.704)*** (-4.650)*** (-4.444)*** 
C 1.603 1.638 1.703 1.634 1.668 1.735 
  (3.211)*** (3.284)*** (3.404)*** (3.278)*** (3.349)*** (3.473)*** 
R² 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Adj.  R² 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 7-4 corporate governance and information leakage - 
CARs(C) in state owned listed companies 
 
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C  
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUAC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUCC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2SPER  + β3LNTINTPER +β4LNTPER +β5 INDPER + β6 LNBSIZE 
+β7ROLESE P +β8DUNC + β9LNSSIZE +β10DUREFORM +  C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional ownership of company). 
1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of 
company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if 
there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the 
dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory 
board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-
reform = 1, otherwise = 0. 
  
Dependent variable: CARs(C) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 
  (-0.451) (-0.455) (-0.585) (-0.318) (-0.316) (-0.431) 
Ownership concentration -0.199 -0.201 -0.211     
  (-0.998) (-1.006) (-1.054)     
State ownership     -0.513 -0.514 -0.541 
     (-2.293)** (-2.298)** (-2.422)** 
institutional ownership -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 
  (-1.027) (-1.030) (-1.068) (-1.123) (-1.124) (-1.164) 
tradable shares 0.004 0.004 -0.014 -0.105 -0.105 -0.128 
  (0.042) (0.040) (-0.149) (-0.993) (-0.990) (-1.216) 
Size of BOD 0.285 0.285 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.282 
  (2.145)** (2.139)** (2.132)** (2.151)** (2.146)** (2.131)** 
Independence of BOD 0.528 0.529 0.461 0.525 0.527 0.458 
  (0.958) (0.958) (0.833) (0.951) (0.955) (0.829) 
Leadership of BOD 0.072 0.072 0.076 0.084 0.084 0.088 
  (0.812) (0.813) (0.852) (0.946) (0.945) (0.993) 
Audit committee -0.032   -0.021    
  (-0.587)   (-0.377)    
Compensation committee  -0.033   -0.024   
   (-0.625)   (-0.453)   
Nomination committee   0.045   0.054 
    (0.853)   (1.015) 
Size of BOS 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.037 0.037 0.039 
  (0.358) (0.358) (0.377) (0.469) (0.468) (0.494) 
Market reform -0.988 -0.987 -0.968 -0.992 -0.993 -0.975 
  (-16.676)*** (-16.793)*** (-16.741)*** (-16.762)*** (-16.890)*** (-16.852)*** 
C -2.409 -2.406 -2.390 -2.416 -2.414 -2.397 
  (-5.055)*** (-5.042)*** (-5.002)*** (-5.069)*** (-5.059)*** (-5.018)*** 
R² 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Adj.  R² 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 7-5 corporate governance and information leakage – 
CARs (M) in private listed companies 
 
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3SPER + β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER +β6INDPER + 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P +β9DUAC + β10LNSSIZE +β11DUREFORM +  C 
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3SPER + β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER +β6INDPER + 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P +β9DUCC + β10LNSSIZE +β11DUREFORM +  C 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3SPER + β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER +β6INDPER + 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P +β9DUNC + β10LNSSIZE +β11DUREFORM +  C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional ownership of company). 
1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of 
company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if 
there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the 
dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory 
board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-
reform = 1, otherwise = 0. 
  
Dependent variable: CARs(M) 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  -0.054 -0.055 -0.058 
  (-2.930)*** (-2.989)*** (-3.138)*** 
Ownership concentration -0.092 -0.101 -0.116 
  (-0.613) (-0.671) (-0.768) 
State ownership  -0.011 -0.015 -0.003 
  (-0.068) (-0.091) (-0.019) 
institutional ownership 0.007 0.007 0.005 
  (0.974) (0.980) (0.629) 
tradable shares -0.141 -0.149 -0.178 
  (-3.203)*** (-3.418)*** (-4.067)*** 
Size of BOD -0.035 -0.027 -0.024 
  (-0.464) (-0.352) (-0.314) 
Independence of BOD -0.404 -0.419 -0.454 
  (-1.744)* (-1.807)* (-1.950)* 
Leadership of BOD -0.021 -0.022 -0.019 
  (-0.622) (-0.661) (-0.574) 
Audit committee -0.066    
  (-3.239)**    
Compensation committee  -0.061   
   (-2.981)***   
Nomination committee   -0.013 
    (-0.562) 
Size of BOS 0.045 0.046 0.055 
  (0.642) (0.664) (0.786) 
Market reform -0.196 -0.194 -0.183 
  (-9.407)*** (-9.328)*** (-8.850)*** 
C 1.023 1.020 1.001 
  (3.211)*** (3.199)*** (3.127)*** 
R² 0.46  0.46  0.46  
Adj.  R² 0.24  0.24  0.23  
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Figures of table 7-6 describe the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and CARS that is calculated by the constant-mean-
model in the sample of private listed companies. There is a positive relationship 
between the size of a board of directors (LNBSIZE) and CARs at the 10% 
significance level. The dummy variable of market reform (DUREFORM) has a 
negative effect on CARs. In other words, the pre-reform CARs are lower than 
those of post-reform in private listed companies. Other variables in this table do 
not affect CARs.  
Generally speaking, the firm size of companies will reduce the 
phenomenon of information leakage. The ownership concentration and the state 
ownership of Chinese listed companies do not affect the phenomenon of 
information leakage. Proportions of the tradable shares decrease the 
phenomenon of information leakage. Institutional ownership reduces the 
information leakage in general. However, this effect is not robust in sub-
samples. The size of a board of directors only exacerbates the information 
leakage, which is calculated by the constant- mean-model. However, other 
variables of the board of directors do not affect information leakage. Board 
subcommittees will help companies to reduce the phenomenon of information 
leakage. The board of supervisors does not significantly contribute to 
decreasing information leakage. Finally, market reform exacerbates the problem 
of information leakage. In other words, the phenomenon of information leakage 
is more serious after the market reform. 
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Table 7-6 corporate governance and information leakage-
CARs(C) in private listed companies 
 
 
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3SPER + β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER +β6INDPER + 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P +β9DUAC + β10LNSSIZE +β11DUREFORM +  C 
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3SPER + β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER +β6INDPER + 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P +β9DUCC + β10LNSSIZE +β11DUREFORM +  C 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β21STPER  + β3SPER + β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER +β6INDPER + 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P +β9DUNC + β10LNSSIZE +β11DUREFORM +  C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional ownership of company). 
1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of 
company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if 
there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the 
dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory 
board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-
reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
  
Dependent variable: CARs(C) 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  0.014 0.015 0.015 
  (0.395) (0.422) (0.443) 
Ownership concentration -0.202 -0.205 -0.258 
  (-0.661) (-0.669) (-0.849) 
State ownership  0.006 0.007 -0.016 
  (0.017) (0.018) (-0.042) 
institutional ownership -0.018 -0.019 -0.022 
  (-0.754) (-0.788) (-0.914) 
tradable shares -0.111 -0.112 -0.147 
  (-0.788) (-0.791) (-1.059) 
Size of BOD 0.324 0.323 0.327 
  (1.731)* (1.722)* (1.744)* 
Independence of BOD 0.315 0.303 0.272 
  (0.421) (0.405) (0.364) 
Leadership of BOD -0.006 -0.002 0.000 
  (-0.056) (-0.018) (-0.001) 
Audit committee -0.100    
  (-1.250)    
Compensation committee   -0.091   
    (-1.156)   
Nomination committee    0.001 
     (0.009) 
Size of BOS -0.097 -0.095 -0.095 
  (-0.692) (-0.672) (-0.674) 
Market reform -1.014 -1.007 -0.978 
  (-11.105)*** (-11.152)*** (-11.033)*** 
C -2.548 -2.566 -2.648 
  (-3.542)*** (-3.573)*** (-3.698)*** 
R² 0.15  0.15  0.14  
Adj.  R² 0.13  0.13  0.13  
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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7.4. Discussion and interpretation 
In this section, the empirical results of section 7.2 will be discussed and 
interpreted. 
7.4.1. Firm size and information leakage 
A good corporate governance mechanism is costly for listed companies, 
since it relies on professional people and professional services (Gibbins et al., 
1990; Bujaki and McConomy, 2002). Large companies have a strong financial 
capacity and can afford the cost of developing a good corporate governance 
mechanism. Under this circumstance, there will be less information asymmetry 
between large companies and shareholders. This will increase corporate 
transparency and therefore reduce pre-announcement abnormal returns. The 
figures of tables 7-1, 7-3, and 7-5 indicate that there is a negative relationship 
between firm size and information leakage in Chinese listed companies.  
Balasubramanian et al. (2010) state that in the emerging markets, the 
quality of corporate governance is positively related to firm size. In the Chinese 
market, the imperfect market mechanism means that large companies, and 
especially state owned companies, have more resources. Under this 
circumstance, large companies are more able to adopt a better corporate 
governance mechanism. A good corporate governance mechanism will reduce 
information asymmetry between companies and shareholders and reduce 
information leakage.  
7.4.2. Ownership structure and information 
leakage 
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7.4.2.1. Non-tradable shares and information 
leakage 
One feature of Chinese listed company ownership structure is the stock 
segmentation system. This system classifies shareholders of Chinese listed 
companies in two categories, shareholders of non-tradable and of tradable 
shares. Stock segmentation excludes small shareholders from the process of 
corporate decision making, thereby causing the corporate governance 
mechanism to be influenced by corporate insiders (Tomasic and Fu, 2006; Xu 
et al., 2005). The figures in table 4-1 (chapter 4) indicates that before market 
reform, the majority shares of Chinese listed companies were non-tradable 
shares. Large shareholders held a substantial proportion of non-tradable shares 
and controlled the listed company AGM  (Li et al., 2005; Wei and Geng, 2008). 
Thus, small shareholders are unable to influence the management of these 
companies. In this circumstance, the corporate governance mechanism cannot 
effectively achieve corporate transparency. This may increase information 
asymmetry between companies and external investors, and thus increase 
information leakage.  
Although figures of table 7-1 and 7-5 indicate there is a negative 
relationship between the proportion of tradable shares and information leakage, 
the other table indicates that the proportion of tradable shares does not affect 
information leakage. Thus, it is hard to say that the reduction of non-tradable 
shares is a factor in decreasing information leakage in Chinese listed 
companies.   
One result of the elimination of non-tradable shares is the problem of the 
free–rider. In the foregoing discussion in sections 2.3.1.1 and 5.5.2.1, the 
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problem of the free-rider is shown to decrease the effect of corporate 
governance on listed companies, and thus, increase information asymmetry 
between companies and shareholders. Market reform removes the trading 
restriction from the majority of shares in Chinese listed companies, thereby 
dispersing the ownership of those companies. The majority of Chinese investors 
are individual, small investors  (China Academy of Social Science, 2010; Zhang 
et al., 2010). They lack the ability to monitor the listed companies to motivate 
them to increase corporate transparency. Under this circumstance, the 
widespread ownership structure of Chinese listed companies will exacerbate 
the problem of the free-rider. This will make listed companies vulnerable to 
information asymmetry and thereby increase information leakage.  
Another result of the elimination of non-tradable shares is that the market 
mechanism has the opportunity to influence most of Chinese listed companies, 
and they will be driven to comply with the requirements of the market 
mechanism. Chinese listed companies will begin to strengthen the quality of 
their corporate governance mechanisms, by reducing information asymmetry 
and increasing corporate transparency. This will reduce pre-announcement 
abnormal returns in the Chinese securities market.  
7.4.2.2. State ownership and information leakage 
State ownership has been criticized by Chinese market participants for a 
long time. State ownership will influence the quality of the corporate governance 
mechanism of the Chinese listed companies. For instance, it influences the 
composition of the boards of directors since the state appoints government 
officials to work as directors and senior executives (Huang et al., 2006). 
Additionally, state ownership reduces the regulatory efficiency of the market 
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watchdog (Berkman et al., 2009). In the Chinese securities market, the market 
watchdog is a government department, thus the relationship between market 
watchdog and state shareholders will prevent the market regulator from the 
effective regulation of those shareholders. In this way, state ownership may 
cause serious information asymmetry between companies and shareholders.  
However, the empirical results of tables 7-2 and 7-4 show that there is a 
negative relationship between the proportion of state ownership and information 
leakage. Compared with private shareholders, state shareholders are subject to 
administration orders from the government (Li et al., 2005). Although state 
shareholders reduce the regulatory efficiency of the market watchdog, this does 
not mean that the shareholders are unregulated. The activities of state 
shareholders are controlled by government administration, and this ensures that 
they cannot abuse their power to expropriate the rights of small shareholders (Li 
et al., 2005). As a result, state ownership does not necessarily exacerbate 
information asymmetry. Additionally, state shareholders are less likely to 
expropriate the right of small shareholders (Yang, 2002). Thus, the proportion of 
state ownership may decrease information asymmetry. Compared with state 
shareholders, private shareholders, especially large private shareholders, are 
more likely to expropriate the right of other shareholders (Yang, 2002). The 
market watchdog of the Chinese securities market is unable to effectively 
monitor the activities of large private shareholders (Li et al., 2005), in which 
case, they exacerbate the information asymmetry between companies and 
shareholders. This will increase information leakage in the Chinese securities 
market. The proportion of state ownership reduces the ability of large private 
shareholders to expropriate the rights of small shareholders. Therefore, state 
ownership decreases information leakage.  
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7.4.2.3. Ownership concentration and information 
leakage 
Conventional wisdom holds that ownership concentration will exacerbate 
the conflicts of interest among shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; López-de-
Foronda et al., 2007), thereby impairing the quality of corporate governance. It 
also holds that ownership concentration will exacerbate information asymmetry 
between companies and shareholders. 
However, the figures in tables 7-1 to 7-6 indicate that the ownership 
concentration (1STPER) does not affect information leakage in Chinese listed 
companies. Although inappropriate ownership concentration will exacerbate the 
conflict of interest between large and small shareholders and therefore increase 
information asymmetry, ownership concentration will reduce the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and executives. To some extent, it may reduce 
the information asymmetry between companies and shareholders. The majority 
of Chinese investors are individual investors, and they are unsophisticated and 
irrational (Tang et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2010). Thus, most Chinese investors 
lack the ability to monitor the listed companies. Under this circumstance, the 
executives of listed companies can exacerbate information asymmetry and 
thereby increase information leakage. Ownership concentration will increase the 
supervisory pressure exerted by shareholders to motivate companies to 
increase their corporate transparency and reduce information leakage. 
As the Chinese market develops, large shareholders begin to pay 
attention to the rights of minority shareholders (Corporate Governance 
Research Centre, 2010). Under this circumstance, large shareholders will 
increase corporate transparency to fulfil the demand for information from 
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minority shareholders. Thus, there is no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and information leakage in private listed companies. 
7.4.2.4. Institutional ownership and information 
leakage 
Conventional wisdom believes that institutional shareholders improve the 
quality of the corporate governance mechanism and thereby reduce information 
asymmetry (Laidroo, 2009; Chen-Lung et al., 2009). The results reported in 
tables 7-1 indicate that there is a negative relationship between the proportion 
of institutional ownership and information leakage. However, figures of other 
tables indicate that the proportion of institutional ownership does not affect 
information leakage. Thus, it is hard to support the hypothesis that there is a 
negative relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and 
information leakage. 
Prior to market reform, institutional shareholders are less inclined to be 
involved in the corporate managerial decision making process, since stock 
segmentation allowed shareholders of non-tradable shares to control the 
process of this decision making (as discussed in section 3.3). This means that 
the institutional investors were unable to effectively protect their interests, and in 
order to do so, they would collude with the corporate insider large shareholders 
to increase their wealth and expropriate the rights of other shareholders. Yue 
(2005) indicates that before market reform, institutional investors were more 
inclined to abuse their information advantage and expropriate the rights of other 
shareholders. Thus, institutional investors increased information asymmetry 
between companies and shareholders, and increased information leakage.  
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After market reform, the proportion of non-tradable shares in Chinese 
companies is decreasing and more Chinese investors are entering the Chinese 
securities market (Zhang et al., 2010). At the same time, the numbers of 
institutional investors is increasing (Zhang et al., 2010). The elimination of non-
tradable shares gives institutional investors the opportunity to purchase more 
shares in Chinese listed companies. Table 4-1 (chapter 4) indicates that the 
proportion of institutional ownership is increasing. Under this circumstance, 
institutional investors are able to purchase large proportions of shares in the 
listed companies. This increases the influence of outside investors on those 
companies. For instance, institutional investors have more opportunities to take 
part in the process of corporate decision making (China Academy of Social 
Science, 2010), and thus, Chinese listed companies will face more monitoring 
pressure from outside investors. As a result of this, institutional investors will 
motivate the listed companies to increase their corporate transparency and 
thereby reduce information asymmetry.  
In general, the two opposite effects of institutional ownership on 
information asymmetry means that institutional ownership has no significant 
effect on information leakage in listed companies. 
7.4.3. Board of directors and information 
leakage 
Besides the ownership structure, another important pillar of the internal 
corporate governance mechanism is the board of directors (Dahya et al., 2008). 
The separation of control and ownership which is a feature of listed companies 
means that boards of directors play an important role in listed companies. 
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However, the empirical results of section 7.3 indicate that boards of directors do 
not affect information leakage in the Chinese securities market.  
As an agent of the corporate shareholders, members of the boards of 
directors should represent the majority interests of their shareholders. However, 
in Chinese listed companies, the inappropriate ownership structure means that 
the boards of directors fail to represent them properly. In Chinese listed 
companies, the majority of shares are held by the majority (holding) shareholder  
(Xu and Wang, 1999; Li et al., 2005). The descriptive statistics reported in 
section 4.8 indicate that the ownership concentration of the Chinese listed 
companies is dispersing. However, Deloitte-China (2010) indicates that 
shareholdings of the second and third largest shareholders are still far smaller 
than the shareholding of the largest shareholders. Majority (holding) 
shareholders still have a substantial influence on the AGMs of Chinese listed 
companies (Deloitte-China, 2010). Under this circumstance, the composition of 
the board of directors is determined by the interests of majority (holding) 
shareholders rather than by those of the majority of shareholders. Thus, the 
boards of directors effectively become the agents for the majority (holding) 
shareholders in Chinese listed companies. 
7.4.3.1. Board size and information leakage 
Theoretically, the size of a board of directors is a factor in determining the 
quality of that board, since it determines the communication efficiency of the 
board (Jensen, 1993; Eisenberg et al., 1998). However, empirical results of 
section 7.3 report that there is no significant relationship between board size 
and information leakage. This indicates that in the Chinese listed companies, 
the size of a board of directors is not a factor in its efficiency and performance. 
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Huang et al. (2006) and Allen et al. (2007) indicate that majority (holding) 
shareholders will appoint their affiliated people to work as board  directors. Thus, 
majority (holding) shareholders have a substantial influence on the boards of 
directors of Chinese listed companies. Under this circumstance, the size of a 
board of directors does not affect its performance and efficiency, nor does 
board size have any effect on information leakage. 
7.4.3.2. Leadership structure and information 
leakage 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the role separation of  CEO and 
chairman of the board of directors will increase the quality of corporate 
transparency, since it reduces collusion between board members and corporate 
executives (Mak and Li, 2001) and therefore drives listed companies to disclose 
more information (Ho and Wong, 2001). According to the empirical results 
represented in section 7.2, role separation does not really affect the 
performance of the board of directors, since there is no significant relationship 
between role separation (ROLESEP) and information leakage in Chinese listed 
companies. As mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, majority (holding) 
shareholders of Chinese listed companies determine the composition of the 
corporate managerial team and the board of directors (Li et al., 2005). Under 
this circumstance, both CEO and chairman appointments are influenced by the 
interests of the majority (holding) shareholders. Thus, although the figures of 
table 4-1indicate that the majority of Chinese listed companies separate CEO 
from chairman, this role separation does not affect the performance of board of 
directors and will have no significant effect on information leakage. 
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7.4.3.3. Board independence and information 
leakage 
In the developed market, independent directors are an important factor in 
the increase of corporate transparency and the decrease of information 
asymmetry (Nowak and McCabe, 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Ahmed et al., 
2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). However, the empirical results of section 7.3 
indicate that board independence in Chinese listed companies does not affect 
information leakage in the Chinese securities market.  
In Chinese listed companies, nominations of independent directors are 
seriously influenced by the interests of the majority (holding) shareholders 
(Zhou, 2009). Under this circumstance, people affiliated to the majority (holding) 
shareholders are nominated to serve as independent directors in Chinese listed 
companies. Secondly, not all of the independent directors of Chinese listed 
companies are qualified for the role (Zhou, 2009); some of them lack the 
professional knowledge and ability to work as independent directors. 
Additionally, conflicts of duties between independent directors and the board of 
supervisors can prevent independent directors from having any effect on the 
quality of the corporate governance mechanism (Jiang, 2009). According to the 
managerial hierarchy of Chinese listed companies, independent directors and 
supervisors face the problem of duty duplication. Finally, Chinese listed 
companies are still learning the importance of independent directors, since the 
relevant codes and laws fail to clearly define their duties in the listed companies 
(Jiang, 2009; Qu, 2009). This means that independent directors of Chinese 
listed companies are unable to increase their performance and efficiency as 
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directors. Thus, board independence does not affect information leakage in the 
Chinese securities market. 
7.4.4. Board subcommittees and information 
leakage 
The purpose of establishing a subcommittee is to increase the quality and 
efficiency of the board‟s supervision, and thus increase the transparency of 
companies (Vafeas, 1999). Through the establishment of subcommittees, 
groups of relevant directors solve specific managerial issues for their 
companies. Figures in section 7.3 show that board subcommittees begin to 
have negative effects on information leakage after market reform. To some 
extent, this is consistent with the theoretical prediction that the use of board 
subcommittees will reduce the information asymmetry between companies and 
investors, and thus lower the information leakage.  
The results reported in section 7.3 suggest that after market reform, the 
market mechanism has more opportunity to influence the conduct of Chinese 
listed companies and they begin to pay attention to the quality of their corporate 
governance mechanisms. For instance, more Chinese listed companies begin 
to appoint board subcommittees after the year 2005. Figures reported in table 
4-1 indicate that there has been a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
companies that establish board subcommittees in recent years. This 
development is expected to strengthen the quality of corporate governance in 
Chinese listed companies and reduce information asymmetry between 
companies and shareholders. The use of audit and remuneration committees 
motivate listed companies to disclose more information to the market, which 
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reduces information asymmetry between companies and shareholders (Koh et 
al., 2007; Laksmana, 2008). Nomination committees ensure board 
independence and therefore reduce information asymmetry between companies 
and shareholders (Ruigrok et al., 2006). After market reform, Chinese listed 
companies begin to strengthen the operation of their subcommittees (China 
Academy of Social Science, 2010). Thus, the results reported in section 7.3 
indicate that after market reform there are negative relationships between board 
subcommittees and information leakage in the Chinese securities market. 
The efficiency and performance of board subcommittees depend on 
quality of the members of these subcommittees. Klein (1998) and Vafeas (1999, 
2003) indicate that independent directors are suitable members of board 
subcommittees. However, the characteristics of independent directors of 
Chinese listed companies may limit their future development since these 
companies lack qualified independent directors (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; 
Zhou, 2009). Thus to increase the performance and efficiency of subcommittees, 
Chinese listed companies need to appoint better qualified independent directors.  
7.4.5. Board of supervisors and information 
leakage 
All Chinese listed companies must establish a board of supervisors, and 
this works as another internal monitoring institution. Previous papers indicate 
that the board of supervisors does not have much influence in Chinese listed 
companies (Tian and Estrin, 2005; Li et al., 2005; Deloitte-China, 2010). Hence, 
the board of supervisors does not affect corporate transparency and information 
leakage in the Chinese securities market. 
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Results from section 7.3 indicate that there is no significant relationship 
between the size of a supervisory board and information leakage. Relevant laws 
in the Chinese securities market dictate that a board of supervisors also takes 
on the duty of monitoring its company. However, the board of supervisors lacks 
real supervisory power in the listed companies, and so they cannot really 
increase the quality of corporate governance to reduce information leakage. 
Secondly, Li et al. (2005) indicate that there is rivalry between boards of 
directors and boards of supervisors in Chinese listed companies, and this 
reduces the efficiency and performance of the board of supervisors. In the 
managerial hierarchy of Chinese listed companies, boards of supervisors and 
boards of directors are nearly at the same level. This duplication of the duties of 
the two constituents reduces the effectiveness of the board of supervisors. 
Finally, like the board of directors, large shareholders, especially the majority 
(holding) shareholder, can influence the board of supervisors (Li et al., 2005; 
Deloitte-China, 2010). People affiliated to large shareholders will be appointed 
as members of the board of supervisors. Under this circumstance the board of 
supervisors then becomes a nominal constituent in the company, since 
itsactivities will be influenced by the majority (holding) shareholder. The above 
reasons may explain why there is no significant relationship between the size of 
a board of supervisors and information leakage in Chinese listed companies. 
7.4.6. Market reform and information leakage 
To reflect the influence of market reform on the relationship between the 
corporate governance mechanism and information leakage, there is a dummy 
variable of market reform in regression models. Empirical results of section 7.3 
indicate that there is a negative relationship between the dummy variable and 
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information leakage. This means that after market reform, information leakage 
continues in the Chinese market.  
One feature of the market reforms of 2005 is the elimination of non-
tradable shares. On the one hand, this increases market liquidity of the Chinese 
market, since more shares can be exchanged. However, the unsophisticated 
corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies coupled with the 
unsophisticated market regulation mechanism means that the increase in 
market liquidity causes an increase in the profitability of market fraud. The 
majority of Chinese investors are individual investors (Zhang et al,. 2010), and 
thus they  lack the ability to monitor the activities of insiders. At the same time, 
the corporate governance mechanism and market regulation mechanism also 
fail to reduce market fraud. Thus, after reform, there is more information 
leakage in the Chinese market. 
7.5. Robustness test 
To ensure the robustness of the empirical results of chapter 7, this section 
also employs the pooled OLS estimation technique to estimate the relationship 
between the corporate governance mechanism and information leakage in 
Chinese listed companies. 
Results of the pooled OLS estimation are listed in appendix 7-1 to 7-6. 
Firstly, the empirical results indicate that firm size will help Chinese listed 
companies to reduce the phenomenon of information leakage. Generally, 
ownership concentration and state ownership do not affect information leakage 
in Chinese listed companies. Institutional ownership and the proportion of 
tradable shares are found not to affect information leakage. The empirical 
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results of the pooled OLS estimation indicate that the board of directors and the 
board of supervisors do not affect information lekage. Results of this section 
indicate that audit and compensation committees will help companies to reduce 
information leakage in the Chinese market. However, the negative effect of a 
nomination committee on information leakage is not robust. Finally, figures of 
Appendix 7-1 to 7-6 indicate that there is more information leakage in the 
Chinese market after market reform. 
7.6. Conclusion 
This chapter reported and interpreted the empirical results about the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and information 
leakage in Chinese listed companies. 
Previous studies find that there is a positive relationship between firm size 
and the quality of corporate governance in emerging markets (Balasubramanian 
et al., 2010).  A good corporate governance mechanism will reduce information 
asymmetry and increase corporate transparency (Lakhal, 2003). Thus, firm size 
may reduce the phenomenon of information leakage in the Chinese securities 
market. In this thesis, the empirical results confirm that larger companies will 
have less information leakage in the Chinese market.  
Huang and Fung (2005) state that non-tradable shares increase 
information asymmetry between the listed companies and their shareholders in 
the Chinese securities market. Thus, the elimination of non-tradable shares 
should reduce information asymmetry between companies and shareholders, 
and this may lower information leakage in the Chinese securities market. 
Results from section 7.3 indicate that the proportion of tradable shares has no 
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significant effect on information leakage in the Chinese securities market. The 
elimination of non-tradable shares will exacerbate the problem of the free-rider 
in the Chinese securities market. The majority of investors in the Chinese 
securities market are individual and small shareholders (Zhang et al., 2010). 
Thus, they cannot effectively motivate listed companies to decrease information 
leakage. However, the elimination of non-tradable shares removes the trading 
restriction and this will allow the market mechanism more opportunity to 
influence Chinese listed companies. This may reduce information leakage. Thus, 
the proportion of tradable shares does not affect information leakage in the 
Chinese securities market. 
Choi et al. (2010) point out that the state can exacerbate information 
asymmetry between Chinese listed companies and their shareholders. 
However, the empirical results indicate that state ownership (SPER) negatively 
affects information leakage in the Chinese securities market. Although the state 
has the ability to increase information asymmetry, it does not mean that it 
wishes to do so. Li et al. (2005) indicate that compared with private companies, 
state owned companies are more likely to disclose information to the market. 
Additionally, state shareholders cannot abuse their power and expropriate small 
shareholders, since the government administration order will limit their 
behaviour (Li et al.,2005). However, the market regulatory agency cannot 
effectively monitor holders of state shares, since both of them are influenced by 
the government. Under this circumstance, some holders of state shares will 
exacerbate information asymmetry, thereby increasing the information leakage. 
Thus, in general, there is no significant relationship between state ownership 
and information leakage. 
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Although ownership concentration will exacerbate the conflict of interest 
between shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001;López-de-Forondaet al., 2007), 
ownership concentration will reduce the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and executives. In the Chinese securities market, the majority of 
investors are individual investors, and they are unsophisticated and irrational 
(Tang et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2009); they lack the ability and desire to 
monitor the executives of listed companies. Under this circumstance, ownership 
concentration will reduce information leakage. Therefore, this thesis finds that 
the ownership concentration does not affect information leakage in Chinese 
listed companies. 
The effect of the proportion of institutional ownership (LNTINTPER) on 
information leakage is not significant in general. In the pre-reform period, the 
ownership structure gives institutional investors few opportunities to influence 
listed companies. Thus institutional investors may abuse their information 
advantages to expropriate the rights of the small shareholder and increase their 
wealth (Yue, 2005). Thus, the proportion of institutional ownership has a 
positive effect on information leakage before market reform. After market reform, 
institutional investors begin to have opportunities to take part in the process of 
corporate decision making; they are then able to monitor the listed companies. 
This reduces information asymmetry between companies and shareholders. 
Thus, this is reason that there is no significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and information leakage. 
In Chinese listed companies, the boards of director and boards of 
supervisors are influenced by the large shareholders, especially majority 
(holding) shareholders (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; Zhou, 2009). The 
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empirical results of this thesis find that the boards of directors and the boards of 
supervisors (LNBSIZE, INDPER, ROLESEP, and LNSSIZE) do not affect 
information leakage. Under the influence of large shareholders, these boards 
cannot motivate the listed companies to increase their corporate transparency. 
Hence, boards of directors and boards of supervisors have no effect on 
information leakage in the Chinese securities market.  
Before market reform, Chinese listed companies paid less attention to the 
issue of the quality of corporate governance (Lu and Kong, 2005), and thus, the 
subcommittees did not work properly in the Chinese listed companies (Lin et al., 
2008). However, the figures reported in table 4-1 indicate that there is an 
increasing trend in the numbers of companies that have established board 
subcommittees. This means that Chinese listed companies are beginning to pay 
attention to the quality of corporate governance mechanisms (China Academy 
of Social Science, 2010). Therefore, board subcommittees have a negative 
effect on information leakage in Chinese listed companies. 
The purpose of the new market reforms, which started at the end of year 
2005, is to increase the effect of the market mechanism on Chinese listed 
companies in order to protect the interest of shareholders. However, the 
empirical results of this chapter find that these market reforms have led to an 
increase in information leakage. Market reforms increase market liquidity of 
Chinese market, since more shares can be exchanged in the market. However, 
the unsophisticated corporate governance mechanism and market regulation 
system lead to an increase in the profitability of market fraud. Thus, there is an 
increase in information leakage after market reforms. 
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Chapter 5 to chapter 7 are three chapters that empirically evaluate the 
effects of corporate governance on firm performance, the extent of information 
leakage, and the effects of corporate governance on information leakage. The 
aim of this thesis is to evaluate the effects of corporate governance. Thus, these 
three chapters provide empirical evidence about the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance and information leakage in Chinese 
companies. Based on this empirical evidence, the final chapter will provide 
recommendations to help Chinese companies increase the quality of corporate 
governance, and therefore, increase firm performance and reduce information 
leakage  
.  
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Chapter 8. Policy implications 
for the Chinese Stock 
Market and conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters of this thesis offer an empirical evaluation of the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance of Chinese listed companies, and of the relationship between the 
corporate governance mechanism and information leakage. The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss how the corporate governance mechanism of Chinese 
listed companies could be further reformed.  
Generally, these recommendations can be classified into the following 
categories: 
 Definition of „insider‟ in the Chinese securities market based on the 
principle of „equal access‟. 
 Further reform of the ownership structure of Chinese listed 
companies to reduce the influence of single large shareholders.  
 Redesign of the internal governance mechanism to increase its 
performance. 
 Revision of the relevant code to motivate independent and 
institutional investors to actively monitor listed companies. 
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 Strengthening of the role of the market regulator to include more 
duties which would increase the quality of the corporate 
governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies. 
8.2. Suggestions for the Chinese market 
8.2.1. External market regulation reform 
8.2.1.1. Legislation reform 
The definition of insider will determine the quality and effectiveness of 
insider trading legislation (Beny, 2005). 
The main debate of the legal scope is whether the tippees should be 
considered as corporate insiders (Beny 2005). The tippers must be defined as 
corporate insiders, since they work in the companies or they can access the 
specific material information whereas tippees are not directly related to the 
companies. However, they can receive specific material information from the 
tippers and in this way become informed investors in the securities market; 
therefore, the tippees can be seen as accomplices of the tippers. Thus, it is 
necessary to define tippees as insiders to deter them from being involved in 
insider trading activities.   
Compared with the CSL 1996, the CSL 2006 extends the definition of 
corporate insiders. In the CSL 2006,  
relevant staffs of sponsors, underwriting securities companies, 
exchanges, registration and settlement bodies, securities service 
institutions, controlling shareholders, actual controlling persons of the 
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issuer and their directors, supervisors and senior management 
(encompassing parent entities), as well as companies of which the 
issuer is the controlling person and their directors, supervisors and 
senior management (subsidiary entities) (Xu and Zheng, 2007:106).  
The former CSL only focuses on the issuer of shares but ignores their 
parent and subsidiary entities. Staff of the parent and of the subsidiary entities 
also has the opportunity to access material information of listed companies, 
which are the issuers of shares. Thus, these people should also be considered 
as insiders, although they may not actually work for the listed companies. The 
CSL 2006 extends the scope of insiders to deter more people from being 
involved in insider trading. The CSL 2006 also prohibits corporate insiders 
leaking corporate inside information before corporate disclosure, and corporate 
insiders must not encourage other people to trade shares with material 
information.  
However, the CSL 2006 does not define the „tippees‟ as insiders. Law 
makers of the Chinese market adopt a theory of fiduciary duty to define its 
notion of insiders. Huang (2007:29) indicates that „he undeveloped and 
inadequate notion of fiduciary duty in China may pose a considerable obstacle 
to adopting fiduciary-duty-based theories‟.  Although Chinese companies have 
been experiencing economic reform for decades, there is a lack of 
sophistication in the use of the principle of fiduciary duty in the Chinese market. 
As a result, if the principle of fiduciary duty is used as criteria it cannot 
effectively include all insiders who engage in illegal insider trading activities. 
Thus, the theory of fiduciary duty should be replaced by theory of equal access 
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(or theory of disclosure of information or abstinence from trading), which will be 
easy to apply in Chinese securities market. 
Currently, the principle of fiduciary duty is unsophisticated in Chinese 
listed companies (Huang, 2007; Shen 2008). Under this circumstance, use of 
the principle of fiduciary duty cannot effectively distinguish insiders. Instead, the 
principle of equal access will simplify the requirements of evidence, thereby 
increasing the regulatory efficiency against insider trading (Huang, 2005). Low 
evidence requirement will help the market watchdog of the Chinese securities 
market easily catch the suspects who violate insider trading rules. Thus, it may 
be better to use the theory of equal access to distinguish the insiders.  
The principle of equal access requires that people who have material 
information which they are waiting to disclose to the market must not trade 
shares using that information. This ensures that few investors have information 
advantage in the market. Compared with the theory of fiduciary duty, the theory 
of equal access will be easily applied in the Chinese market. Under this theory 
both tippers and tippees will be prohibited from trading shares using material 
information. Although tippees do not work for the companies, they have the 
chance to access inside information through being tipped by corporate insiders. 
Compared with other investors, tippees therefore have an information 
advantage, and thus, both tippers and tippees are taking advantage of them. If 
the tippers are guilty of insider trading activities, tippees, who receive the inside 
information from tippers, should also be considered guilty. As mentioned above, 
the scope of the definition of an insider will determine the quality of insider 
trading legislation. Thus, law makers for the Chinese market need to expand 
their definition to increase the quality of public regulation of the Chinese market. 
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8.2.1.2. Reform of the regulatory authority 
The CSL 2006 extends the investigatory power of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is the Chinese market watchdog. 
Compared with the FSA, however, the CSRC is still an unsophisticated market 
watchdog in global terms. The CSRC lacks power to subpoena suspects of 
illegal insider trading. The power to subpoena is very important to a market 
regulatory authority, since it plays a key role in collecting evidence of insider 
trading (Xu and Zheng, 2007). Although the CSL 2006 provides the CSRC with 
the power to freeze assets and seize other evidence to prove insider trading, 
the absence of a power of subpoena reduces the efficiency of insider trading 
investigations by the CSRC, since it cannot directly interview suspects. Instead, 
the CSRC has to inform other institutions, such as the police, which do have the 
power to subpoena those suspects. This will prolong the investigation period of 
insider trading cases, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the CSRC. Thus it is 
necessary to give the power of subpoena to the CSRC to strengthen its 
investigative efficiency.  
Secondly, compared with other market regulatory agencies, such as the 
Financial Service Authority (FSA), the CSRC lacks power to prosecute the 
suspects of insider trading. Under the Financial Services and Market Act 
(FSMA) 2000, which is a law of the UK financial market, the FSA has authority 
to prosecute those suspected of insider trading itself. However, the CSRC has 
to rely on the People's Procuratorate, the prosecution authority in China, to 
prosecute insider trading suspects. However, the People's Procuratorate lacks 
experience of white collar crime, and especially of illegal trading activities in the 
securities market, like insider trading. While it has considerable experience of 
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criminal cases, the People's Procuratorate cannot effectively help the CSRC to 
increase the quality of its insider trading regulation. The CSRC needs to be 
given the power of prosecution; if it had this, the knowledge it has would help it 
develop a suitable prosecution strategy and increase the deterrence value of 
market regulation. Therefore, the CSRC should have the power to prosecute 
insider trading cases itself.  
The Chinese capital market is still a developing market in global terms. 
Thus, compared with the western developed market, it lacks sophisticated and 
rational investors. Therefore, there needs to be an institution that takes on the 
responsibility of creating more sophisticated investors in the Chinese market. In 
the UK market, one of the major regulatory objectives of the FSA is to increase 
investor awareness. To achieve this objective, the FSA strengthens its public 
promotion to ensure that individuals understand the financial markets, and to 
motivate them to develop a sophisticated investment habit. At the same time, 
the FSA requires financial institutions to provide professional and constructive 
financial suggestions to facilitate their customers‟ understanding of risk in the 
financial market. As a watchdog in an emerging market, the CSRC should 
assume the duty of developing more sophisticated investors in the Chinese 
market. The CSRC can draw on the experiences of the FSA. The CSRC could 
strengthen its public promotion work to help individuals in the market to a 
greater understanding of it. Currently, the CSRC has an official newspaper and 
website to convey regulatory policy and other important news to the market. 
Using both these, the CSRC could convey more information about the stock 
market and investment skill to investors. Additionally, the CSRC could emulate 
the practice of the FSA in requiring financial companies to provide better 
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financial assistance and advice to investors, thereby helping them improve their 
investment knowledge and skills.   
Additionally, the CSRC should motivate Chinese investors to learn about 
corporate governance. If investors have more knowledge about corporate 
governance, they will be more likely to demand that companies increase the 
quality of their corporate governance. Under this circumstance, companies will 
have to comply with the requirements of their shareholders. As the market 
develops, investors will have more opportunities to take part in the process of 
corporate decision making. Under this circumstance, the companies will have to 
take notice of the requirements and pressure of the investors. If investors 
understood corporate governance and its importance, they would be able to 
influence companies to adopt a good corporate governance mechanism, which 
in turn would protect them and align managerial activities with the interests of 
the companies. 
8.2.2. Reform of corporate governance 
mechanism 
8.2.2.1. Code of corporate governance 
The Combined Code, which is the corporate governance code in the UK 
market, requires companies that are listed on the FTSE-350 to fully comply with 
it, since these companies can afford the cost of this full compliance. In the 
Chinese securities market, the code of corporate governance could set a higher 
standard of requirement for large companies. This would motivate them to 
adopt an advanced corporate governance mechanism. Currently, the Chinese 
market is building a corporate governance index system to evaluate the practice 
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of corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. For companies which 
consistently have a poor record of corporate governance practice, the new code 
of corporate governance should contain provisions that require these 
companies to improve the quality of their corporate governance. Good 
corporate governance will increase investor confidence and facilitate the 
development of the Chinese securities market. 
Secondly, the CSRC should regularly upgrade the content of the code of 
corporate governance.  The current code of corporate governance for the 
Chinese market was issued on 20th Jan, 2002, and there have been no new 
codes issued since then. At the same time, the Chinese market has been 
experiencing a high number of changes during the past few years. Thus, the 
content of the old code is no longer adequate for the development of corporate 
governance. Under this circumstance, the CSRC should copy the practice of the 
UK market that regularly updates the content of its code of corporate 
governance. The developments in the Chinese securities market means that the 
provisions of the corporate governance code are inadequate in the current 
market environment. Because of this, the corporate governance code will not 
help Chinese listed companies increase the quality of their practice. Thus, it is 
necessary to update the code to drive Chinese listed companies to improve the 
quality of their corporate governance.  
The former code also fails to take into account the effect of institutional 
investors on corporate governance. As the market develops, the institutional 
investors are becoming important market participants in China. However, the 
code of corporate governance of the Chinese market fails to include this new 
development  Institutional investors will reduce the influence of single 
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shareholders on listed companies, and they will have the ability to impose 
supervisory pressure on executives, to encourage them to improve firm 
performance. Thus, it is necessary to consider the effect of institutional 
investors on the quality of corporate governance; a new code would motivate 
institutional investors to become actively involved in the firm‟s management.  
Finally, the new code would provide a clearer definition of the duties and 
responsibilities of independent directors. Although the corporate governance 
code of the Chinese securities market provides criteria for the qualification of 
independent directors, there is no clear definition of their role. This means that 
there is no way of assessing their performance. Hence, this lack of a defined 
role means that independent directors are unlikely to work effectively in Chinese 
listed companies. Thus, it is necessary to provide a clear prospectus for 
independent directors, to increase the importance of their role on the boards of 
Chinese listed companies.  
8.2.2.2. Reforms of ownership structure 
It would seem that the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies 
generates a series of problems for corporate governance in the Chinese 
securities market. Hence, solving these problems by reforming the ownership 
structure is an important precondition for the improvement of corporate 
governance in Chinese listed companies.  
Although stock segmentation used to effectively protect the interests of the 
state, as the market developed stock segmentation became a barrier of the 
future development of the Chinese market. Stock segmentation exacerbated 
conflicts of interest among investors, and thereby generated a serious agency 
problem in the Chinese listed companies. Transactions of non-tradable shares 
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had to be approved by the market regulatory authority, and thus they had low 
liquidity, which led to external investors having few opportunities to influence 
firm management. Thus, the market mechanism could not effectively influence 
Chinese listed companies. The elimination of non-tradable shares gives the 
market mechanism more opportunity to influence companies, and this will 
provide better protection to investors and improve firm performance. 
The empirical results that are represented in tables 5-1 to 5-9 indicate that 
the elimination of non-tradable shares, contrary to original expectation, 
decreases firm performance of Chinese listed companies. At the same time, 
there is no evidence that the elimination of non-tradable shares affects 
information leakage.  Although these results indicate that the elimination of non-
tradable shares has had unexpected effects on the quality of the corporate 
governance mechanism, this policy of non-tradable shares elimination should 
not be terminated.  
The elimination of non-tradable shares motivates the market mechanism 
to influence listed companies in the Chinese market. External investors had few 
opportunities to enter the process of corporate decision making due to non-
tradable shares. As transactions of non-tradable shares had to be approved by 
the market regulatory agent, large shareholders became entrenched in the 
market as they held the majority of these shares. As a consequence of this, the 
interest of majority (holding) shareholders determined the choice of a corporate 
governance mechanism and firm management. Thus, there were serious 
conflicts of interest between large shareholders and other corporate participants 
in the Chinese listed companies. The elimination of non-tradable shares 
removes the trading restriction; this increases market liquidity, as it increases 
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the supply of shares. This enables more investors to enter the market, which 
will disperse the ownership structure of the Chinese listed companies. This in 
turn will reduce the substantial influence of large shareholders, especially 
majority (holding) shareholders, on listed companies.  
These new investors will require listed companies to reduce the 
information asymmetry between companies and shareholders. The corporate 
transparency of listed companies will give shareholders more opportunity to 
monitor corporate executives and majority shareholders. As a result, there will 
be fewer conflicts of interest between corporate participants. Poorly performing 
executives will be replaced by others to improve firm performance if there is 
less information asymmetry. The activities of corporate insiders will be known to 
the market and this reduces the profitability of market fraud. Thus, the 
elimination of non-tradable shares should not be reversed.  
The unexpected negative effect of the proportion of tradable shares on 
firm performance and information leakage result from the problem of the free-
rider. This problem arises when individual investors lack the ability and desire to 
monitor the quality of the corporate governance mechanism of listed 
companies. Because of this, the Chinese securities market needs more 
institutional investors; they will represent the outside investors in monitoring the 
listed companies. According to the empirical results from Chapter 5, the 
institutional investors positively affect firm performance. Thus, one possible 
solution to the problem of the free-rider is to increase the number of institutional 
investors. The Chinese securities market needs to facilitate that increase, to 
motivate them to reduce the problem of the free-rider. Additionally, the market 
regulatory agency should take responsibility for promoting the development of 
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skilled individual investors. This will motivate the individual investor to think 
more about the listed companies and this in turn will increase the supervisory 
pressure supervision on them. This will also reduce the problem of the free-rider.  
Besides stock segmentation, another problem of the ownership structure 
in Chinese listed companies is state ownership. Although empirical results do 
not support the statement that state ownership will exacerbate information 
leakage in Chinese listed companies, this does not mean that state ownership 
should not be reformed. Although the state shareholders are less likely to 
expropriate the rights of small shareholders, they will decrease the regulatory 
efficiency of the Chinese securities market watchdog. Because of the 
relationship between state shareholders and the market regulatory agency, the 
latter is unable to effectively monitor listed companies, especially state owned 
companies. Although the empirical results of this thesis indicate that state 
ownership has no significant influence on firm performance of the Chinese listed 
companies in general, state ownership still needs to be changed. State 
ownership can result in Chinese listed companies being influenced by non-
commercial factors. For example, state owned listed companies might have to 
undertake some task which is orientated by a political policy, and this could 
decrease the managerial efficiency of the companies. Thus, state ownership 
should be reformed. 
However, the reform of state ownership has to take into account the 
interests of the state. In the foreseeable period the influence of the state cannot 
be reduced, since it wishes to maintain its influence on the Chinese economy; if 
reform damages the interests of the state, reform will be harder to achieve. The 
following proposal might be a solution to this: state ownership should be 
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concentrated in specific industries. Through this concentration, the government 
will keep its substantial influence on economic development, since these key 
industries are essential to the economic development of China. Concentration 
of state ownership will free other Chinese listed companies from influence by 
the government‟s political agenda. The China Securities Regulation 
Commission (CSRC), which is the watchdog of the Chinese securities market, 
will be more able to genuinely monitor companies, in order to increase fairness 
and integrity in the market. The concentration of state ownership will give the 
market mechanism more opportunity to influence Chinese listed companies. 
This will motivate them to comply with the market mechanism, and the 
management of Chinese listed companies will be driven by commercial factors, 
and make more appropriate managerial decisions. 
8.2.2.3. Reform of board of directors and board of 
supervisors 
A good corporate governance mechanism relies on an effective board of 
directors. The empirical results of this thesis indicate that boards of directors fail 
to increase firm performance and corporate transparency of the Chinese listed 
companies. Thus, boards of directors should be reformed further.  
The performance and efficiency of a board of directors rely on the level of 
its independence. Chinese listed companies need more qualified people to work 
as independent directors to improve board performance. As mentioned above 
(Chapter 5 and 7), the inappropriate ownership structure leads to the large 
shareholder having too much influence on the nomination process of 
independent directors, which reduces the quality of those appointed. Thus, an 
increase in board independence of the Chinese listed companies depends on 
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the results of the reform of ownership structure. Secondly, the limitation of 
human resource reduces the effectiveness and performance of independent 
directors in Chinese listed companies. The Chinese securities market needs 
more qualified independent directors to improve the quality of the corporate 
governance mechanism. To close the gap between supply and demand of 
independent directors, market participants need the CSRC to increase the 
quality of the human resource. As a market regulatory agent, the CSRC 
understands what is meant by a qualified independent director, and thus it 
should strengthen the training of independent directors. This will help the 
candidates increase their capacity to work effectively as independent directors 
in listed companies.  
The CSRC should regularly review the independent directors to ensure 
they are maintaining their independence. Additionally, the CSRC should 
establish a database to record the performance of independent directors, and 
disclose this information to the market. This will create pressure on the 
independent directors to maintain their reputations. If independent directors 
cease to act independently, the cost will be loss of reputation and this will affect 
their future careers in the market. Besides the CSRC, companies also should 
take on the responsibility of improving the quality of their independent directors. 
Companies should provide training courses for them which will ensure that 
independent directors can properly carry out their duties. However, the success 
of training independent directors depends on the independence of the 
nomination process. If the candidates are not really independent from the 
corporate insiders, none of these measures mentioned above will improve the 
quality of their work.  
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Secondly, relevant legislation and codes should be reformed to motivate 
independent directors to actively perform their duties. The current corporate 
governance code and laws of the Chinese securities market fail to allocate clear 
responsibilities and obligations for independent directors. Thus, independent 
directors of Chinese listed companies are less likely to monitor their companies. 
Additionally, this phenomenon means that Chinese investors are less inclined to 
trust independent directors to monitor the listed companies and increase 
corporate transparency. Therefore, a clear definition of their role will improve 
the performance of independent directors, and ensure they have more influence 
on listed companies. The code of corporate governance also needs to increase 
the percentage of independent directors on a board of directors. A low 
proportion of independent directors on a board impair their effectiveness. 
Regulation requires that the minimum proportion of the independent directors 
on a board is 1/3. The majority of the Chinese listed companies have complied 
with this minimum requirement. However, a small number of independent 
directors on a board mean they have few opportunities to really influence their 
companies. Thus, it is necessary to increase the independence of the board of 
directors in the Chinese listed companies, thereby motivating them to effectively 
monitor their companies. 
To increase performance and effectiveness of the board of directors, and 
especially the performance and efficiency of independent directors, the board of 
supervisors also needs to be reformed. To some extent, the establishment of a 
board of supervisors generates a conflict of duty between it and the board of 
directors, thereby further reducing the quality of internal governance. Relevant 
legislation and codes make both boards responsible for internal governance to 
protect the rights of shareholders. Thus, the boards of directors and of 
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supervisors become two pillars of the internal governance of Chinese listed 
companies. In the former CSL, the board of supervisors had a purely advisory 
role for the board of directors, whereas the new CSL allocates some actual 
monitoring power to them. The new regulatory power gives the board of 
supervisors more incentive to perform its role; however, it also exacerbates the 
power rivalry between it and the board of directors. If both institutions have the 
same power and duties, it may make the board of directors and the board of 
supervisors fail in their monitoring of their companies. Thus, it is necessary to 
redesign the internal governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies.  To 
some extent, the role of supervisors is similar to that of the independent 
directors, and thus both boards should be combined into one. This will simplify 
the internal governance structure and give it a better chance of being 
successful. Under the new internal governance regime, the executive directors 
have a duty to make managerial decisions for their companies. Independent 
directors have a duty to represent the majority of shareholders in monitoring the 
managerial activities of the Chinese listed companies. 
8.3. Summary of thesis  
The recent series of financial scandals and crises have impaired investor 
confidence, as well as the future development of the financial market. Thus, the 
majority of global financial markets have begun to take a series of actions to 
restore the global financial system and rebuild investor confidence. One of 
these is to improve the quality of the corporate governance mechanism in listed 
companies. Because of the managerial hierarchy of the modern listed company, 
the majority of shareholders do not have opportunities to monitor the 
managerial activities of corporate insiders. Thus, the corporate governance 
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mechanism is employed to align the managerial activities with the interests of 
shareholders. Additionally, the corporate governance mechanism is employed 
to reduce conflicts of interest between large shareholders and small 
shareholders. A decrease in conflicts of interest will reduce self-interested 
activities and agency cost, thereby increasing corporate information 
transparency and firm performance. 
As one of the foremost emerging markets in the world, the corporate 
governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies is not as sophisticated as 
that of companies in the developed markets. Although the Chinese financial 
market has experienced economic reforms for 30 years, the market mechanism 
is still unsophisticated. Investors in the Chinese market complain that their 
investment cannot be effectively protected by the market‟s regulatory system, 
and that the ownership structure of the companies restricts the improvement of 
firm performance. For instance, investors in the Chinese financial market state 
that there are serious insider trading activities in the market, and the market 
regulation system cannot effectively regulate them (Huang, 2007). The 
ownership structure of the Chinese listed companies generates serious conflicts 
of interest among shareholders and therefore reduces firm performance (Li et 
al., 2008).  
Information leakage may cause illegal insider trading activities, since 
anyone using leaked inside information to trade shares in advance of public 
disclosure is breaking the law prohibiting insider trading (Keown and Pinkerton, 
1981). In the Chinese securities market, weak regulation (Chen, 2007) and 
information asymmetry (Wu, 2004) may result in information leakage being 
widespread. The majority of insider trading cases in the Chinese securities 
market are based on information leakage prior to the earnings announcement 
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date (cs.com.cn, 2010). Thus, the information leakage may lead to insider 
trading in Chinese securities market.  A good corporate governance mechanism 
will increase the transparency of a listed company and decrease the information 
asymmetry between companies and shareholders. This may reduce information 
leakage. To improve performance, a company has to reduce the conflicts of 
interest among its participants; with fewer conflicts of interest, there will be a 
lower agency cost in a company. A good corporate governance mechanism will 
reduce the conflict of interest among corporate participants, thereby increasing 
firm performance of the companies (Klapper and Love, 2004). 
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the effects of the current 
corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies on information 
leakage prior to earnings announcements and on firm performance. This is 
done by: 
(i) Evaluation of the effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance in Chinese companies. 
(ii) Empirical analysis of information leakage in the Chinese securities 
market. 
(iii) Empirical assessment of the relationship between corporate 
governance and information leakage in Chinese companies.  
(iv) General assessment of the effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance and information leakage in Chinese companies.  
This thesis empirically evaluates the effect of a corporate governance 
mechanism on firm performance of Chinese listed companies.  It employs 
several proxies to represent ownership structure, board of directors, 
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subcommittees, and board of supervisors. The empirical results of this study are 
consistent with the following theoretical predictions.  
(i) Institutional investors will help increase the influence of the external 
shareholders to put pressure on listed companies to improve firm 
performance of Chinese listed companies.  
(ii) Subcommittees increase the quality of the corporate governance 
mechanism of the listed companies to help them reduce the conflict 
of interest between executives and shareholders, which in turn 
helps companies to improve firm performance. 
In general, state ownership has no significant effect on firm performance 
of the listed companies. On the one hand, state ownership will help the 
companies achieve a good performance. Political influence may help state 
owned companies to perform well in the market. However, on the other hand, 
state ownership will decrease the operational efficiency of listed companies, 
since the managerial decisions of state shareholders are driven by political 
factors. Thus, in general, state ownership does not affect firm performance of 
Chinese listed companies. 
The board of directors and board of supervisors have no significant effect 
on firm performance of the Chinese companies. As mentioned in section 3.3, 
large shareholders, especially the majority (holding) shareholder, have 
substantial influence in Chinese listed companies. They can determine the 
composition of the board of directors and board of supervisors in their own 
interests. In this case, the board of directors and the board of supervisors 
cannot work effectively, and thus they have no significant effect on firm 
performance.  
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The empirical results of event study of this thesis indicate that there is 
significant information leakage in the Chinese securities market. This may 
therefore suggest illegal insider trading activities in the Chinese securities 
market.  
The empirical results indicate that the proportion of non-tradable shares 
does not affect information leakage. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
the increase in proportion of tradable shares will decrease the information 
leakage.  
After market reform, trading restrictions on the majority of shares in 
Chinese listed companies have been removed. This is attracting more investors 
to enter the Chinese securities market, and it is facilitating the decrease in 
ownership concentration of the companies. Under this circumstance, the market 
mechanism may have an opportunity to affect Chinese listed companies, 
motivating them to increase the quality of their corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, the elimination of non-tradable shares will lead to the 
problem of the free-rider in Chinese market. The majority of Chinese investors 
are small shareholders, and they lack the ability and desire to monitor the listed 
companies. Under this circumstance, executives and large shareholders will 
have more opportunities to expropriate the interest of small shareholders. As a 
consequence, this study finds that the elimination of tradable shares do not 
affect information leakage in Chinese stock market in general. 
The board of directors and the board of supervisors have no significant 
effect on firm performance and the phenomenon of information leakage. 
Although market reform begins to disperse the inappropriate ownership 
concentration of Chinese listed companies, large shareholders, especially the 
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majority (holding) shareholder, still have a substantial influence on them. Thus, 
these shareholders still have opportunities to influence the choice of a corporate 
governance mechanism, such as the composition of the board of directors and 
the board of supervisors (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; Zhou, 2009; Kang et 
al., 2008). Under this circumstance, these boards lack actual managerial 
discretion, thereby having no significant influence on firm management, and so 
the board of directors cannot reduce the phenomenon of information leakage. 
According to the empirical results of Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, the key 
factor of the corporate governance mechanism in Chinese listed companies is 
the ownership structure. If there is no appropriate ownership structure, the 
corporate governance mechanism cannot effectively increase corporate 
transparency and firm performance. Additionally, the reform of ownership 
structure will provide other components of the corporate governance 
mechanism with opportunities to influence corporate transparency and firm 
performance. Thus, the increase in quality of corporate governance depends on 
the reform of the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies.       
Taking into account the empirical results from previous chapters, this study 
provides the following recommendations for the Chinese securities market: 
 The current policy of the reduction of non-tradable shares should be 
continued. Although the higher proportion of tradable shares may 
decrease the quality of corporate governance mechanism of the 
Chinese listed companies, the reduction of non-tradable shares 
persuades Chinese listed companies to consider the quality of 
corporate governance and investor protection.   
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 The legislation and the regulatory agent of the Chinese market 
should adopt the principle of equal access to expand the definition 
of insider and increase the deterrence value of insider trading 
regulation. 
 The code of corporate governance of the Chinese market should 
motivate independent directors to become involved in corporate 
decision making. The code along with other laws should increase 
board independence of Chinese listed companies and increase the 
influence of independent directors on corporate governance. 
Additionally, the Chinese market should motivate institutional 
investors to actively monitor the listed companies. 
 The regulatory authority of the Chinese market should be given 
more power in order to undertake the duty of developing the quality 
of Chinese investors.  
8.4. Contributions 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways: 
 This study analyses the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance in Chinese 
companies. Through the use of recent market data, this thesis 
shows that the optimal ownership structure will have positive 
effects on firm performance in Chinese companies. The recent 
reforms have positive effects on firm performance in Chinese 
companies.  
 This study empirically evaluates information leakage in the 
Chinese market. This provides evidence that the Chinese 
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security market needs more reform to increase corporate 
transparency, to reduce information leakage and to protect the 
interests of investors. 
 The thesis analyses the effect of the corporate governance 
mechanism on information leakage in the Chinese securities 
market. This thesis finds that Chinese companies need to 
increase the quality of corporate governance to reduce 
information leakage and thereby protecting the interest of 
Chinese investors. 
 This thesis empirically evaluates the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance and information leakage in the 
Chinese market. This thesis then provides recommendations to 
help Chinese companies to increase firm performance and 
decrease information leakage.   
8.5. Limitations and future research 
In this thesis, information leakage is measured by the price changes prior 
to announcement day, price-run up index, and trading volume. Results indicate 
that there are significant changes in stock price prior to an announcement day 
in the Chinese market. This may suggest that information leakage in the 
Chinese securities market is widespread. However, information leakage is a 
complex phenomenon in the stock market, and the proxies used in this thesis 
may not measure the information leakage as accurately as they should.  
Therefore, future research should focus on finding alternative proxies. 
Empirical findings of this thesis indicate that the state still has significant 
influence on Chinese companies even after the reforms. This influence may 
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affect choice of corporate governance (e.g. nomination of board of directors and 
board of supervisors) in Chinese companies. The government will appoint 
members of government or China Communist Party (CCP) to sit on companies‟ 
board. In this case, members of the two boards in Chinese companies, 
especially in state owned companies, may not really work for the majority of 
shareholders. Because of the time limitation, this thesis did not explore the 
political background of the members of the two boards. Thus, one of the future 
research directions could be to find out the political ties of the board members 
to ascertain who are really independent from the government, and examine 
whether these members help companies improve their performance and reduce 
information leakage. Uncovering the effects of political ties in the effectiveness 
of corporate governance will inform the market regulator and the policy makers 
of a way forward in future governance reforms.  
Empirical findings in Chapter 6 of this thesis indicate that there is 
significant information leakage prior to corporate announcements in the Chinese 
securities market.  However, results reported in Chapter 7 suggest that the 
majority of corporate governance mechanisms employed by Chinese 
companies do not diminish information leakage. Thus, it is worthwhile to 
introduce new variables into this relationship to gain new insights. The special 
cultural background of Chinese market may cause the failure of corporate 
governance in Chinese companies. For instance, the guanxi network among 
Chinese society may hinder the effectiveness of corporate governance on 
information leakage. In this case, the incorporation of cultural aspects into the 
examination of the relationship between corporate governance and information 
leakage might be a fruitful research area to pursue.  
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Empirical findings in Chapter 5 of this thesis show that institutional 
investors have a positive effect on the performance in non-financial companies 
in China. However, financial companies are not included in the data sample of 
this thesis. The financial industry is a risk sensitive industry. Financial 
companies may need a more complex governance mechanism to avoid the 
potential risk. In this case, it is worthwhile assessing the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance in Chinese financial companies. 
Therefore, a recommended research topic for future study is the effect of 
institutional ownership on firm performance in Chinese financial companies.  
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Appendix 1 corporate governance and firm performance (ROE) 
in Chinese listed companies 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C   
                      
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: ROE 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  0.062 0.061 0.064 0.079 0.079 0.082 
  (3.928)*** (3.882)*** (4.068)*** (5.075)*** (5.040)*** (5.236)*** 
Leverage (debt to 
equity) 
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 
  (4.887)*** (4.885)*** (4.870)*** (4.684)*** (4.680)*** (4.669)*** 
Ownership 
concentration 
0.511 0.506 0.522 
  
  
  (4.225)*** (4.180)*** (4.320)*** 
  
  
State ownership  
   
-0.008 -0.012 -0.001 
  
   
(-0.111) (-0.165) (-0.0.007) 
institutional ownership 0.220 0.220 0.221 0.221 0.220 0.222 
  (21.276)*** (21.241)*** (21.392)*** (21.155)*** (21.121)*** (21.302)*** 
tradable shares -0.457 -0.463 -0.445 -0.596 -0.603 -0.603 
  (-7.739)*** (-7.855)*** (-7.571)*** (-11.230)*** (-11.347)*** (-11.049)*** 
Size of BOD -0.066 -0.065 -0.066 -0.105 -0.103 -0.107 
  (-0.826) (-0.814) (-0.827) (-1.312) (-1.292) (-1.330) 
Independence of BOD -0.316 -0.325 -0.291 -0.341 -0.350 -0.314 
  (-0.944) (-0.973) (-0.870) (-1.016) (-1.044) (-0.936) 
Leadership of BOD -0.076 -0.077 -0.077 -0.066 -0.067 -0.068 
  (-1.457) (-1.465) (-1.471) (-1.256) (-1.266) (-1.277) 
Audit committee 0.028 
  
0.037 
 
  
  (0.810) 
  
(1.076) 
 
  
Compensation 
committee  
0.061 
  
0.069   
  
 
(1.810)* 
  
(2.042)**   
Nomination committee 
  
-0.034 
  
0.029 
  
  
(-1.044) 
  
(-0.878) 
Size of BOS 0.070 0.069 0.071 0.073 0.072 0.073 
  (1.401) (1.385) (1.406) (1.436) (1.425) (1.424) 
Market reform -0.128 -0.116 -0.149 -0.129 -0.118 -0.153 
  (-3.377)*** (-3.103)*** (-4.093)*** (-3.398)*** (-3.144)*** (-4.180)*** 
C -3.219 -3.231 -3.215 -3.296 -3.311 -3.286 
  (-10.884)*** (-10.925)*** (-10.871)*** (-10.904)*** (-10.955)*** (-10.872)*** 
R² 0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  
Adj.  R² 0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 2 corporate governance and firm performance (ROA) 
in Chinese listed companies 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C                        
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: ROA 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.114 -0.113 -0.110 -0.098 -0.097 -0.094 
  (-7.005)*** (-6.973)*** (-6.792)*** (-6.063)*** (-6.024)*** (-5.836)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
  (-4.250)*** (-4.255)*** (-4.251)*** (-4.315)*** (-4.320)*** (-4.312)*** 
Ownership concentration 0.748 0.750 0.769 
  
  
  (5.817)*** (5.836)*** (5.989)*** 
  
  
State ownership    
  
0.202 0.204 0.219 
    
  
(2.552)*** (2.572)*** (2.759)*** 
institutional ownership 0.244 0.245 0.246 0.248 0.248 0.250 
  (22.212)*** (22.233)*** (22.406)*** (22.367)*** (22.394)*** (22.596)*** 
tradable shares -0.507 -0.507 -0.487 -0.655 -0.655 -0.635 
  (-8.112)*** (-8.115)*** (-7.803)*** (-11.626)*** (-11.628)*** (-11.307)*** 
Size of BOD -0.045 -0.044 -0.0452 -0.1104 -0.109 -0.113 
  (-0.531) (-0.514) (-0.529) (-1.298) (-1.282) (-1.323) 
Independence of BOD -0.096 -0.092 -0.053 -0.083 -0.078 -0.036 
  (-0.271) (-0.259) (-0.149) (-0.233) (-0.219) (-0.102) 
Leadership of BOD -0.069 -0.071 -0.071 -0.066 -0.067 -0.068 
  (-1.240) (-1.265) (-1.275) (-1.168) (-1.195) (-1.213) 
Audit committee 0.088 
  
0.095 
 
  
  (2.396)** 
  
(2.556)*** 
 
  
Compensation 
committee 
  0.088 
  
0.093   
    (2.431)** 
  
(2.568)***   
Nomination committee   
 
-0.021 
  
-0.017 
    
 
(-0.597) 
  
(-0.492) 
Size of BOS 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.0496 0.048 0.048 
  (1.246) (1.227) (1.255) (0.904) (0.882) (0.884) 
Market reform -0.075 -0.077 -0.117 -0.077 -0.080 -0.121 
  (-1.848)* (-1.937)* (-3.012)*** (-1.897)* (-2.000)** (-3.103)*** 
C -1.630 -1.6427 -1.617 -1.575 -1.588 -1.552 
  (-5.279)*** (-5.320)*** (-5.235)*** (-4.986)*** (-5.024)*** (-4.911)*** 
R² 0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  
Adj.  R² 0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 3 corporate governance and firm performance 
(Tobin's Q) in Chinese listed companies 
  
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1ROE+ β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C                        
                                                                                                                                
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
  
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
  
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
  
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
  
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
  
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  ROE is the return on equity. LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional 
ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log 
(proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the 
dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of 
board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log 
(number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM 
is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0. 
Dependent variable: Tobin‟s Q 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
ROE 0.108 0.110 0.112 0.115 0.117 0.119 
  (1.826)* (1.838)* (1.856)* (1.874)* (1.890)* (1.916)* 
Firm size  -0.2414 -0.240 -0.239 -0.236 -0.234 -0.233 
  (-27.238)*** (-26.969)*** (-26.692)*** (-29.741)*** (-29.415)*** (-29.031)*** 
Ownership concentration 0.268 0.286 0.311 
  
  
  (2.077)** (2.208)** (2.405)** 
  
  
State ownership  
   
0.081 0.087 0.095 
  
   
(2.048)** (2.175)** (2.365)** 
institutional ownership 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.089 0.090 
  (17.167)*** (17.191)*** (17.255)*** (17.180)*** (17.208)*** (17.289)*** 
tradable shares -0.294 -0.285 -0.271 -0.345 -0.339 -0.329 
  (-6.387) (-6.152)*** (-5.859)*** (-11.683)*** (-11.388)*** (-11.021)*** 
Size of BOD 0.057 0.059 0.060 0.034 0.034 0.033 
  (1.407) (1.436) (1.459) (0.858) (0.850) (0.820) 
Independence of BOD 0.135 0.146 0.159 0.137 0.148 0.162 
  (0.829) (0.890) (0.966) (0.829) (0.890) (0.967) 
Leadership of BOD 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.017 
  (0.409) (0.369) (0.370) (0.521) (0.488) (0.500) 
Audit committee 0.087 
  
0.089 
 
  
  (4.945)*** 
  
(5.009) 
 
  
Compensation committee 
 
0.060 
  
0.0618   
  
 
(3.429)*** 
  
(3.471)***   
Nomination committee 
  
0.021602 
  
0.022 
  
  
(1.255) 
  
(1.238) 
Size of BOS 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.027 0.026 0.025 
  (1.346) (1.303) (1.311) (0.972) (0.908) (0.886) 
Market reform -0.368 -0.381 -0.397 -0.369 -0.382 -0.399 
  (-18.504)*** (-19.287)*** (-20.467)*** (-18.348) (-19.135)*** (-20.357)*** 
C 3.900 3.898 3.911 3.928 3.928 3.944 
  (27.013)*** (26.854)*** (26.797)*** -26.392 (26.218)*** (26.145)*** 
R² 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 
Adj.  R² 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 4 corporate governance and firm performance (ROE) 
in state owned listed companies 
 
 
  
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C   
                      
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: ROE 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  0.072 0.072 0.073 0.079 0.078 0.080 
  (4.097)*** (4.065)*** (4.180)*** (4.543)*** (4.509)*** (4.618)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.317) (0.320) (0.303) (0.241) (0.245) (0.227) 
Ownership concentration 0.735 0.733 0.738 
   
  (5.266)*** (5.252)*** (5.288)*** 
   
State ownership  
   
0.850 0.844 0.859 
  
   
(5.404)*** (5.373)*** (5.469)*** 
institutional ownership 0.232 0.231 0.232 0.235 0.235 0.235 
  (20.058)*** (20.044)*** (20.089)*** (20.391)*** (20.375)*** (20.424)*** 
tradable shares -0.322 -0.325 -0.316 -0.249 -0.254 -0.241 
  (-4.821)*** (-4.875)*** (-4.744)*** (-3.335)*** (-3.398)*** (-3.230)*** 
Size of BOD -0.110 -0.109 -0.111 -0.137 -0.136 -0.138 
  (-1.217) (-1.206) (-1.229) (-1.525) (-1.515) (-1.534) 
Independence of BOD -1.062 -1.069 -1.044 -1.060 -1.067 -1.039 
  (-2.789)*** (-2.808)*** (-2.739)*** (-2.784)*** (-2.803)*** (-2.729)*** 
Leadership of BOD -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.040 -0.040 -0.041 
  (-0.512) (-0.506) (-0.523) (-0.614) (-0.607) (-0.630) 
Audit committee 0.001 
  
-0.006 
  
  (0.021) 
  
(-0.164) 
  
Compensation committee 
 
0.020 
  
0.012 
 
  
 
(0.518) 
  
(0.324) 
 
Nomination committee 
  
-0.033 
  
-0.042 
  
  
(-0.894) 
  
(-1.138) 
Size of BOS 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.076 0.076 0.076 
  (1.859)* (1.852)* (1.863)* (1.407) (1.404) (1.408) 
Market reform -0.092 -0.085 -0.100 -0.079 -0.072 -0.087 
  (-2.190)** (-2.047)** (-2.492)** (-1.877)* (-1.730)* (-2.147)** 
C -3.057 -3.060 -3.057 -3.075 -3.076 -3.074 
  (-9.317)*** (-9.325)*** (-9.317)*** (-9.374)*** (-9.377)*** (-9.374)*** 
R² 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Adj.  R² 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 5 corporate governance and firm performance (ROA) 
in state owned listed companies 
  
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C   
 
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: ROA 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.069 -0.068 -0.066 -0.056 -0.056 -0.054 
  (-3.613)*** (-3.595)*** (-3.510)*** (-3.015)*** (-2.999)*** (-2.924)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 
  (-5.949)*** (-5.952)*** (-5.971)*** (-6.080)*** (-6.082)*** (-6.104)*** 
Ownership concentration 1.147 1.149 1.153 
   
  (7.553)*** (7.569)*** (7.599)*** 
   
State ownership  
   
1.197 1.200 1.214 
  
   
(6.991)*** (7.012)*** (7.100)*** 
institutional ownership 0.252 0.252 0.253 0.258 0.258 0.258 
  (20.099)*** (20.109)*** (20.153)*** (20.507)*** (20.520)*** (20.566)*** 
tradable shares -0.342 -0.341 -0.332 -0.270 -0.268 -0.256 
  (-4.718)*** (-4.7015)*** (-4.586)*** (-3.330)*** (-3.307)*** (-3.156)*** 
Size of BOD -0.062 -0.062 -0.064 -0.109 -0.109 -0.110 
  (-0.632) (-0.632) (-0.649) (-1.114) (-1.116) (-1.129) 
Independence of BOD -0.799 -0.796 -0.769 -0.794 -0.791 -0.761 
  (-1.931)* (-1.924)* (-1.857)* (-1.916)* (-1.908)* (-1.835)* 
Leadership of BOD -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 
  (-0.158) (-0.161) (-0.177) (-0.260) (-0.263) (-0.285) 
Audit committee 0.021 
  
0.012 
  
  (0.491) 
  
(0.286) 
  
Compensation committee 
 
0.014 
  
0.004 
 
  
 
(0.330) 
  
(0.096) 
 
Nomination committee 
  
-0.040 
  
-0.052 
  
  
(-0.993) 
  
(-1.290) 
Size of BOS 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.072 0.071782 0.072 
  (1.837)* (1.835)* (1.8413)* (1.214) (1.213) (1.214) 
Market reform -0.056 -0.059 -0.074 -0.037 -0.041 -0.055 
  (-1.227) (-1.304) (-1.688)* (-0.820) (-0.897) (-1.251) 
C -2.125 -2.128 -2.125 -2.146 -2.148 -2.146 
  (-5.978)*** (-5.987)*** (-5.981)*** (-6.030)*** (-6.034)*** (-6.032)*** 
R² 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Adj.  R² 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 6 corporate governance and firm performance 
(Tobin's Q) in state owned listed companies 
 
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1ROE+ β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER + 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C         
                
 M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER+ 
β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5:FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1 ROE + β2 LNBV + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  ROE is the return on equity. LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional 
ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log 
(proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the 
dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of 
board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log 
(number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM 
is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0. 
Dependent variable: Tobin‟s Q 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
ROE 0.192 0.195 0.198 0.197 0.199 0.203 
  (2.507)*** (2.525)*** (2.561)*** (2.575)*** (2.597)*** (2.638)*** 
Firm size  -0.222 -0.220 -0.218 -0.222 -0.219 -0.217 
  (-27.115)*** (-26.932)*** (-26.663)*** (-27.168)*** (-26.990)*** (-26.734)*** 
Ownership concentration 0.096 0.104 0.112 
  
  
  (1.523) (1.643) (1.764)* 
  
  
State ownership    
  
0.126 0.136 0.152 
    
  
(1.801)* (1.941)** (2.154)** 
institutional ownership 0.093 0.093 0.094 0.093 0.093 0.094 
  (16.996)*** (17.029)*** (17.119)*** (17.018)*** (17.057)*** (17.154)*** 
tradable shares -0.336 -0.329 -0.320 -0.321 -0.314 -0.301 
  (-11.042)*** (-10.790)*** (-10.446)*** (-9.466)*** (-9.199)*** (-8.810)*** 
Size of BOD 0.058 0.057 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.051 
  (1.435) (1.409) (1.356) (1.354) (1.321) (1.266) 
Independence of BOD -0.166 -0.159 -0.143 -0.166 -0.159 -0.142 
  (-0.986) (-0.941) (-0.840) (-0.984) (-0.939) (-0.837) 
Leadership of BOD -0.045 -0.046 -0.047 -0.046 -0.048 -0.049 
  (-1.574) (-1.606) (-1.637)* (-1.618) (-1.654) (-1.693)* 
Audit committee 0.107 
  
0.106 
 
  
  (5.943) 
  
(5.873) 
 
  
Compensation committee   0.080 
  
0.078   
    (4.582)*** 
  
(4.494)***   
Nomination committee   
 
0.035 
  
0.033 
    
 
(2.065)** 
  
(1.972)** 
Size of BOS 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.036 
  (1.618) (1.573) (1.605) (1.484) (1.429) (1.448) 
Market reform -0.355 -0.368 -0.388 -0.353 -0.365 -0.385 
  (-18.321)*** (-19.228)*** (-20.988)*** (-18.185)*** (-19.066)*** (-20.769)*** 
C 3.821 3.810 3.821 3.823 3.812 3.823 
  (25.644)*** (25.502)*** (25.464)*** (25.629)*** (25.486)*** (25.446)*** 
R² 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 
Adj.  R² 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 7 corporate governance and firm performance (ROE) 
in private listed companies 
  
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
                                                                                                                                
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
  
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C 
  
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Dependent variable: ROE 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  0.100 0.099 0.100 
  (2.903)*** (2.891)*** (2.926)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) 0.086 0.086 0.086 
  (8.080)*** (8.077)*** (8.097)*** 
Ownership concentration 0.382 0.353 0.413 
  -1.44 (1.329) (1.556) 
State ownership  0.161 0.132 0.184 
  (0.474) (0.390) (0.544) 
institutional ownership 0.182 0.180 0.186 
  (8.170)*** (8.110)*** (8.387)*** 
tradable shares -0.673 -0.693 -0.647 
  (-5.501)*** (-5.663)*** (-5.308)*** 
Size of BOD 0.173 0.172 0.180 
  (1.034) (1.027) (1.070) 
Independence of BOD 1.288 1.285 1.322 
  (1.935)* (1.934)* (1.985)** 
Leadership of BOD 
-0.117 -0.123 -0.119 
  (-1.291) (-1.354) (-1.315) 
Audit committee 0.109 
  
  (1.492) 
  
Compensation committee 
 
0.184 
 
  
 
(2.587)*** 
 
Nomination committee 
  
-0.027 
  
  
(-0.389) 
Size of BOS 0.185 0.185 0.179 
  (1.507) (1.516) (1.459) 
Market reform -0.211 -0.186 -0.268 
  (-2.588)*** (-2.318)*** (-3.456)*** 
C -5.236 -5.277 -5.160 
  (-7.572)*** (-7.648)*** (-7.468)*** 
R² 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Adj.  R² 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 8 corporate governance and firm performance (ROA) 
in private listed companies 
  
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
                                                                                                                                
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
  
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C 
  
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Dependent variable: ROA 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  -0.186 -0.186 -0.186 
  (-5.749)*** (-5.767)*** (-5.749)*** 
Leverage (debt to equity) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (-1.015) (-1.026) (-0.960) 
Ownership concentration 0.027 0.000 0.071 
  (0.099) (0.001) (0.261) 
State ownership  0.235 0.210 0.278 
  (0.677) (0.606) (0.798) 
institutional ownership 0.212 0.212 0.219 
  (9.415)*** (9.429)*** (9.717)*** 
tradable shares -0.726 -0.738 -0.681 
  (-5.834)*** (-5.932)*** (-5.477)*** 
Size of BOD 0.017 0.020 0.027 
  (0.103) (0.120) (0.160) 
Independence of BOD 0.948 0.961 1.022 
  (1.410) (1.431) (1.513) 
Leadership of BOD -0.148 -0.157 -0.155 
  (-1.596) (-1.691) (-1.666) 
Audit committee 0.234 
  
  (3.141)*** 
  
Compensation committee 
 
0.268 
 
  
 
(3.698)*** 
 
Nomination committee 
  
0.030 
  
  
(0.424) 
Size of BOS 0.055 0.052 0.046 
  (0.438) (0.413) (0.362) 
Market reform -0.103 -0.099 -0.201 
  (-1.236) (-1.213) (-2.535)** 
C -1.093 -1.111 -0.936 
  (-1.640) (-1.671) (-1.402) 
R² 0.11 0.11 0.10 
Adj.  R² 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 9 corporate governance and firm performance 
(Tobin's Q) in private listed companies 
  
M1: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 ROE + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C               
                                                                                                                 
M2: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 ROEO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: FIRM PERFORMANCE = α + β1LNBV + β2 ROE + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  ROE is return on equity. LNTINTPER is log (proportion of institutional 
ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest shareholder. LNTPER is log 
(proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUNC is the 
dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log (number of members of 
board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log 
(number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent directors of board. DUREFORM 
is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: Tobin‟s Q 
  M1 M2 M3 
ROE -0.010 -0.010 -0.0010 
  (-0.241) (-0.234) (-0.229) 
Firm size  -0.278 -0.278 -0.278 
  (-20.752)*** (-20.729)*** (-20.671)*** 
Ownership concentration -0.253 -0.251 -0.239 
  (-2.351)** (-2.329)** (-2.221)** 
State ownership  -0.246 -0.247 -0.229 
  (-1.824)* (-1.825) (-1.697)* 
institutional ownership 0.066 0.067 0.068 
  (7.360)*** (7.453)*** (7.599)*** 
tradable shares -0.415 -0.409 -0.397 
  (-7.833)*** (-7.705)*** (-7.598)*** 
Size of BOD -0.042 -0.040 -0.039 
  (-0.648) (-0.612) (-0.595) 
Independence of BOD 0.481 0.493 0.497 
  (1.837)* (1.882)* (1.895)* 
Leadership of BOD -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 
  (-0.136) (-0.189) (-0.178) 
Audit committee 0.099 
 
  
  (3.058)*** 
 
  
Compensation committee   0.075   
    (2.352)**   
Nomination committee   
 
0.050 
    
 
(1.597) 
Size of BOS 0.052 0.049 0.048 
  (0.903) (0.856) (0.827) 
Market reform -0.415 -0.428 -0.444 
  (-12.331)*** (-12.859)*** (-13.544)*** 
C 4.563 4.581 4.610 
  (16.894)*** (16.945)*** (17.073)*** 
R² 0.37 0.37 0.36 
Adj.  R² 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 10 corporate governance and information leakage – 
CARs (M) in Chinese listed companies 
  
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C   
                      
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: CARs(M) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.087 -0.089 -0.091 -0.084 -0.087 -0.089 
  (-3.635)*** (-3.721)*** (-3.812)*** (-3.596)*** (-3.686)*** (-3.789)*** 
Ownership 
concentration 
-0.227 -0.242 -0.260 
  
  
  (-1.202) (-1.279) (-1.375)*** 
  
  
State ownership    
  
-0.209 -0.219 -0.226 
    
  
(-1.819)* (-1.899)* (-1.959)* 
institutional ownership -0.017 -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.023 -0.026 
  (-1.075) (-1.178) (-1.378) (-1.292) (-1.404) (-1.611) 
tradable shares -0.125 -0.141 -0.153 -0.120 -0.135 -0.143 
  (-1.364) (-1.541) (-1.673)* (-1.463) (-1.641)* (-1.751)* 
Size of BOD 0.162 0.156 0.167 0.191 0.187 0.200 
  (1.285) (1.238) (1.323) (1.533) (1.500) (1.599) 
Independence of BOD -0.263 -0.286 -0.270 -0.289 -0.313 -0.298 
  (-0.509) (-0.551) (-0.520) (-0.559) (-0.603) (-0.573) 
Leadership of BOD 0.014 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.027 0.025 
  (0.181) (0.284) (0.255) (0.234) (0.337) (0.308) 
Audit committee -0.248 
  
-0.245 
 
  
  (-4.849)*** 
  
(-4.809)*** 
 
  
Compensation 
committee 
  -0.186 
  
-0.184   
    (-3.686)*** 
  
(-3.649)***   
Nomination committee   
 
-0.167 
  
-0.165 
    
 
(-3.324)*** 
  
(-3.279)*** 
Size of BOS 0.034 0.032 0.030 0.056 0.055 0.053 
  (0.431) (0.403) (0.375) (0.700) (0.684) (0.665) 
Market reform -0.957 -0.932 -0.909 -0.958 -0.933 -0.910 
  (-16.363)*** (-16.009)*** (-15.938)*** (-16.392)*** (-16.040)*** (-15.971)*** 
C -1.098 -1.097 -1.145 -1.245 -1.250 -1.301 
  (-2.421)** (-2.412)** (-2.519)** (-2.690)** (-2.695)** (-2.807)** 
R² 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Adj.  R² 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 11 corporate governance and information leakage – 
CARs (C) in Chinese listed companies 
  
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C   
                      
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: CARs(C) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.144) (-0.337) (-0.646) (-0.114) (-0.315) (-0.622) 
Ownership concentration 0.015 0.011 0.002 
  
  
  (0.507) (0.382) (0.070) 
  
  
State ownership    
  
0.008 0.006 -0.001 
    
  
(0.460) (0.338) (-0.046) 
institutional ownership -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
  (-1.487) (-1.591) (-1.932)** (-1.426) (-1.544) (-1.927)** 
tradable shares 0.032 0.029 0.020 0.030 0.028 0.019 
  (2.191)** (2.001)** (1.364) (2.303) (2.123)** (1.461) 
Size of BOD 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.137) (0.116) (0.122) (0.062) (0.059) (0.116) 
Independence of BOD 0.029 0.024 0.009 0.030 0.025 0.009 
  (0.363) (0.299) (0.112) (0.375) (0.308) (0.109) 
Leadership of BOD -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
  (-0.963) (-0.876) (-0.828) (-0.969) (-0.879) (-0.819) 
Audit committee -0.061 
  
-0.061 
 
  
  (-7.158)*** 
  
(-7.154)*** 
 
  
Compensation committee   -0.049 
  
-0.049   
    (-5.837)*** 
  
(-5.833)***   
Nomination committee   
 
-0.007 
  
-0.007 
    
 
(-0.881) 
  
(-0.876) 
Size of BOS 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  (0.515) (0.550) (0.469) (0.442) (0.495) (0.471) 
Market reform -0.086 -0.080 -0.063 -0.086 -0.080 -0.063 
  (-9.249)*** (-8.657)*** (-7.068)*** (-9.259)*** (-8.666)*** (-7.075) 
C 0.1029 0.106 0.093 0.107443 0.109 0.092 
  (1.450) (1.484) (1.301) (1.485) (1.501) (1.261) 
R² 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Adj.  R² 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 12 corporate governance and information leakage - 
CARs (M) in state owned listed companies 
  
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C   
 
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: CARs(M) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 
  (-0.432) (-0.563) (-0.706) (-0.667) (-0.804) (-0.944) 
Ownership concentration -0.130 -0.134 -0.138 
   
  (-1.901)* (-1.961)*** (-2.011)** 
   
State ownership  
   
-0.096 -0.101 -0.109 
  
   
(-1.249) (-1.319) (-1.420) 
institutional ownership -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  (-0.444) (-0.477) (-0.548) (-0.542) (-0.580) (-0.654) 
tradable shares -0.010 -0.013 -0.018 -0.005 -0.009 -0.015 
  (-0.309) (-0.403) (-0.550) (-0.136) (-0.238) (-0.413) 
Size of BOD -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 -0.023 -0.022 -0.021 
  (-0.670) (-0.663) (-0.644) (-0.507) (-0.497) (-0.477) 
Independence of BOD -0.112 -0.115 -0.125 -0.111 -0.115 -0.125 
  (-0.602) (-0.622) (-0.672) (-0.601) (-0.622) (-0.674) 
Leadership of BOD -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.023 -0.022 -0.021 
  (-0.698) (-0.679) (-0.664) (-0.713) (-0.692) (-0.672) 
Audit committee -0.050 
  
-0.049 
  
  (-2.599)** 
  
(-2.579)** 
  
Compensation committee 
 
-0.036 
  
-0.035 
 
  
 
(-1.928)** 
  
(-1.887)* 
 
Nomination committee 
  
-0.012 
  
-0.011 
  
  
(-0.667) 
  
(-0.604) 
Size of BOS 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.013 
  (0.357) (0.369) (0.355) (0.490) (0.506) (0.497) 
Market reform -0.118 -0.112 -0.102 -0.120 -0.113 -0.103 
  (-5.711)*** (-5.468)*** (-5.133)*** (-5.766)*** (-5.520)*** (-5.190)*** 
C 0.308 0.314 0.310 0.307 0.313 0.310 
  (1.932)** (1.968)** (1.945)** (1.927)** (1.962)** (1.939)** 
R² 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Adj.  R² 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 13 corporate governance and information leakage - 
CARs (C) in state owned listed companies 
  
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C   
 
 M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C  
 
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M4: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUAC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M5: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUCC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
M6: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2DERATIO + β3SPER +β4LNTINTPER +β5LNTPER + β6INDPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8ROLESE P+ β9DUNC +β10LNSSIZE + β11DUREFORM + C 
 
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.   
Dependent variable: CARs(C) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Firm size  0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.538) (0.275) (-0.150) (0.581) (0.303) (-0.110) 
Ownership concentration 0.009 0.004 -0.002 
  
  
  (0.250) (0.120) (-0.042) 
  
  
State ownership    
  
0.006 0.001 -0.013 
    
  
(0.148) (0.025) (-0.316) 
institutional ownership -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
  (-1.975)** (-2.026)** (-2.237)** (-1.963)** (-2.022)** (-2.247) 
tradable shares 0.031 0.028 0.019 0.031 0.027 0.016 
  (1.782) (1.616) (1.102) (1.573) (1.408) (0.799) 
Size of BOD -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 
  (-0.691) (-0.680) (-0.608) (-0.719) (-0.699) (-0.626) 
Independence of BOD 0.061 0.059 0.040 0.061 0.059 0.040 
  (0.625) (0.600) (0.404) (0.625) (0.600) (0.404) 
Leadership of BOD -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
  (-0.502) (-0.464) (-0.393) (-0.498) (-0.459) (-0.372) 
Audit committee -0.066 
  
-0.066 
 
  
  (-6.659) 
  
(-6.645)*** 
 
  
Compensation committee   -0.055 
  
-0.055   
    (-5.627)*** 
  
(-5.614)***   
Nomination committee   
 
-0.010 
  
-0.010 
    
 
(-1.008) 
  
(-0.991) 
Size of BOS 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (0.924) (0.951) (0.887) (0.908) (0.945) (0.898) 
Market reform -0.076 -0.070 -0.053 -0.076 -0.070 -0.053 
  (-7.023)*** (-6.551)*** (-5.043)*** (-7.004)*** (-6.538)*** (-5.052)*** 
C 0.070 0.079 0.071 0.069 0.079 0.071 
  (0.820) (0.926) (0.831) (0.818) (0.925) (0.829) 
R² 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Adj.  R² 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 14 corporate governance and information leakage - 
CARs (M) in private listed companies 
  
M1: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
                                                                                                                                
M2: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C  
  
M3: INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER 
+β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + C 
  
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Dependent variable: CARs(M) 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  0.011 0.011 0.011 
  (1.510) (1.543) (1.545) 
Ownership concentration -0.058 -0.058 -0.068 
  (-0.920) (-0.920) (-1.072) 
State ownership  -0.043 -0.043 -0.054 
  (-0.542) (-0.540) (-0.688) 
institutional ownership 0.012 0.011 0.011 
  (2.344)** (2.241)** (2.084)** 
tradable shares -0.057 -0.061 -0.069 
  (-2.000)** (-2.104)** (-2.411)** 
Size of BOD -0.052 -0.054 -0.054 
  (-1.366) (-1.408) (-1.416) 
Independence of BOD -0.177 -0.186 -0.192 
  (-1.165) (-1.221) (-1.263) 
Leadership of BOD -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 
  (-0.671) (-0.569) (-0.568) 
Audit committee -0.067 
 
  
  (-3.910)*** 
 
  
Compensation committee   -0.052   
    (-3.094)***   
Nomination committee   
 
-0.033 
    
 
(-2.049)** 
Size of BOS 0.033 0.034 0.035 
  (1.157) (1.202) (1.229) 
Market reform -0.148 -0.140 -0.128 
  (-7.780)*** (-7.432)*** (-7.059)*** 
C 0.118 0.104 0.083 
  (0.794) (0.701) (0.554) 
R² 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Adj.  R² 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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Appendix 15 corporate governance and information leakage - 
CARs (C) in private listed companies 
  
M1: PREANNOUNCEMETN INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  
β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER +β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUAC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + 
C  
                                                                                                                                
M2: PREANNOUNCEMETN INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  
β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER +β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUCC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + 
C  
  
M3: PREANNOUNCEMETN INFORMATION LEAKAGE = α + β1LNBV + β2 DERATIO + β3 1STPER +β4SPER +  
β5LNTINTPER + β6 LNTPER +β7LNBSIZE +β8 INDPER + β9 ROLESE P +β10DUNC + β11LNSSIZE + β12DUREFORM + 
C 
  
Where LNBV is log (total asset of company).  DERATIO is the proxy of leverage (D/E ratio). LNTINTPER is log 
(proportion of institutional ownership of company). 1STPER is the proportion of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. LNTPER is log (proportion of tradable shares of company). DUAC is the dummy that there is audit 
committee in company =1, otherwise =0. DUCC is the dummy that if there is compensation committee in company =1, 
otherwise =0. DUNC is the dummy that if there is nomination committee in company =1, otherwise =0. LNBSIE is log 
(number of members of board of directors). ROLESEP is the dummy that if CEO separated from Chairman =1, 
otherwise=0. LNSSIE is log (number of members of supervisory board). INDPER is the proportion of independent 
directors of board. DUREFORM is the dummy that the data is pre-reform = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Dependent variable: CARs(C) 
  M1 M2 M3 
Firm size  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.441) (-0.407) (-0.378) 
Ownership concentration 0.016 0.015 0.004 
  (0.276) (0.252) (0.062) 
State ownership  0.067 0.066 0.057 
  (0.898) (0.882) (0.758) 
institutional ownership -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.121) (-0.235) (-0.476) 
tradable shares 0.034 0.031 0.022 
  (1.250) (1.127) (0.797) 
Size of BOD 0.039 0.038 0.037 
  (1.058) (1.026) (1.004) 
Independence of BOD -0.021 -0.028 -0.036 
  (-0.144) (-0.194) (-0.249) 
Leadership of BOD -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 
  (-0.847) (-0.762) (-0.750) 
Audit committee -0.052 
 
  
  (-3.223) 
 
  
Compensation committee   -0.037   
    (-2.346)***   
Nomination committee   
 
-0.004 
    
 
(-0.256) 
Size of BOS -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 
  (-0.583) (-0.543) (-0.534) 
Market reform -0.110 -0.102 -0.089 
  (-6.136) (-5.776)*** (-5.167)*** 
C 0.124 0.110 0.083 
  (0.858) (0.759) (0.570) 
R² 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Adj.  R² 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Value of t-test is in the bracket.  Where * is the 10% significance level, ** is the 5% significance level, and *** is 1% 
significance level. 
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